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1 Introduction
The use of markets and payments for environmental services is a topic gaining increasing
attention amongst policy-makers and environment and development practitioners around the
globe. Simply put, the term ‘environmental services’ can be taken to refer to the overall
concept of natural systems providing a continuous flow of valuable goods and services to
society. This is in contrast to similar services provided by man-made physical infrastructure
and technological capital (i.e. water treatment, artificial fertilization, genetic modification) for
which these environmental services are a substitute. The use of market mechanisms as a
means of incorporating the economic value of these environmental services into the financial
decision-making of producers and consumers is an additional tool that can be employed to
resolve longstanding market failures that lead to less than desirable economic outcomes – i.e.
having fewer environmental services and paying more for their man-made substitutes.
In the developing world, Costa Rica has led efforts to experiment with the application of
these mechanisms, many of which were simply ideas on paper just a few years ago. A survey
of markets for environmental services by IIED highlights the formative role Costa Rica has
played and provides a rich characterization of the economics of these initiatives in a global
context (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). As a complementary effort, this paper digs deeper
into the literature regarding the Costa Rica experience in an effort to see what we are learning
from the experience: how has technical, scientific and economic information on
environmental services fed into these initiatives? To what extent are these initial experiences
being monitored and evaluated? Is there a feedback loop that connects these experiences with
learning about environment and development issues, particularly in the local context of
policy-making within the country?
The principal objective of the literature review is to identify and review documents and other
material that address the following:
1. the local origins of the concept of payments and markets for environmental services and
how they have developed over time, particularly in relation to the broader international
development of the concept and local necessities/realities (historical and trend analysis);
2. the types of existing initiatives related to markets for environmental services, and who is
participating in such initiatives (descriptive work);
3. the knowledge base that underpins market development, i.e. the extent to which markets
are based on specific scientific and technical knowledge regarding the biophysical,
economic and social relationships involved as opposed to general views on the subject
(critical assessment);
4. the initiatives undertaken and underway to date with respect to the monitoring and
evaluation of the experience with payments and markets for environmental services and
to what extent (and with what results) the literature assesses these initiatives in terms of
economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, and social equity and/or poverty
reduction.
Where written material is not available or does not provide comprehensive coverage,
interviews with those involved in these initiatives were used to supplement the documentary
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evidence. Given that IIED has undertaken a thorough review of the global literature on this
topic and identified the examples emerging from Costa Rica, objectives 1 and 2 draw heavily
on the existing IIED work by attempting to cross-check, confirm and, where possible, expand
the coverage (in number and depth) of existing cases of markets and payments. The added
value of the literature review will be in the deepening of the knowledge base and analysis of
its content with respect to objectives 3 and 4. This in turn provides a basis for charting a way
forward.
The paper is organized to cover the objectives one by one. In the first chapter the local
origins of the concept of markets and payments for environmental services in Costa Rica is
explored. The paper then turns to the experiences (or market cases) gained so far in the
country, providing in each of the succeeding chapters a description and review of each of the
cases, an assessment of the role of knowledge in the development and formulation of the
initiatives and a report on monitoring and evaluation underway to date. The paper concludes
by drawing out some of the lessons learned and making recommendations regarding practical
steps that other countries, researchers and financing organizations might take to improve the
process of launching such initiatives in the future.
1.1

References (Chapter 1)

Landell-Mills, N., and I. Porras. 2002. Silver bullet or fools' gold: A global review of markets
for forest environmental services and their impacts on the poor. London: International
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).
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2 Local origins of payments and markets for environmental
services
Pagos por servicios ambientales or ‘payments for environmental services’ (PES) as set forth
and defined in the Forestry Law of 1996 defines new terminology for Costa Rica. It also
marks an important international milestone with respect to the development of policies that
promote efforts to convert the economic value of environmental services as received and
perceived by consumers into financial incentives targeted to the producers of these services.
However, viewed in historical context it can be seen as a result of an evolving national
concept of how to use markets and payments to ensure the provision of the products and
services that ecosystems – not just forest ecosystems – provide to human society. In this
section the origins and precedents in this regard are explored, focusing primarily on a number
of key ingredients that have led not only to an established legal definition of the term PES,
but also to a more unconstrained exploration of the concept in the context of forests,
environmental services, and biodiversity.
Indeed, in drawing lessons from the Costa Rican experience it is important not to fall into the
trap of believing that the system of PES now in place either represents the totality of the
Costa Rican experience with the larger concept of markets for environmental services, or that
the legal definition of environmental services is one that should automatically be replicated
elsewhere. Thus throughout the paper an effort is made to distinguish between the legally
established confines of the PES term and the larger conceptual ambit of the concept of
markets for environmental services. While markets for environmental services is in itself an
ambiguous and difficult term, it is taken to refer to the larger effort to employ market
mechanisms to resolve externality problems with respect to the provision of environmental
services (Aylward 2002).
2.1

Environmental services and the evolution of markets for their provision

Environmental services have been recognized for a long time in Costa Rica, although clearly
the attention they have received, both locally and internationally, has increased in the last 20
years. The environmental service that has the longest history of formal recognition is the
service of watershed protection. One of the earliest official acknowledgements dates back to
1888, when a decree was passed declaring a 2-km wide strip on the sides of Barva Volcano as
state-owned land, which could not be appropriated by any individual. The area was
considered of public interest because the streams and springs that supplied drinking water to
the towns of Alajuela and Heredia had their headwaters on the slopes of the volcano (Watson
et al. 1998).
Although some protected areas were instituted in the early 1900s,1 recognition of biodiversity
and scenic landscapes is a more recent development, beginning in the 1970s with the
establishment of the country’s system of national parks, biological reserves and other
protected areas. By 1999, the 120 protected areas in the country covered 1.2 million hectares,
which represented 24.8 per cent of the national territory (see Table 2.1). In the early stages,
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“Poas Volcano entered the system in 1913, and the summits of all volcanoes were declared national parks in
1955” (de Camino et al. 2000).
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Costa Rica closely followed the institutional model of the United States, in which separate
institutions manage wildlife, forestry, and national parks. During the 1980s and 1990s the
system of protected areas evolved as the main mechanism to preserve biodiversity. In 1995
the entire country was divided into ‘conservation areas’, 11 in all, effectively uniting these
protected areas with surrounding multiple use areas in recognition of the interlinkages in
terms of environmental services provided to economic activities in surrounding areas.2 The
three services – wildlife, forestry and parks – were then merged and operations decentralized
to these conservation areas. Changes to the areas under protection, by category, during the
1990s are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.1. Historical evolution of protected areas in Costa Rica, 1955 to present
Year
1955
1990
1997
1999

Percentage of National Territory in
Protected Areas
0.05%
16.8%
23.8%
24.8%

Source: Adapted from de Camino et al. (2000)

Table 2.2. Changes in the number and area of protected areas in Costa Rica, 1991-1997
Type of Protected
Area
National Park
Biological Reserve
National Monument
Forestry Reserve
Protected Zone
Wildlife Refuge
Wetland
Total

1991
No. of sites
Area (Ha)
14
465,698
7
17,653
1
217
13
No data
21
No data
9
No data
0
No data
65
1,094,413

1993
No. of sites
Area (Ha)
20
505,484
8
30,482
1
217
9
312,930
27
188,350
9
117,483
0
0
74
1,154,945

1997
No. of sites
Area (Ha)
24
541,576
9
39,644
1
217
12
291,513
31
178,677
39
181,018
14
50,465
132
1,284,543

Source: MINAE (http://www.minae.go.cr/estrategia/Inf_Pais/labor_art8_a1.htm)

By the early 1990s tourism had surpassed coffee and bananas as the country’s number one
earner of foreign exchange, the National Biodiversity Institute (INBio) had signed its famous
$1 million contract for biochemical prospecting with Merck, Sharpe and Dohme, Inc. and
‘green’ product certification efforts were well underway by the Rainforest Alliance and other
actors. In 1994 the government raised the entrance fee to national parks for foreigners to $15
(from $1), again reflecting Costa Rica’s position as an early adopter of the concept of
creating markets for environmental services and applying the principle of ‘user pays.’ During
this same period Costa Rica had taken a leading role in the field of Activities Implemented
Jointly, which allowed the country to capture funds from developed countries to invest in
actions within Costa Rica that would contribute to the reduction of atmospheric greenhouse
gases. By 1994 Costa Rica had established the Costa Rican Joint Implementation Office
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Executive Decree No. 24652-MIRENEM established the framework for the operations of the National System
of Conservation Areas (SINAC).
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(OCIC), a government office responsible for climate change negotiations and the government
counterpart for potential projects, shortly thereafter developing a series of climate change
mitigation projects in the fields of energy and land use.
So, by the mid-1990s there was in Costa Rica an increasingly widespread appreciation of the
linkages between environmental services and the economy, particularly among a growing
clique of environmental policy-makers and entrepreneurs. The adoption, experimentation and
nationalization of these concepts emerged from a familiarity with international ‘best practice’
in the application of economic tools to the environment, as well as from Costa Rica’s own
growing empirical database of valuation studies. In Section 4 the question of the precise role
of empirical work and, in particular, economic valuation in this evolution is taken up again.
For the moment it is sufficient to stress that prior to the advent of the term PES as coined in
the Forestry Law of 1996, the concept of markets and payments for environmental services
was well known – even if it was not referred to as such.
Still, the proximate forces that drove the development of the term PES in the Forestry Law of
1996 came from the forestry sector and these are reviewed in more detail below. Indeed, it
could be said that the majority of the early initiatives focused on providing new sources of
financial flows to officially designated protected areas (prospecting activities, entrance fees,
carbon sales for locking up forest in protected areas) and that the migration and
transformation of the general concept to the forestry sector, where land is privately managed,
was a natural and inevitable extension of the concept to new and fertile ground.
2.2

Incentives for the forest sector

Economic incentives for the reforestation sector were first established in the original Forestry
Law of Costa Rica. The law was passed in 1969 but the incentives entered into operation
only in 1979. Initially the incentive was intended as a means to promote tree planting
through credits that would benefit medium and small size landowners (Camacho et al., 2000).
However, the government opted for actions that would give tax credits to those who pay
income taxes, which excludes many if not most of rural landholders. A fixed amount of
16,000 colones per hectare (equivalent to US$2,000) was set as the income tax credit
(Camacho et al., 2000). This amount was expected to compensate for the expenses incurred
in establishing and maintaining a forestry plantation. The incentive was later modified in
1979, 1984 and 1985, mostly by increasing the amount of the income tax credit. 3
The 1980s saw the development of additional economic incentives, all aimed at promoting
reforestation activities. These included:
•

Soft credits, established in 1983. The credits had an 8 per cent interest rate4, a 10-year
grace period and repayment periods of up to 30 years.

•

Certificate of Forestry Payment (CAF), established with the second forestry law
(No.7032) in 1986. The CAFs were tax-exempt, transferable state bonds that could be

3

Decrees No.10521-AH of September 1979; No.15308-MAG-H of February 1984; and No.16640-MAG-H of
September 1985.

4

As a comparison, in 1983 credits (in colones) for agriculture, coffee, and silvicultural activities had an annual
interest rate of 28.5% (Banco Central de Costa Rica, 2002).
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used to pay any tax obligation to the government. In order to access the CAF a
landowner would be required to make an up front investment in the plantation before
receiving any financial compensation.
•

Certificate of Advanced Forestry Payment (CAFA), was also established in 1986 by the
second forestry law. The difference between the CAF and the CAFA was that the CAFA
was aimed at landowners who could not cover the entire up front investment in a
plantation. In order to qualify for the CAFA, the landowner was expected to be part of a
farmer cooperative, reside where the plantation was to be developed, and be farming a
parcel of less than 25 hectares.

•

Fund for Municipalities and Organizations, set up in 1986 was intended to support the
establishment of reforestation projects and nurseries.

•

A reduction in the taxes on capital goods was another tax break incentive.

Needless to say, landowners preferred the subsidies, such as the CAF and CAFA, to the soft
credits as the latter had to be repaid.
In the 1990s a second set of subsidies and incentives aimed at managing natural forests for
timber production or conserving them were developed. These included:
•

Certificate of Payment for Natural Forest Management (CAFMA), approved in 1994, was
a subsidy for extracting timber from natural forests. A management plan was required.

•

Certificate of Forest Protection (CPB), approved in 1995, was a subsidy to conserve
natural forests on private lands.

These incentives were in effect for only a short period when they were superseded by those
introduced under the third forestry law.
The incentives listed above are well documented in the literature (Segura and Solorzano
1995; Watson et al. 1998; Chomitz et al. 1998; de Camino et al. 2000; Camacho et al. 2000;
Cruz and Navarrete 2000; Mejias et al. 2000a; Mejias et al. 2000b). Analysis of the
effectiveness of these subsides and their social, environmental and economic impacts is
however limited. Many of these documents simply focus on comprehensively describing the
different incentives and on documenting the coverage attained by these programmes.
Conclusions on the utility of these programmes are, therefore, typically drawn on first
principles and received wisdom rather than any substantive empirical analysis. No evidence
of any formal survey work with those participating (or not participating) in the programmes
appears in the papers reviewed, with the exception of Camacho et al. (2001). This is a point
that is worth re-emphasizing later in this paper.
2.3

Payments for forest environmental services

In 1996 the third (No.7575) and most recent forestry law was approved in Costa Rica.
International pressure for Costa Rica to eliminate the existing subsidies – particularly from
the International Monetary Fund – had been mounting since the early 1990s (Watson et al.,
1998). At the time the new forestry law was passed, the government was negotiating the
structural adjustment programme with the World Bank, which required the elimination of
subsidies to the productive sectors, including the forestry sector (Camacho et al. 2000).
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However, 17 years of subsidies to the forestry sector had allowed room for the creation of an
influential institutional framework to support and lobby in favour of the forestry sector’s
interests. These groups exerted pressure and opposed the complete elimination of forestry
subsidies.
These proximate variables, including
•
•
•
•

the development of forestry incentives in Costa Rica,
the transition to give subsidies to forest conservation in addition to reforestation,
the pressure from international financial institutions to eliminate subsidies,
the internal pressure to keep the forestry subsidies,

when combined with the broader expectations for market opportunities associated with
INBio, climate change, ecotourism and certification all served as a basis for the legal
definition of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) that emerged in the Forestry Law
of 1996. The law creates a financial mechanism and the institutional structure to compensate
private forest owners for the services provided by forest as a land use. According to von
Platen (1999: 24,27), with the forestry law’s definition of environmental services:
“Costa Rica directly and legally recognizes that forests produce benefits (services) other
than the traditionally traded forest products (timber and other traded items). Indirectly,
the Law recognizes as well that those benefits are enjoyed by people other than the forest
owners, like urban and rural water consumers, scientists, tourists, and those who do
business in tourism, and mankind as a whole by mitigating the negative effects of
greenhouse gases”
The law recognizes four services provided by forests: watershed protection, scenic beauty,
carbon fixation/sequestration, and biodiversity conservation. The official PES scheme is a
system that pays forest owners, in effect, for producing this bundle of four environmental
services.
According to Camacho et al. (2000) it was argued that private forest lands provide beneficial
externalities to society, and those costs should be internalized through the PES. This is a
fairly straightforward interpretation of environmental economic theory, one that has not
always easily found an application in policy and law. Clearly in this case, theory dovetailed
quite well with the forces of political economy shaping the relationship between the forest
sector – which was alarmed at the possibility of losing access to the existing set of subsidies –
and politicians.
Although the PES scheme of the National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO) is the
official attempt to create a market for environmental services, there have been other efforts to
buy and sell environmental services, or simply to invest in preserving ecosystems to maintain
their services in the long run. Many of these alternatives employ economic, market or
financing mechanisms, which differ in form and nature from the PES approach. These
include grass roots level actions such as cases where communities have purchased forestland
to protect a natural spring, i.e. land purchase as a tool to vertical integration. Others, like the
voluntary contract between La Esperanza hydropower project and the Monteverde
Conservation League (Rojas and Aylward 2001), are fully private agreements that explicitly
mention the economic compensation for environmental services. Thus, while the PES scheme
clearly is very instructive, the general trend towards experimentation has encouraged a series
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of complementary approaches to developing markets and payments for environmental
services.
2.4

References (Chapter 2)

Aylward, B. 2002. Market Mechanisms and Environmental Services: A Conceptual Approach
and Review of International Experience. Report for the project on the Integrated
Management of Natural Resources and the Environment in the Western Highlands of
Guatemala (MIRNA). Guatemala City, Guatemala.
Banco Central de Costa Rica. 2002. Tasas de interés que los bancos aplican en las
operaciones activas de todos sus departamentos (porcentajes a diciembre de cada año):
1973-1985. Table provided by the Central Bank of Costa Rica via email on April 17, 2002.
Camacho, María Antonieta, Olman Segura, Virginia Reyes, Alejandra Aguilar. 2000. Pago
por Servicios Ambientales, Punto Focal: Costa Rica. Proyecto PRISMA-FORD, preparado
por CAMBIOS (Cambio Social, Biodiversidad y Sostenibilidad) y CINPE (Centro
Internacional de Política Económica para el Desarrollo Sostenible). San José, Costa Rica.
Camacho, María Antonieta, Olman Segura, Virginia Reyes, Miriam Miranda. 2001. Gestión
local y participación en torno al pago por servicios ambientales: Estudios de caso en Costa
Rica. Proyecto PRISMA-FORD, preparado por CAMBIOS (Cambio Social, Biodiversidad y
Sostenibilidad) y CINPE (Centro Internacional de Política Económica para el Desarrollo
Sostenible), San Jose, Costa Rica.
Chomitz, K., E. Brenes and L. Constantino. Financing Environmental Services: The Costa
Rican Experience. The World Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Region, Central America
Country Management Unit. Economic Notes. Washington DC: World Bank.
Cruz, Ginette and Gilmar Navarrete. 2000. Los bosques y el servicio ambiental de
protección del recurso hídrico en Costa Rica. San Jose, Costa Rica: FONAFIFO.
de Camino, Ronnie, Olman Segura, Luis Guillermo Arias and Isaac Pérez. 2000. Forest
Policy and the Evolution of Land Use: An Evaluation of Costa Rica’s Forest Development
and World Bank Assistance. Operations Evaluation Department. Washington DC: World
Bank.
Mejías, Ronald, Edwin Alpízar, Vicente Watson, Raúl Solórzano, and Jaime Echeverría.
2000b. Análisis Beneficio-Costo de los Servicios Ambientales en Costa Rica: Tres Estudios
de Caso, preparado para el Proyecto Ecomercados. San José, Costa Rica: Centro Científico
Tropical.
Mejías, Ronald, Jaime Echeverría, and Raúl Solórzano. 2000a. Incentivos para la
Conservacion de Tierras Privadas en Centroamerica. San Jose, Costa Rica: Programa de
Economía Ambiental, Centro Científico Tropical (CCT) y CEDARENA.
Rojas, Manrique and Bruce Aylward. 2002. The Case of La Esperanza: a Small, Private,
Hydropower Producer and a Conservation NGO in Costa Rica. FAO’s Land Water
Linkages in Rural Watersheds Case Study Series. www.fao.org/landandwater/watershed.

8

Segura, O. and R. Solórzano. 1995. Instrumentos Económicos para la Protección de Cuencas
Hidrográficas: El Caso de Costa Rica. CREED Costa Rica Notas Técnicas No. 3. San José:
Centro Científico Tropical.
Von Platen, Henning. 1999. "Payments for environmental services: a new slogan for old
incentives or a new economic concept?” GFA (Gesellschaft fur Agrarprojekte) Natural
Resources Management between Economic Development and Nature Conservation:
Experiences from Development Projects in Asia, Latin America and Africa.
Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk Kiel KG. p. 21-30. GFA-Studien (Germany), no. 4.
Watson, Vicente, Sonia Cervantes, Cesar Castro, Leonardo Mora, Magda Solis, Ina T. Porras
and Beatriz Cornejo. 1998. Making Space for Better Forestry: Costa Rica Country Study.
Policy that Works for Forests and People Series No: 6. London: International Institute for
Environment and Development.

9

3 Review and summary of Costa Rican market initiatives
The cases of market initiatives for environmental services developed in Costa Rica can be
grouped in a number of ways. One option is to group experiences by the type of economic
mechanisms employed (Aylward 2002; Bayon et al. 2000; Landell-Mills and Porras 2002;
Panayotou 1995; Powell et al. 2002; Spergel 2001; WCPA and IUCN 2000). Another option
is to group the cases by the type of environmental (or ecosystem) service involved, for which
there are also a number of classification options – one being the definition of environmental
service proffered by the Costa Rican Forestry Law and another that proposed for use under
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Law No.7575; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MA) 2002). Aylward (2002) reviews the Costa Rican classification, as well as that proposed
by the MA, and concludes that neither is fully up to the task of categorizing the
environmental services that are subject to market failure. The MA approach builds on
previous categorizations offered by natural scientists (Daily 1997; de Groot 2002; Costanza et
al. 1997). As a consequence it is an extensive list that focuses on a functional grouping of
ecosystem services rather than on the economic aspects of these services. Thus, it may not be
a useful structure to group the lesser number of services that have significant economic value
subject to market failure and, are therefore being approached from an economic and
behavioural perspective.
The Costa Rican approach is more intuitive, with the exception of the scenic beauty category,
which can be confusing – given that the economic activity associated with scenery, is tourism
and recreation. Some aspects of scenic beauty are clearly landscape or geological features
rather than of biological or ecological origin, and have little to do with the concept of
environmental services subject to market failure. Where the attraction of scenic beauty that
draws visitors is biologically based it often has to do with biodiversity, which is already
defined as having species and ecosystem levels. So a tourist that enjoys visiting Costa Rica
because it has 13 different life zones all in a small geographic space could be said to be
enjoying the scenic beauty of the diversity of ecosystems that the country possesses. Thus, if
scenic beauty is left out (or incorporated under biodiversity) then the Costa Rican
classification is effectively reduced to hydrological services, climate change services and
biodiversity. This provides a fairly useful way to group the initiatives underway in Costa
Rica and dovetails quite well with the framework proposed by Aylward (see Table 3.1). As
the discussion here revolves around forest environmental services and does not include the
issue of environmental services from agroecological landscapes, the categories of biological
resources and soil fertility are less relevant for the purposes of this paper. The exception is
the use of non-timber forest products (NTFPs). Market failure issues regarding the
commercial exploitation of NTFPs or their subsistence use are less prevalent in Costa Rica
given its very small forest-dwelling population and its status as a post-frontier economy.
Thus, the initiatives are grouped according to whether they involve biodiversity, climate
change services, hydrological services, or represent a bundling of a number of services across
these categories. As noted earlier there have been other initiatives aimed at preserving
ecosystems for the functions they provide. However, many of these are not “market”
initiatives but regulatory measures – such as the creation of protected areas – and are
therefore not included here.
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Table 3.1 Environmental functions and services of forests
Environmental Functions

Environmental Services

•

•

Primary production

Biological resources (i.e. goods or “provisioning
services”)

•

Nutrient (biogeochemical) cycle

•

Soil fertility

•

Hydrological cycle

•

Hydrological services

• Atmospheric regulation
Biological and Cultural Diversity

• Climate change, ozone
Diversity Products, services and attributes

•

Genetic diversity

•

Bioprospecting

•

Flora, fauna and natural landscapes

•

•

Ecosystem diversity

Tourism, Recreation, Scenic Beauty, Existence
Values

•

Ecological services, such as pollination or filtration
services

Source: Aylward (2002)

3.1

Biodiversity5

As indicated above, efforts to conserve biodiversity in Costa Rica date back to the late 1960s
when the first Forestry Law was passed, followed in the 1970s by the introduction of
formally protected areas. In 1989 the creation of the National Institute of Biodiversity
(INBio) expanded the notion of biodiversity protection to one of conservation, defined by
INBio as “studying, knowing and using biodiversity”. Table 3.2 summarizes the initiatives
with respect to the market for payments for forest environmental services identified through
the review of the literature. A brief description and summary of each initiative is provided
below.

5

Defined by the 1996 Forestry Law as “Biodiversity protection to conserve and use it sustainably for scientific,
pharmaceutical, research, genetic improvement, and ecosystem protection purposes.”
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Table 3.2 Markets and Payments for Biodiversity in Costa Rica
Project/commodity

Status

Reference

1. Bioprospecting
A. Bioprospecting contracts:
(i) National Biodiversity Implemented beginning in Aylward et al (1993), Aylward (1993); Espinoza et
Institute (INBio)
1991
al. (1999); Onaga (2001); Mulholland and Wilman,
(1997); Reid et al. (1993); Sittenfeld et al (1999);
Sittenfeld and Lovejoy (1999) and many more
2. Tourism, Recreation and
Scenic Beauty
A. Differentiated entrance
fees:
(i) SPN: public protected
areas
(ii) private reserves (e.g.
Monteverde)
B. Transfer payments for
scenic beauty: Pro Rios
3. Ecological Services
A. Transfer payments for
forest pest and disease
control services
(i) Del Oro
4.

Bundled Biodiversity
Services
A. ODA and GEF funding:
(1) Ecomarkets project

Implemented in 1994

Baldares and Laarman (1991), Aylward et al. (1996),
Chase (1995); Lindberg and Aylward (1999)
Implemented since at least Aylward (1996)
early 1990s
Suspended proposal
Aguilar (2001)

Proposed in 1998 –
cancelled in 1999

Janzen (1999), Rainforest Alliance (1998), Araya
(1997), Pizkulich (1999),

Approved in 2000

World Bank (2000a),
www4.worldbank.org/sprojects/project.asp?pid=P05
2009

3.1.1 Bioprospecting Contracts: National Institute of Biodiversity (INBio)6
INBio is a not-for-profit research organization created by a group of Costa Rican and foreign
scientists. According to Mulholland and Wilman (1997), “… initially their goals were to
conserve and catalogue all of the genetic resources located in the country.” There was,
however, more than this to the work. In 1991 INBio signed a highly publicized
bioprospecting agreement with Merck, Sharpe and Dohme, Inc., a major US pharmaceutical
company, setting an important precedent for developing countries interested in financing
biodiversity conservation.
As suggested by Chapela (1997) the “INBio-Merck agreement has been the subject of intense
scrutiny and is hailed by many as the benchmark of modern bioprospecting.” In the early to
mid-1990s a large body of literature emerged on the INBio case. Much of the work was
descriptive as analysts attempted to understand the INBio “model” and determine its
replicability. The work included papers by foreigners as well as Costa Ricans. In the latter

6

Bioprospecting is the use of biodiversity in the search for commercial genetic resources and chemical
compounds.
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case a number of key players in the early years at INBio produced overview papers in an
effort to educate and promote (and correct misinterpretations regarding) the INBio experience
in response to demand from international institutions and other biodiverse tropical countries
(Sittenfeld et al. 1999; Janzen 1999; Onaga 2001). A smaller subset of the literature examined
the value of bioprospecting as a market mechanism for generating resources for conservation,
both in the case of INBio and more generally. This literature is taken up in Chapter 4. While
INBio’s activities in capturing the value of biodiversity are related below, it is important to
stress that the bulk of the literature concerns the early years. A comprehensive set of
information on INBio’s activities in prospecting is not generally available and was not
provided by INBio when requested as part of this study. This is justified because of the
confidentiality of the bioprospecting agreements. Cevallos (2000) reports that by the end of
2000, INBio had signed 12 bioprospecting agreements. Camacho et al. (2000) provide
similar numbers. In the absence of a current account from INBio itself the cited sources are
used in compiling the summary of INBio’s bioprospecting agreements and activities provided
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Bioprospecting agreements at INBio
Partners and Projects
Activity
Merck, Sharp and Dohme, Inc
screening of plants, insects and microbiological samples for biochemical activity
ICDG
chemical prospecting in a conservation area
Givaudan Roure
fragrance and aroma extraction
Btg-Ecos-La Pacifica
development of a nematicide
Chagas Project
research
Strathclyde University
search for compounds with pharmaceutical application
Phytera Inc
plant cell culture
Diversa
search for enzymes from extremophylic organisms
University Of Massachusetts
search for potential insecticides
CRUSA Foundation
validation of promising plants
Indena S.P.A.
search for natural products with pharmaceutical and agricultural applications
Eli Lilly
search for natural products with pharmaceutical and agricultural applications
Akkadix
search for proteins with nematicide properties
Source: Camacho et al. (2000) and INBio Annual Reports

The INBio-Merck agreement called for INBio to provide Merck with plant, insect and
microbiological samples that could be tested for biological activity against Merck’s
proprietary screens. The extent of INBio’s involvement varied with the type of sample. In
the case of plants, INBio collected, identified and catalogued the species and, received from
Merck the equipment to process the samples into extracts. In the case of microbiological
samples, Merck scientists undertook the collection directly (simply the collection of soil
samples). From Merck’s end the arrangement included up-front payments to INBio for
samples, training opportunities for Costa Rican scientists at Merck facilities and through
collaborative projects with Costa Rican universities, transfer of processing technologies to
INBio, and royalty arrangements developed in the event of marketable pharmaceuticals
resulting from the collaboration. For its part, INBio undertook the collection, taxonomy and
processing of samples to Merck’s specifications. INBio also collaborated with other scientific
institutions in the country to take advantage of the capacity-building provisions of the
agreement.
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There were hiccups of course (as when the National Museum withdrew its offer to locate the
national plant collection at INBio, requiring INBio to develop its own plant reference
collection), but in general the INBio-Merck deal emerged as a full-blown example that
covered most elements, and as a result immediately became known as best practice in the
field of bioprospecting – a field that saw a rapid re-emergence in the early 1990s (Reid et al.
1993).
INBio’s experience is probably the first successful case in the context of a developing
country where a significant financial return to biodiversity has been implemented through
bioprospecting contracts. This has given INBio a very high profile internationally. INBio
received approximately $1.3 million in support of its infrastructure in the first two-year
contract with Merck. Approximately 10 per cent of this sum (USS$100,000) was channelled
to the Environment Ministry and the National Park Service under a formal agreement
developed between INBio and the Environment Ministry. This agreement also stipulated that
50 per cent of any royalties earned from eventual commercial products would be shared with
the Park Service as well. Clearly the INBio-Merck agreement played a large role in shaping
INBio’s policies and future agreements on bioprospecting. As stated by Sittenfeld and
Lovejoy (1999):
“The set of criteria used by INBio to define its research agreements includes access,
equity, transfer of technology, and training. Agreements stipulate that 10 per cent of
research budgets and 50 per cent of any future royalties be awarded to MINAE for
investment in conservation.”
The precise percentage of the agreed-upon royalty for commercial products resulting from the
agreement was kept confidential. The bulletin GRAIN (1999) reported a value of 5 per cent,
but sources inside and outside of INBio state that this would be far beyond established
bounds for the proportion of value added by INBio. As the royalties will naturally be specific
to an individual contract and depend on the contribution to the overall R&D effort made by
INBio, these royalty rates are likely to vary from one agreement to the next.
3.1.2 Site entrance fees: flora, fauna and natural landscapes
Over the years Costa Rica has developed a large and varied system of protected areas. While
many of the principal attractions for tourists and recreationalists are the parks and reserves
managed by the public sector, there is also a significant number of (smaller) private reserves
that, in many cases, subsist on the tourist trade. De Camino et al. (2000) suggests that the
network of private reserves that has developed in the country may total 250,000 hectares in
area, or some 5 per cent of the national territory. As “ecotourism” grew in the late 1980s and
into the 1990s (see Figure 3.1), increasing interest in policy circles centred around capturing
more of the tourists’ supposed willingness-to-pay through entrance fees – as a means of
providing finance for conservation of these same areas.
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Figure 3.1 Foreign tourists visiting Costa Rica 1983-1998 by region of origin
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As elsewhere, national park funding levels in Costa Rica have not always kept up with
increases in the number of parks or visitors, and entrance fees have been increased partly in
response to these financial pressures. The first fees to be charged were instituted in 1972 and,
at around $0.10, represented little more than a token inconvenience to the tourist (see Table
3.4 for entrance fee levels over time). Baldares and Laarman (1991) report that a working
group was formed by the National Parks Service of Costa Rica in 1989 to revise entrance
fees. At the time, fees for both residents and non-residents (foreign tourists) were just 25
colones or from $0.20 to $0.30 at exchange rates prevailing in the late 1980s. Subsequently
rates for foreigners were raised to 100 colones ($1.18) in 1990. Steady devaluation of the
colón in the 1990s gradually reduced the dollar equivalent of entrance fees, resulting in a
doubling of the fee to 200 colones in 1992.
Nevertheless, when a new government took office in May of 1994 the dollar value of the
entrance fee was just $1.28. As part of that administration’s plan to promote sustainable
development in Costa Rica, non-resident fees for entry to all the protected areas were raised
to $15 on September 1, 1994. The resulting backlash from the industry, media, local
communities and tourists led to two concessions. The first concession was that tourists could
purchase entrance in advance (for specific parks) for the reduced fee of $10. This concession
had little effect as it required tourists to find their way to the National Park Service
headquarters in downtown San José, a not inconsequential task. The tourist industry also
succeeded in obtaining a reduced price of $5 for tourists on package tours. This exception
was intended to be temporary, and was designed to provide agencies with time to raise
package prices. However, as noted in Chase et al. (1998), a black market developed in these
$5 tickets, such that their use was not confined to visitors on tours.
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Table 3.4 Entrance Fees to Costa Rican National Parks 1972 to 1997
Beginning
1972
1978
1982
1984
1985
1986
1990 (April)
1991 (August)
1992 (August)
1994 (September)

Residents
Colones
1
2
5
10
20
25
50
100
200
200

US$
0.11
0.23
0.13
0.21
0.39
0.44
0.59
0.80
1.57
1.27

1995 (July)

200

1.12

1996 (April)

200

0.98

Colones
1
2
5
10
20
25
100
100
200

Non-Residents
US$
0.11
0.23
0.13
0.21
0.39
0.44
1.18
0.80
1.57
At gate: 15
Advanced purchase: 10
Travel agencies: 5
At gate: 15
Advanced purchase: 5, 7, or 10
Travel agencies: 5
4-entry pass: 29
6

Source: Lindberg and Aylward (1999) as developed from Chase et al. (1998); MINAE (1998). Also checked
against Reyes and Cordoba, 1999.

In 1995, a pass was created that allowed visits to four parks for $29. In July 1995, the fee was
further revised and included differential pricing across parks, based on visitation levels, for
advance purchase tickets (the three case study parks were all in the most expensive group, at
$10). However, that fee structure was changed again in April 1996, to a daily fee for
foreigners of $6 applied at all parks. Fees have remained at this level since that time.
In the private sector, each reserve maintains its own fee schedules, depending on various
factors including its clientele, location, services and attractions. While there is no
comprehensive listing of these fees, the experience at one of Costa Rica’s most frequently
visited destinations – the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve – provides an indication of the
opportunities that exist for charging differentiated “user” fees at well-managed private
protected areas that offer a true natural history experience (Aylward 1996). At Monteverde
prices are reviewed regularly and adjusted as necessary. Table 3.5 reports on pricing at the
reserve in recent years showing that some time before the parks system introduced its price
hikes, foreigners were paying substantially higher prices at Monteverde than locals. For nonstudents prices have ranged from $8 to $16 depending on whether the tourists arrive
independently or as part of a package tour.
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Table 3.5 Entrance fees at Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve, 1992-2000
Foreigners:
Foreigners:
Package Tour
Self-Drive
colones US$ colones US$
1992
1100 7.98 1100
7.98
1993
1100 7.70 1100
7.70
1994
16.00 1200
7.74
1996
16.00
8.00
1997
16.00
8.00
1998
16.00
8.00
1999 (Jan)
11.00
8.50
1999 (June)
11.25
8.75
2000
11.25
8.75

Foreign Students
colones
550
550
600

US$
3.99
3.85
3.87
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.50
4.75
4.75

Residents
Colones
250
250
250
250

US$
1.81
1.75
1.61
3.00
3.00
3.25
3.25
3.25

Resident
Students
colones US$
125
0.91
125
0.88
125
0.81
125
1.50
1.50
1.75
1.75
1.75

Source: CCT unpublished data gathered by the authors

3.1.3 Transfer payments for scenic beauty: ProRios
In another initiative a non-profit association named ProRios, formed by a number of rafting
companies, explored the possibility of signing a contract with FONAFIFO to develop PES
contracts for forest conservation with landholders along the riverbanks where whitewater
rafting tours take place. This was because it was expected that rafters would prefer to take
trips down a river surrounded by “jungle” instead of cropland. However, no agreement was
reached. The main drawback may have been the difficulty with cooperation between
companies, as no one rafting company can hold an exclusive concession on the river.
Therefore, other companies – or new entrants – could free-ride on payments made by
ProRios.
One of the companies leading the initiative, Rios Tropicales, subsequently created its own
foundation and began purchasing land along the margins of the Pacuare River. A portion of
this land was subsequently put into the PES scheme in order to provide a return to the land, as
well as to the rafting (Aguilar 2002). The land is also used for a lodge where tourists stop
over to have lunch or spend the night during the whitewater rafting tours. To date, Rios
Tropicales has acquired over 1,000 acres of land in six different properties, a majority of it (>
90 per cent) covered by forest (Esquivel 2002). The areas that were cleared have been
reforested using native tree species. Of the six properties that were purchased, only three are
used for the lodge, while the rest were purchased exclusively for conserving the forest cover
on the margins of the river. Some of the properties have been purchased by Rios Tropicales,
while others have been purchased by Rios Tropicales in conjunction with national and
foreign investors interested in forest conservation (Esquivel 2002).
3.1.4 Ecological services contracts: Del Oro – Guanacaste Conservation Area
On August 24, 1998, the Minister of Environment of Costa Rica signed a contract with Del
Oro Group, an agricultural concern belonging to the CDC (Commonwealth Development
Corporation) of the United Kingdom. Del Oro owns and operates citrus plantations and a
citrus juice plant in north western Costa Rica. Through the contract, Del Oro agreed to
purchase environmental services from a government-owned protected area for a period of 20
years. The payments, which would amount to $480,000, were to be made in kind to the
Guanacaste Conservation Area (ACG), which is located on lands adjacent to the 2,000
hectares of citrus plantations belonging to Del Oro. The contract involved the transfer of
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remnants of forestland on Del Oro’s properties to ACG. The total forestland to be transferred
was 1,200 hectares, valued at $400 per hectare.
Del Oro explicitly stated that they were willing to pay for the environmental services of the
ACG, including biological pest control, water supply, and natural decomposition of citrus
peels from the juice plant. Each component was given a specific value as follows (Rainforest
Alliance, 1998; Contract between Del Oro and the ACG, 1998 in Janzen 1999):
1. Biological control agents coming from the ACG forests (primarily parasitic wasps and
flies of importance to Integrated Pest Control): $1/ha per year for the 1,685 ha of
adjacent Del Oro citrus plantations. For the 20 years of the contract, the total would
be $1,685/year.
2. Technical services of the ACG: $500/day for international consultants and $200/day
for national consultants. Del Oro would pay for a minimum of three days and ten
days, respectively, per year, for the 20 years of this contract, for a minimum of $3,500
of consultant services, irrespective of whether Del Oro uses these services or not.
Additional days would be charged at these same rates.
3. Provision of water to the Del Oro farms: $5/ha/year for the 1,169 ha of the drainage
basin of the Rio Mena that lies in the ACG, for a total of $5,885/year for the 20 years
of this contract. Other minor water sources draining from the ACG into the Del Oro
farms at no cost were not included in this valuation.
4. Biodegredation of orange peels from Del Oro on ACG lands: $11.93/truckload, for a
minimum payment of 1,000 truckloads per year, whether used or not, for a minimum
of $11,930/year for the 20 years of the contract. The ACG would design a 20 ha
Biodiversity Processing Ground (BPG) to the east of Del Oro, at some point in Sector
El Hacha to receive the orange peels. The ACG would select another 20 adjacent
hectares for the peels in the next year, and continue doing this in four-year rotation
cycles for a given PBG. Del Oro agreed to maintain the access road and its bridges to
the BPGs for this 20-year period. Del Oro also agreed to maintain a registry of the
number of truckloads of peel that are deposited at a PBG each year.
5. Rent of a hectare of old pasture within the ACG wildlands far from any orange
plantation or other citrus trees: $1,000/year. The objective was that Del Oro would
plant an arboretum of citrus trees free of diseases, from which they could obtain
material for grafts. The environmental service provided to Del Oro is protection from
pests via isolation. Del Oro would pay for and continue any maintenance associated
with this hectare for protection against any kind of threat. Del Oro agreed to avoid any
pesticide or chemical applications that are toxic to biodiversity in the specified hectare
without first having written permission from the ACG. The ACG had full authority to
deny such permission without affecting the agreement.
6. The biodiversity services and ecosystem services described above are worth $1,685 +
$3,500 + $5,885 + $11,930 + $1,000 = $24,000/year. The 1,200 ha are worth
$480,000. This means that the land that the ACG would receive permanently from
Del Oro is worth 20 years of environmental services.
At the time, supporters of the agreement hailed it as the beginning of a new era of contracts
between farming companies and protected areas that provide services to them, such as
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pollination. Since most protected areas in Costa Rica are surrounded by farmland, it was
believed that the Del Oro-ACG contract could serve as a model in other conservation areas
(Rainforest Alliance, 1998). However, a fierce publicity campaign, initiated by another citrus
processing plant in Costa Rica, questioned the Del Oro-ACG contract. The “competing
orange juice firm, TicoFrut, complained that Del Oro had created a garbage dump in a
national park” (Ellison 2001). The objections to the contract included the potential threat to
public health, pollution to nearby streams through leakage of liquid waste, and damage
caused to the Guanacaste National Park caused by decomposing citrus peelings. The publicity
campaign also appealed to nationalistic sentiments by emphasizing the fact that Del Oro was
owned by the British government, who was “dumping its waste in the Guanacaste National
Park” (La Nación, December 5, 1998, publicity paid by Tico Frut). Promoters of the contract,
on the other hand, argued that the decomposing peelings served as a natural fertilizer for
abandoned pastures in the park, and would help speed up the natural regeneration of forest.
The government cancelled the contract in August 1999 (Ellison 2001), following several
months of controversy and successful legal objections to the project presented to the
Constitutional Court (La Nación, March 26, 1999 and September 5, 1999).
3.1.5 Overseas development assistance and GEF funding: Ecomarkets Project
The Ecomarkets Project is a financial assistance package from the World Bank and Global
Environment Facility (GEF) to the government of Costa Rica to support its Payment for
Environmental Services (PES) scheme. The objective of the project, approved in June 2000,
is to “increase forest conservation in Costa Rica by supporting the development of markets
and private sector providers for environmental services supplied by privately owned forests”
(World Bank 2000b). The main focus of the project is to support biodiversity conservation
by targeting resources to priority areas within the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. The
five-and-a-half-year project is financed by a World Bank loan of $32.6 million to the
government of Costa Rica, a GEF grant of $8 million to the National Forestry Financing
Fund (FONAFIFO), plus counterpart funding of $8.6 million from the government of Costa
Rica (World Bank, 2000a).
Of the $49 million to be invested in the project, U$14 million will be destined to support PES
contracts already programmed by FONAFIFO, $23.3 million will be for new PES contracts
through FONAFIFO, and $0.4 million will be to support the development of FONAFIFO’s
revenue capture mechanisms (World Bank, 2000a). Therefore 77 per cent of all funds will be
used to finance the purchase of environmental services, while the remaining funds are for
strengthening the administration and field supervision of FONAFIFO’s PES programme.
Although the project’s funding will be used to strengthen the overall PES scheme, which
means paying for a bundle of four environmental services, the explicit interest is on the
service of biodiversity conservation in specific geographic locations. In practice this objective
is realized by prioritizing lands for biodiversity conservation and offering FONAFIFO to
cover $10 of the $40/year payment made to landholders in these areas. This cost sharing
makes conservation of these areas relatively less expensive for FONAFIFO providing an
additional incentive to target lands important for biodiversity conservation.
The PES contracts that can receive Ecomarkets funding are only those that fall within the
priorities established by the project. For the programmed contracts (1995-1999), priority
areas include 1) forest ecosystems in buffer zones of national parks and biological reserves,
2) forest ecosystems within the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, 3) forest ecosystems
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which provide critical hydrological services, 4) degraded forests or those at high risk of fire,
5) wildlife refuges, and 6) priority areas for recuperating forest ecosystems. For new
contracts beginning 2000/2001, priorities are given to 1) conservation easements in
Tortuguero, La Amistad-Caribe, and Osa Conservation Areas, 2) conservation easements in
areas of high biological importance as identified in the 1996 GRUAS report outside of
Tortuguero, La Amistad-Caribe, and Osa Conservation Areas, 3) additional areas outside of
the GRUAS report areas based on the priorities established by the Ministry of Environment
(World Bank 2000b). Within each of the Conservation Areas mentioned, Ecomarkets has
identified specific areas that deserve special attention and should be targeted with new PES
contracts.
3.2

Greenhouse gas mitigation 7

At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 155 countries signed the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), an agreement to seek the
stabilization of the enhanced greenhouse effect. Its objective was to reduce the concentration
of GHGs in the atmosphere to levels below those that could cause severe climate change.
The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994, after the receipt of the 50th ratification.
Prior to the UNFCCC, there were two World Climate Conferences in 1979 and 1990 that laid
out many of the issues addressed by the UNFCCC.
A series of policy level events regarding climate change have taken place since the
ratification of the UNFCCC, at meetings of the Conferences of the Parties (COP) to the
UNFCCC. One of the major results from these international conferences was the Kyoto
Protocol, in which industrial nations committed themselves to reduce their GHG emissions
by 5.2 per cent from 1990 levels by 2008-2012. In addition, there are three “Kyoto Flexibility
Mechanisms” in the Protocol that are intended to help the global reduction of emissions in a
cooperative fashion. In other words, the Kyoto Protocol defines assigned amounts of GHG
emissions for Annex B countries (developed countries and countries with transition
economies) and authorizes cooperative emission reduction methods under which portions of
the assigned amounts may be shared or re-allocated. The Kyoto Mechanisms are International
Emission Trading (IET), Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM).
Prior to the Kyoto Protocol, there was a series of initiatives aimed at creating mechanisms to
reduce GHGs, which later served as experiences to develop the Kyoto Flexibility
Mechanisms.
In 1993, the United States announced the US Initiative on Joint
Implementation (USIJI), a voluntary pilot programme designed to contribute to the
international knowledge base though projects that would demonstrate a range of approaches
to reduce or sequester greenhouse gas emissions in different geographic regions. The
programme encouraged private sector investment in international partnerships to reduce
GHGs. Thus, USIJI became the first programme set up by a developed country to promote
Joint Implementation. Costa Rica had a leading role in the early stages of USIJI, and
benefited from having seven projects approved through the USIJI portfolio from 1995 to1999
(USIJI 1999).

7

Defined by the 1996 Forestry Law as mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions or reducing, sequestering,
storing, and absorbing greenhouse gases.
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After the first COP meeting, which took place in Berlin in 1995, the concept of Joint
Implementation was rearranged so that instead of full projects with carbon credits as initially
conceived under the USIJI framework, there would be an experimental period to develop
pilot projects. This new concept was called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ).
Also prior to the Kyoto Protocol, Costa Rica developed an innovative financial instrument,
called "Certifiable Tradable Offsets" (CTOs) as a means to facilitate the development of AIJ
projects. A CTO was defined as a specific amount of greenhouse gas emissions, expressed in
carbon equivalent units, reduced or sequestered, or to be reduced or sequestered by AIJ
actions, in which all phases have already been completed. Each CTO was to be certified,
fully transferable and guaranteed for a specific period of years, according to the project
lifetime. It gave the bearer the right to claim the offsets. The idea was that CTOs would
resemble bonds, with 20 yearly coupons, that could be sold through brokers. During the
guarantee period any CTO declared invalid by the monitoring and/or independent third party
verification would be replaced (www.cinde.or.cr).
However, the CTOs were soon replaced at the international level by the Certified Emission
Reductions (CERs) embodied in the Kyoto Protocol, which very closely resembled the CTO
concept as conceived in Costa Rica. Therefore, CTOs were only used for one transaction that between the Governments of Norway and Costa Rica (Alpízar 2001).
AIJ projects in Costa Rica preceded the Kyoto Protocol and were among the first project
proposals globally designed to mitigate climate change through innovative mechanisms. The
AIJ projects were initiated in Costa Rica in 1994, when it signed along with the United
States, the first AIJ agreement in the Western Hemisphere. In 1995, Costa Rica set up OCIC
(Costa Rican Joint Implementation Office) as the official national counterpart for climate
change projects and negotiations. It was through OCIC that Costa Rica then developed the
concept of CTOs.
The forestry projects that were approved under the Costa Rica AIJ programme are listed in
Table 3.6 and discussed more fully below. There were AIJ proposals outside of the forestry
sector, and therefore are not addressed in this paper.
Table 3.6 Markets and payments for carbon in Costa Rica
Project/commodity
1. Activities Implemented Jointly
(i) Ecoland
(ii) Klinki
(iii) Costa Rica / Norway
Reforestation and
Forest Conservation
AIJ Pilot Project
(iv) Territorial and
Financial Consolidation
of Costa Rican National
Parks and Biological
Reserves
(v) EARTH

Status

Reference
USIJI (1999)

Implemented
In progress
In progress

http://unfccc.int/program/aij/aijproj.html
Barres (2002)
http://unfccc.int/program/aij/aijproj.html

Did not receive any
funding from the sale of
Carbon Credits

Http://unfccc.int/program/aij/aijproj.html

Implemented

Russo (2001), Russo (2002)
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3.2.1 Activities Implemented Jointly
With OCIC in place, and reforms in the institutional, legal, and administrative structure,
Costa Rica was able to develop 11 project proposals under the AIJ framework during the
period 1995-1999:
•
•
•

five forestry projects (US$158 million total investment),
five energy projects (US$135 million total investment), and
one agricultural project (US$1 million total investment).

Of these, one forestry project and one energy project were funded through the Norwegian
Government. A second forestry project, and the agricultural project, were funded through the
Dutch Government. All other projects were to be funded through the USIJI initiative (Manso
1998). Detailed descriptions of the forestry projects are given in Table 3.7 below. The
intention was that the projects within the AIJ portfolio would have a climate change
component that would credit them with a given quantity of CTOs. These could then be sold
to investors or companies in developed countries as a means to fulfill their commitments to
reduce that country’s GHG emissions. Income received from the sale of CTOs would make
the projects more attractive in financial terms as they would have an additional source of
income.
Table 3.7 Forestry sector projects developed in Costa Rica under the AIJ scheme
Project Title

ECOLAND: Piedras
Blancas National Park
Territorial and
Financial
Consolidation of Costa
Rican National Parks
and Biological
Reserves
Klinki Forestry Project
Costa Rica-Norway
Reforestation and
Forest Conservation
AIJ Pilot Project *

GHG Impact (CO2
Total
Project Cost equivalent in metric
tons)
(US$
millions)
$1.1
1,342,733

Type of
Activity

Project
Lifetime
(yrs)

Area (ha)

Conservation
Regeneration
Conservation
Regeneration

16

2,500

25

422,800
(Manso 1998)
555,000
(Busch et al. 2000)

$157

Reforestation
Conservation
Regeneration
Reforestation

46
25

6,000
4,000

$3.8
$3.3

57,467,271
(UNFCCC 2001)
66,000,000
(Manso 1998)

7,216,000
230,842
(UNFCCC 2001)
1,150,139
(Manso 1998)
EARTH
Reforestation
na
121
$0.33
16,474
TOTAL
542,461
$158.4
75,650,393
Sources: Adapted from Manso 1998, www.cinde.or.cr, Busch et al. 2000, and UNFCCC 2001.

Unfortunately, a majority of projects under the AIJ portfolio in Costa Rica never received the
expected level of income from the sale of CTOs, and some did not receive any funding at all
from carbon offsets. Despite the availability of carbon credits to sell the demand has not
been significant, and the only forestry projects that received significant funding from carbon
offsets were the Ecoland and the Costa Rica-Norway projects. The Protected Areas Project
(PAP) was able to consolidate one million tons of carbon that were certified by the Societé
Generale de Surveillance (SGS), but these CTOs were never sold. A brief description of each
approved forestry project is given below.
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ECOLAND – Piedras Blancas National Park
The ECOLAND Project’s objective was to preserve tropical forest through the purchase of
approximately 2,500 hectares of privately-owned forest in the Piedras Blancas National Park
(formerly named the Esquinas National Park), in south western Costa Rica. The purchased
land was to be passed to the Costa Rican system of conservation areas for permanent
protection. GHG benefits accrue from conservation of existing carbon stocks in the park that
would have otherwise been deforested (USIJI, 1999).
The 12,500-hectare Esquinas Forest was declared a national park by the Government of Costa
Rica in 1993, but almost all of the land within the park was privately-owned. Some
landowners held logging concessions, a number of which were active at the time, and many
owners faced economic pressures that encouraged deforestation. Under Costa Rican law, the
government cannot restrict land-use decisions of private landowners, thus the government
had to purchase the land it wished to protect. The ECOLAND Project was intended to bring
nearly 20 per cent of the park’s land under protection. At the time, approximately 2,150 ha of
the total land to be purchased was forested. The remaining 350 ha had already been cleared,
but forest regeneration was expected to occur once the area became protected (USIJI 1999).
All 2,500 ha of land were purchased through the project and have been passed to the Costa
Rican National Park Service for permanent protection.
The ECOLAND project was one of the few AIJ projects to be fully funded through carbon
credits. The total project cost was $1.1 million, of which $150,000 was used for project
development and representation, $40,000 was used as an endowment to cover annual costs,
and the remaining $910,000 was used for land purchases (UNFCCC, 2001). The funding
sources for the carbon component of the project are given in Table .
Table 3.8 Co-financing for the Ecoland Project
Funding Source
Tenaska
Rainforests of Austria
National Fish and
Wildlife Foundation
Total

Country of Funding
Source
U.S.A.
Austria
U.S.A.

Amount ($US)
650,000
200,000
250,000
1,100,000

Source: Adapted from USIJI 1999 and UNFCCC 2001

Territorial and Financial Consolidation of Costa Rican National Parks and Biological
Reserves (Protected Areas Project)8
The primary objective of the Territorial and Financial Consolidation of Costa Rican National
Parks and Biological Reserves Project, also known as the Protected Areas Project (PAP), was
the acquisition of 555,000 ha of land in 27 National Parks and Biological Reserves in Costa
Rica - land that was still in the hands of its original owners after they were declared protected
areas (Busch et al. 2000). With this objective the project would facilitate the consolidation of
national parks through land purchases financed through the sale of carbon savings. The

8

Protected Area Project, or PAP, is a shorter name also used for this project.
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project included all of the unregistered national parks and biological reserves in Costa Rica
(UNFCCC 2001).
At the time, the land to be purchased was being deforested at an average rate of 2-3 per cent
per year, releasing approximately 1.5 mt C/yr. Therefore, the GHG benefits of the project
would accrue from the preservation of carbon stocks in the primary forest and from biomass
growth (i.e., carbon sequestration) in the secondary forest and pasture. This project was the
result of combining two earlier USIJI projects, Project BIODIVERSIFIX and the protected
area component of Project CARFIX: Sustainable Forest Management (USIJI 1999).
The project was to be funded through an initial contribution of $376,241 from the Earth
Council Foundation and the Costa Rican National Parks Foundation, plus an estimated
$156.7 million to be generated through the sale of carbon offsets (UNFCCC 2001).
However, only approximately 6 per cent of the PAP project was executed, and it did not
receive any funds from the sale of carbon credits. With the first 35,000 ha the project
purchased, it consolidated one million tons of carbon, all of which was certified by SGS.
Another 16,000 ha were later purchased in Guanacaste, but again, it did not receive any
carbon credits. The only external funds received were $50,000 which was donated by the
Earth Council to consolidate the first 35,000 hectares (Manso 2002).
Klinki Forestry Project
The aim of the Klinki Forestry Project was to convert pastures and marginal farmland to
commercial tree plantations by promoting the planting of 6,000 ha of private farms with
mixtures of selected fast-growing tree species in a matrix, with the Klinki (Araucaria
hunsteinii) tree as the major component for carbon sequestration. The trees would be
harvested periodically for use in long-life lumber products (such as utility poles) or left
standing.
The project would include small, medium, and large farms, educational pilot projects, and
investor farms. Farmers would be given incentives for planting in return for the rights to the
sequestered carbon. The objective of the project was to foster the involvement of the farmer
in carbon sequestration as an economic activity using the latest tree farming technology while
providing GHG, wood production, and conservation benefits (USIJI, 1999).
By early 2002, 47 hectares had been reforested under the Klinki project in five participating
farms. Funds have come from 36 greenhouse gas emitters in the United States. The project
does not deal in carbon credits because the funding required for long-term commitments has
not been found. Thus, the project is structured on donations that are used to carry out the
reforestation projects. On average, the project offsets 6.4 tons of CO2 per hectare per year
(Barres 2002).
It is expected that an additional 40 to 160 hectares will be planted in the short term.
Negotiations are underway with two potential donors in the USA who are interested in
offsetting their greenhouse gas emissions. One potential donor wants to mitigate the
emissions from the use of fuel cells (Barres 2002).
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Costa Rica-Norway Reforestation and Forest Conservation AIJ Pilot Project
The objective of the project is to conserve and rehabilitate four thousand hectares of forests in
the upper Virilla river basin, to produce among other environmental benefits, the reduction of
atmospheric GHG emissions through biomass growth and avoidance of future emissions.
One thousand ha will be reforested and 3,000 ha of existing forestland will be conserved 2,000 ha in a natural primary forest area and 1,000 ha in a secondary forest area. The
implementation period will be ten years in successive and overlapping stages covering the
micro-basins in the zone. The estimated life of the project is 25 years.
The forestry activities are expected to improve the existing hydrological resources of the
watershed (increased output), increasing the efficiency of the hydroelectric plants and
therefore enhancing the displacement of fossil fuel use in the national electricity system
(UNFCCC 2001). This is of relevance for the various hydroelectric projects located on the
Virilla River.
This project is part of the "Private Forestry Project" (PFP), a national forestry project
designed to use AIJ foreign investments to compensate farmers for their conservation and
reforestation efforts. The project will therefore be developed within the legal and
institutional framework of Costa Rica’s Payments for Environmental Services (PES)
programme. Legislation authorizes the Ministry of Environment to find international partners
for the PES programme so that the cost of producing global environmental services like CO2
reduction can be shared with the international community (UNFCCC 2001). To make use of
external AIJ investments a Specific Fund for the Conservation and Development of
Greenhouse Gas Sinks and Deposits was established through Executive Decree Nº 25067MINAE.
Within the project OCIC is responsible for collecting the contributions and disbursing these
funds to FONAFIFO upon proof of successful sequestration or avoidance of CO2 emissions
through the PES programme. In addition, OCIC issues the CTOs to foreign AIJ investors as
proof of the offsets. Each CTO issued is guaranteed against CO2 offsets that have already
taken place through the PES programme. These CTOs are transferred by OCIC to the
Norwegian investors in return for their financial contributions to the project.
FONAFIFO is responsible for carrying out the financial administration of the PES
Programme by signing legally binding contracts with individual farmers, through which the
farmers receive annual payments in return for proof of effective forest conservation
reforestation activities.
The Compañia Nacional de Fuerza y Luz (CNFL), a public utility, and MINAE are
responsible for the technical promotion and implementation of the PES programme in the
upper Virilla river basin for 1,000 ha of reforestation, 2,000 ha of natural forest conservation,
and 1,000 ha of natural forest regeneration.
The total cost of the project is US$3,395,243. In accordance with the Costa Rican legal
framework for AIJ forestry projects, the investment capital contribution from the Norwegian
partners, equivalent to 200,000 metric tons of carbon, is US$2 million. The price per CTO
was determined by OCIC as US$10/mt of C. (UNFCCC 2001). National matching funds of
$1.39 million are provided by CNFL.
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The Costa Rica-Norway AIJ Pilot Project was the first international financing initiative for
the PES programme. In February 1997, through OCIC, the Government of Costa Rica issued
CTOs to Norwegian AIJ investors in exchange for the first disbursement of US$1 million
corresponding to the first tranche of 100,000 mt of C. In 1997, the final disbursement of
US$1 million was channelled to FONAFIFO in exchange for the second tranche of 100,000
mt of C.
During the period 1996 to 1999, a total of 2,387 ha in the upper Virilla river basin were
incorporated into the PES programme. This area is equivalent to about 60 per cent of the
total 4,000 ha referred to in the project agreement (UNFCCC 2001).
EARTH
A commercial reforestation project on land belonging to the EARTH (Agricultural College
for the Humid Tropics) was the core component of this project. EARTH received funds from
the municipality of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. A total of 121 ha were planted with native
timber species in abandoned banana plantations currently covered by pasture land. Carbon
credits for 5,000 mt of C during the lifetime of the project (20 years) were sold for $400,000
to the municipality of Rotterdam.9 This payment gave an average value of $20 for every ton
of carbon be sequestered (Alpizar 2001).
Through the agreement, the municipality of Rotterdam could partially mitigate its CO2
emissions resulting from the expansion of the port of Rotterdam and industrial activities in
the Rijinmond area (Russo, 2001). However, no carbon certificates were issued for this
project (Russo 2002), thus the Netherlands could not use them to fulfill their commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol (Russo 2001). Although no certificates were issued, the contract
states that EARTH cannot sell the carbon credits to anyone else.
The project was implemented in three years, and planting of trees was completed in
November 2001. EARTH’s commitment is to manage and maintain the plantation for a
period of 20 years (Russo 2002). It is likely that some blocks of the plantation will not be
harvested within 20 years of planting, since the rotation cycle for some species is much
longer than 20 years.
Monitoring of the project is carried out by EARTH while OCIC is responsible for verification
through annual progress reports. Every year EARTH presents a progress report, and a final
report will be prepared in 2005. In addition to the income from the sale of carbon credits,
EARTH expects that the project will also provide additional benefits through educational and
knowledge transfer opportunities from the different courses it offers to its students (Russo,
2001).
3.3

Hydrological services 10

The environmental service that has been formally recognized for the longest time in Costa
Rica is watershed protection (or hydrological services). One of the earliest official

9

Banana was eradicated from the area several years earlier due to the marginal condition of the soils (Russo,
2001).
10

Defined by the 1996 Forestry Law as water protection for urban, rural, and hydroelectric use of water.
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acknowledgements of this service dates back to 1888, when a decree was passed declaring a
2-km wide strip on the sides of Barva Volcano as state-owned land, which could not be
appropriated by any individual. The area was considered of public interest because the
streams and springs that supplied drinking water to the towns of Alajuela and Heredia had
their headwaters on the slopes of the volcano (Watson et al. 1998). However, the first case
that more closely resembles a market based transaction did not take place until 1997, when a
private hydropower company signed an agreement to pay landowners in its watershed who
would ensure conservation of existing forest on their land.
A summary of the market cases covered in more detail in this section is provided in the table
below.
Table 3.9 Markets and payments for hydrological services in Costa Rica
Service/Mechanism/Case
Status (Dec. 2001)
1. Hydrological Services to Hydropower Production
A. Transfer Payments: FONAFIFO and Hydropower
Companies
(i) Energía Global and FUNDECOR (2)–Don
Implemented and
Pedro and Rio Volcan HEP
coming to a close,
likely to be renewed
(ii) Hidroeléctrica Platanar (1)
Ongoing
implementation
(iii) Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz (3) –
Ongoing
Aranjuez, Balsa and Cote
implementation
B. Voluntary Contracts
(i) La Esperanza HEP and Monteverde
Ongoing
Conservation League
implementation
2. Hydrological Services to Water Supply
A. Transfer Payments: FONAFIFO and Industry
(i) Costa Rican Brewery
Agreed

(ii) Melia Playa Conchal Hotel
B. Water Use Charges
(i) Heredia Public Water Supply Company

Proposal
Charges levied to
water consumers,
payments to forest
owners pending

Reference

Cruz and Navarrete (2000);
Benavides (2001)
Cruz and Navarrete (2000)
Cruz and Navarrete (2000)

Rojas and Aylward (2001)

Echeverría (2001); Mejias
(2001); Mejias and Segura
(2001)
Melia Conchal (2001)
Barrantes and Castro (1999b);
Cordero (2001)

Note: HEP refers to hydoelectric power project

3.3.1 Transfer payments for environmental services: FONAFIFO-hydropower
companies
Arrangements made between FONAFIFO and Energía Global, Hidroeléctrica Platanar, and
Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz are described below.
Energía Global
Energía Global de Costa Rica, a private power producer, owns and operates two small run-ofriver hydropower plants in northern Costa Rica; Don Pedro (14 MW) and Rio Volcan (17
MW). The projects began producing hydropower in November 1996 and December 1997,
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respectively. In late 1997, Energía Global signed a five-year agreement with FUNDECOR
(Foundation for the Development of the Central Volcanic Range) to promote forest
conservation in the watersheds of both projects. Through the agreement, the company has
offered landowners in its watersheds a $10 per hectare annual payment in order to maintain
or restore forest cover on their plots. Energía Global covers a quarter of the $40/ha/yr that
FONAFIFO pays forest owners because the hydropower company is only interested in one of
four environmental services, namely watershed protection. FONAFIFO therefore has to
fundraise the remaining $30/ha/yr from other sources.
The payments are made to FONAFIFO through FUNDECOR, which has a separate
agreement, and the funds are used to finance the official PES scheme. As in the case of the
Ecomarkets scheme, FONAFIFO in turn prioritizes payments to the watersheds of Energía
Global’s projects under the official PES scheme. The landowner contracts and conservation
commitments are for five years. Landowners can also participate in reforestation or forest
management activities as established by FONAFIFO.
At the time the two hydropower projects were built, more than 75 per cent of the watersheds
were covered by forest (Table3.10). However, using a model developed by FUNDECOR to
predict changes in land use FUNDECOR forecasted that 46 per cent and 15 per cent of the
watersheds of Rio Volcan and Don Pedro hydropower projects, respectively, were at high
risk of deforestation (FUNDECOR and Energía Global, undated).11 These predictions were
an incentive for the hydropower company to invest in the PES scheme and therefore
minimize the perceived threat posed by deforestation (Benavides 2001).
Table 3.10 Land use in the watersheds of Don Pedro and Rio Volcan watersheds, 1996
As % of
watershed
Land Use
Don Pedro
Forest
2,076
87%
Crops/Pasture
240
10%
Reforestation
48
2%
Other*
13
1%
Total
2,377
Note: *Other includes clouds and water.
Source: (FUNDECOR and Energía Global, undated)

Rio Volcan
2,603
757
60
9
3,429

As % of
watershed
76%
22%
2%
0%

During the first year of the contract, Energía Global made payments of $18,180 for Don
Pedro and US$24,870 for Rio Volcan (for the allocation of these funds see Table 3.11).

11

The model predicts changes on a one-hectare plot basis and takes into account such variables as distance to
nearby human populations and agricultural lands, access roads, and topography of the terrain
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Table 3.11 Allocation of payments made by Energía Global in the first year of the PES
contract
Allocation
1. To compensate FONAFIFO for land already reforested
through the PES scheme ($10/ha)
2. To cover FUNDECOR’s expenses in promoting
conservation and sustainable forest use in the watershed
3. To cover expenses of the ACCVC in protecting natural
resources
Total

Don Pedro HEP
$4,000
(400 ha)
$7,090

Rio Volcan HEP
$3,000
(300 ha)
$10,935

$7,090

$10,935

$18,180

$24,870

Source: Adapted from Reyes and Cordoba 1999

After the first year, Energía Global committed to paying up to $29,540/year for Rio Volcan’s
watershed and $23,800/year for Don Pedro’s watershed (Reyes and Cordoba 1999). By
2000, 72 per cent of Rio Volcan’s watershed and 75 per cent of Don Pedro’s watersheds had
been incorporated into the PES scheme (Cruz and Navarrete 2000).
In addition to overseeing the funds directly received from Energía Global, FUNDECOR is
responsible for executing the forest conservation activities, and carries out the legal and
administrative procedures for the PES on behalf of landowners. For this service, they charge
a fee to landowners that is deducted from the payment they receive from FONAFIFO.
The Energía Global–FUNDECOR–FONAFIFO model was later adopted and modified by
two other hydropower companies: Hidroeléctrica Platanar and CNFL (Compañía Nacional de
Fuerza y Luz).
Hidroeléctrica Platanar
Hidroeléctrica Platanar, a private power producer, owns a 15 MW run-of-river hydropower
project in northern Costa Rica, which began operations in 1995. In 1999 Platanar signed an
agreement for PES in its catchment similar to that of Energía Global-FUNDECOR, but
instead of paying $10/ha/yr, Platanar contributes $15/ha to the annual PES payment to
landholders. In addition, Platanar has a separate agreement for properties that do not have a
formal land title deed, for which the hydropower company contributes $30/ha/yr. In these
cases Platanar makes the full payments directly and the landowners do not receive any funds
from the official PES scheme. In both cases Hidroeléctrica Platanar works with FUNDECOR
and CODEFORSA, the intermediary NGOs responsible for preparing the forest management
plan. The cost of this is covered by a fee charged directly to landowners, approximately
equivalent to 18 per cent of the payment amount (Pérez 2002).
Approximately 35 per cent of the 3,655-hectare watershed of Platanar was forested in 1996,
and it is these areas that are the main target of Platanar’s PES efforts. In early 2002 there
were already 555 hectares incorporated into the PES scheme, which represents 45 per cent of
the forested area in the watershed (Table 3.12). The initiative of the hydropower company is
complemented by other local forestry agents that independently promote the incorporation of
forested areas into the national PES scheme. These forestry agents act as intermediaries
between landowners and FONAFIFO, and the benefit they receive is a fee paid by
landowners. If activities continue as planned, the hydropower project expects to incorporate
90 per cent of the forested area in the watershed into a PES scheme in the short term (Table
3.12).
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Table 3.12 Breakdown of forested area in the watershed of Hidroeléctrica Platanar and
the forested area participating in the PES scheme
(Information as of 24 January, 2002)
Total Watershed Area
Total Forested Area (in 1996)
Area Currently Receiving PES
Area in Process of Applying for PES
Area that was approached but did not join the PES scheme
Area where landowners are in the process of deciding whether or not to join the
PES scheme
Total forested area in the watershed expected to be incorporated into PES scheme
Source: Chacon (2002)

Area
(hectares)
3,655

% of forested
area (in 1996)
-

1,226
556
464
100
85

34% (of total
watershed)
45%
38%
8%
7%

1,105

90%

There are currently 14 landowners receiving benefits through the PES scheme in Platanar’s
watershed (Table 3.13). By the time the project reaches its intended target it is likely that 28
landowners will benefit from the scheme. Land use in the catchment is mixed, composed
mostly of dairy farms and some forest patches. Sections of Ciudad Quesada, an urban area
with a population of 36,000, also lie within Platanar’s watershed. The beneficiaries of the
PES scheme are, for the most part, farm owners. In the uppermost section of the watershed,
there is also a forested section that lies within the borders of the Juan Castro Blanco National
Park. However, the park lands have not been expropriated, and are still held by private land
owners.
Table 3.13 Landowners, area, and status of PES scheme in the watershed of
Hidroeléctrica Platanar
No. of Landowners
8
6

Area (ha)

4
4
6

75
85
389

4

540

399
157

Status of PES
Have signed contract through the FONAFIFO-Fundecor-Platanar scheme
Have signed contract through Platanar scheme (the company makes 100 per cent of
payment ($30/ha))
Have completed technical studies to apply for PES
Have expressed an interest to participate in the scheme
In process of application to the national PES scheme through other agents
(APAIFO)
Properties adjacent to but located outside the watershed (participate as a result of
the promotion of the PES scheme that is part of the FONAFIFO-Fundecor-Platanar
agreement)

Source: Chacon (2002)

National Power and Lighting Company12 (CNFL)
CNFL is a private company majority-owned by the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (ICE),
the state utility. In November 1998 CNFL signed an agreement with FONAFIFO and
MINAE for the purchase and sale of environmental services in three watersheds of interest to
CNFL where it plans to develop hydropower projects. As in the Energía Global case, the
12

Compañia Nacional de Fuerza y Luz in Spanish.
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agreement is aimed at promoting forest conservation and management as well as
reforestation, which are believed to contribute to the protection of water resources.
Under the CNFL-FONAFIFO scheme, the forest owner receives $40/ha/year from
FONAFIFO under a ten-year contract. CNFL in turn pays FONAFIFO $47/ha/year, with the
exception of the first year, when it pays $53/ha/yr in order to cover the expenses of the
management plan at the beginning of the contract. There are important differences between
the CNFL-FONAFIFO scheme and the Energía Global scheme:
•
•
•
•
•

the CNFL-FONAFIFO scheme does not require a land title, accepting established rights
of possession (derechos posesorios) as sufficient indication of tenure;
the contracts are for ten years instead of five;
CNFL pays for all four environmental services plus an additional amount to cover
FONAFIFO’s promotion costs;
the hydropower projects are yet to be built;
there is no intermediary between the utility and FONAFIFO.

Table 3.14 Land to be incorporated under the CNFL PES agreement
Watershed
Aranjuez HEP
Balsa HEP
Cote HEP

Area of Watershed
(ha)
9,516
18,926
1,458

Percentage of the watershed to be
incorporated into the PES scheme
53%
32%
62%

Source: Cruz and Navarrete (2000)

In all cases, the hydropower companies enter into the agreements with
FONAFIFO/FUNDECOR voluntarily and on their own initiative. However, implementation
of the agreements, that is finding willing sellers, is largely up to FONAFIFO and
FUNDECOR.
3.3.2 Voluntary contracts: La Esperanza Hydropower Project and Monteverde
Conservation League
La Esperanza Hydropower Project (LEHP) is a 6MW run-of-river power project located in
northern Costa Rica. Most of the 3,400-hectare watershed used by the project is located
within the Children’s Eternal Rainforest, owned by the Monteverde Conservation League
(MCL). MCL is a not-for-profit non-governmental organization created in 1986, and
currently owns over 22,000 ha of forestland in the Tilarán Cordillera. MCL was created by a
group of scientists, activists, and community members with the goal of purchasing sections of
the remaining forestland in the surroundings of Monteverde for conservation purposes.
On October 28th 1998, MCL and LEHP signed a private contract through which LEHP would
make payments to the MCL for the environmental services its forests provide. The 99-year
contract focuses on preserving forest cover as the desired land use in the watershed. The
contract also resolved a land ownership dispute between the two parties relating to an area of
half a hectare. This area was vital for the hydropower project, as the dam and water intake
were to be built there. The conflict arose because two different official land titles stated that
both entities owned the same parcel of land.
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The contract grants surface rights to LEHP, while the MCL retains full ownership of the land.
This arrangement allowed LEHP to build and utilize the land autonomously for a period of 99
years. At the end of this period, the surface right will expire and the infrastructure will
become the exclusive property of the MCL. Although the contract states that the payment for
environmental services is explicitly independent of the surface right, it is an end product of
the negotiations initiated because of the land dispute. In fact, the contract states that if LEHP
delays payment of a PES by more than one month after it is due, the MCL will immediately
recover the surface right to the land and all infrastructure on it.
Through the agreement, LEHP commits to paying for environmental services provided by the
3,000 hectares of forest located in the watershed. Instead of fixing payment for the duration
of the entire contract, the MCL-LEHP contract introduces different amounts to be paid at
different stages of the project. It starts out with a payment of $3/ha/yr during the construction
phase of the hydro project. This is gradually raised to $10/ha/yr on the third and fourth years
of operations (Table 3.15). All payments up to the fifth year are to be made in advance, at the
beginning of every year. After that, payment is made retroactively every six months.
Table 3.15 Contracted amounts paid for environmental services to the MCL
Period of Payment
During Construction
1st Year of Operations
2nd Year of Operations
3rd & 4th Year of Operations
5th Year & onwards

Payment (US$/ha/year)
$3
$8
$9
$10
Based on a formula, adjusted every 6 months

Notes: All payments up to the fifth year are made up front at the beginning of each period. From the fifth year
onwards, they are paid at the end of every six-month period. The amounts are paid for a total area of 3,000 ha
Source: Contract between MCL and LEHP

From the fifth year onwards, the amount to be paid is variable, calculated every six months
using the formula:
PES = $10 * (Gr/Gf) * (Tavg/Tbeg)
Where:
$10, is the reference value of the services per hectare per year
Gr, is the real energy (GWh) generated during the time period
Gf, is the forecasted energy (GWh) production for the time period
Tavg, is the average power tariff (US$) paid throughout the time period
Tbeg, is the tariff (US$) paid for the energy generated on the first day of the time period
The innovative aspect of the formula is that it links the payment to power production and
inflation. If the power plant produces more or less power, it will proportionately affect the
total amount paid to the MCL. Also, because the power tariff changes through time, it allows
for adjustments to be made accordingly. Therefore, if the power plant produces more power,
the MCL receives more than $10/ha/yr. Similarly, if the electricity tariff increases, so does
the payment to MCL.
In exchange for the payment for hydrological services made by LEHP, the MCL commits to:
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•
•
•
•

conserve and protect the existing forests in the watershed of LEHP;
watch for and repel land invasions that might take place in the watershed;
manage the forest area and the forest rangers who protect it;
attain the economic means to fulfill its conservation commitment.

3.3.3 Transfer payments and water use charges for water supply services: FONAFIFO
and industry
Experimentation in the development of markets for hydrological services in Costa Rica
extends beyond hydropower to the services provided by intact forests to industries that use
water for water supply. The industries involved to date include those that use clean water as
an input to water treatment for municipal water supply or as an input in the production of
retail and service products such as beer and lodgings.
Cervecería Costa Rica and FONAFIFO
Florida Ice & Farm, owners of Cervecería Costa Rica (CCR), the largest brewery in the
country, uses groundwater in the production of beer, bottled water, and fruit juices.
However, there has been concern that groundwater sources in the Central Valley, where CCR
is located, are being affected by reduction in the recharge zone due to land conversion and
pollution. In October 2001, CCR signed an agreement with FONAFIFO to promote forest
conservation and regeneration through the PES scheme (Echeverría 2001; Mejías 2001). The
goal is to promote forest conservation or regeneration in the recharge areas of the aquifer
used by CCR.
•

CCR will pay FONAFIFO a total of $225,000 distributed over seven years, equivalent to
US$45/ha/yr for 1,000 ha located in the upper part of Rio Segundo Watershed.
Landowners will subscribe contracts with FONAFIFO for five years.

•

CCR will pay FONAFIFO US$1,500/month for 12 months to contract FUNDECOR as
the intermediary and programme promoter.

•

CCR will pay FONAFIFO a lump sum of US$15 for each new hectare entering the
project. These funds will be used by FUNDECOR for technical and legal advice for the
proprietors.

•

CCR will pay FONAFIFO a lump sum of US$14 for each new hectare entering the
project. These funds will cover administrative expenses by FONAFIFO.

•

The total amount of funds for the project is US$272,727 (equivalent to 90 million
colones).

Melia Playa Conchal Hotel and FONAFIFO
The Melia Playa Conchal is a tourism development project in Guanacaste province owned by
the Melia hotel group. The project has already built a first phase including a beach resort and
golf course. The entire complex will be finished within 15 years. The project currently has its
own water supply from ground water wells, but as the project expands it will require
additional water. A potential source has already been identified as the Nimboyores River.
Melia has contacted FONAFIFO to explore the option of developing a management plan for
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the watershed of the Nimboyores River in order to ensure the protection of the water source
in the long term. Although the available supply (>1,000 l/s) far exceeds the forecasted
demand (180 l/s), the hotel group believes such a plan would be beneficial for the area. The
objective would be to conserve existing forests or allow regeneration/reforestation in
unproductive land within the watershed. FONAFIFO would be responsible for implementing
the project while the hotel would provide the financial resources to execute it. This proposed
watershed conservation scheme is currently being negotiated between Melia and FONAFIFO
(Melia Conchal 2001).
Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia and water use charges
The Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia (ESPH) is a utility owned by three
municipalities in the province of Heredia, where it provides electricity, potable water, public
lighting and sewerage services. In 1999 ESPH made a proposal to ARESEP (Regulating
Authority for Public Services) to raise the potable water tariff in order to compensate forest
owners for the services their land use provides to water users. ARESEP approved a tariff
increase of ¢1.90/m3 in 1999 to cover the environmental services component. ESPH has been
collecting the funds and has designed a project, Procuencas, to implement the environmental
services component in the watersheds of the Ciruelas, Segundo, Bermudez, and Tibas rivers.
The objective is to protect groundwater sources through forest conservation where forests
already exist, and restore forest cover through reforestation or natural regeneration in some
denuded areas. ESPH is the only water company in the country that has included an
environmental component in its water tariff to invest in its watersheds.
Originally the ESPH scheme was envisaged as independent from the official PES scheme.
Funds would be collected directly by ESPH via water tariffs, and the amount charged for
watershed protection would be channelled to an independent fund administered by ESPH.
During the development of this scheme, it was unclear what role other key players would
have, particularly the Ministry of Environment (MINAE). MINAE insisted on participating in
the decision-making, and eventually, it was decided that the funds collected by ESPH would
be transferred to FONAFIFO, who would implement the PES scheme in the areas of interest
to ESPH as part of the overall PES programme. Therefore, what was originally conceived as
an independent PES programme ended up being incorporated into the national PES scheme.
3.4

Bundles of environmental services

In many cases either the buyer or the seller of environmental services wishes to make a single
transaction that includes a number of or all of the environmental services provided by a
parcel of land. In such cases, services are “bundled” either at the buying end or from both
ends of the transaction. Land purchases, conservation easements, forest certification and
transfer payments are approaches to transacting bundles of services that have been widely
applied in developed countries. As can be seen in Table 3.16 and the ensuing discussion,
efforts have been made to employ all four methods in the Costa Rican context, and these
approaches have met with varying degrees of success.

34

Table 3.16 Markets and payments for bundles of environmental services in Costa Rica
Service/Mechanism/Case

Status

Reference

1. Voluntary Contributions: Land Purchase
(i) Children’s Eternal Rainforest, Monteverde

Implemented

www.acmonteverde.com/ibosqu
e.html
Blanco (1999)

(ii) FAMAAR, Zarcero
2. Tradable Development Rights: Conservation
Easements
(i) CEDARENA Land Trust

Implemented

3. Product Labeling and Certification: Forest
Certification
(i) Various certified operations
4. Transfer Payments and Market Based Instruments:
Official PES Scheme
(i) FONAFIFO Payment Programme

(ii) Tax on Petrol

Implemented

www.cedarena.org/landtrust,
Chacon and Meza (2001)

Implemented

www.smartwood.org

Implemented

Chomitz et al. (1998); Camacho
et al. (2000); Cruz and
Navarrete (2000); Landell-Mills
and Porras (2002); Rodríguez
(2002);
Ortiz, (2002); Rodriguez, (2002)

Implemented

3.4.1 Land purchases
Probably the most traditional means to ensure that the environmental services of forests are
provided in the long term has been purchasing and conserving the land where the forests are
found. This is how the national system of protected areas was created. Conservation
organizations have also used land purchase to set aside land. The Tropical Science Center
and the Monteverde Conservation League, each of which was referred to earlier with
reference to the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve and the Children’s Eternal Rainforest,
respectively, protected these lands by purchasing more than 54,000 hectares
(www.acmonteverde.com/ibosque.html). Much of this money came from overseas, though
some was sourced locally, principally through voluntary contributions.
Recently, grassroots organizations and private sector interests have opted for land purchases
as a means to ensure forest conservation and the provision of desired environmental services
in their areas of interest (such as water supply, existence values, tourism and recreation).
This includes, for example, a local organization in Zarcero, FAMAAR, which purchased over
200 ha of forest with funds raised from community members. The objective of purchasing
the forestland was to protect the natural springs from where the drinking water for the town
comes. The idea sprang from local dairy farmers who were concerned about water quality for
their aqueducts (Blanco 1999). Although the organization did not have any legally
recognized status, community members began to give money to the association, which has
purchased the land under the name of one of its members. Given that Zarcero is a small and
close-knit community, there is a high level of public accountability among the association
members. Other communities that have made similar land purchases include the towns of
San Ramon, and Hojancha. There are, no doubt, other similar initiatives, but they are
unlikely to be documented or included in literature related to environmental services.
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While land purchase is clearly a market transaction and one that can be motivated by interest
in securing environmental services it can be differentiated from many of the other market
mechanisms by its degree of permanency, unlike schemes where users of services make
regular payments linked to usage of the provided services. In other words, land purchase
represents an investment in environmental services rather than a payment for environmental
services.
3.4.2 Conservation easements
The CEDARENA Land Trust was created in 1999 by the Environmental and Natural
Resources Law Center (CEDARENA) of Costa Rica for the purpose of promoting
biodiversity conservation in private lands within the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. This
was the first land trust created in Latin America (Chacon and Meza 2001). CEDARENA
provides technical and legal assistance to landowners interested in conserving their forests.
The preferred mechanism to promote conservation in the long term is a voluntary contractual
agreement between the landowner and the Land Trust. This conservation easement is
recorded in the National Register and is a limitation imposed on the property regardless of the
landowner. CEDARENA monitors and verifies that land use is not changed on those
properties that have a contract.
Since 1992, 50 conservation easement contracts have been established in Costa Rica (Chacon
and Meza 2001). In the Talamanca-Caribe Biological Corridor (CBTC), the CEDARENA
Land Trust has already established 28 conservation easements, protecting 1,200 ha of
forestland in perpetuity. The work has been carried out in coordination with the Nature
Conservancy, and the Association of Organizations in the CBTC (www.cedarena.org). Land
purchase and easements often go hand in hand. Such initiatives are limited in Costa Rica,
probably due to the lack of incentive for landowners to enter into such agreements, unless
they purchased land primarily for their environmental services in the first place. Chacon and
Meza (2001) consider that another major limitation to expanding the conservation easements
programme is the legal structure of easements under Costa Rican law, which requires that an
easement be conceived in terms of land and not individuals or organizations, ie, it is a
property that gives an easement to another property, not the landowner. The limitation is that
it does not allow conservation organizations to be the beneficiaries of the easement. Some
countries have modified their legislation to allow easements to be transferred to conservation
organizations or the government (Chacon and Meza 2001).
During the period 2001-2005 CEDARENA is focusing its efforts in four biological corridors
considered a priority for conservation purposes. These are: Paso de la Danta, Osa, San JuanLa Selva, and the Pacific drainage of the Monteverde biological corridor.
3.4.3 Forest certification
Forest Certification is another means by which forest owners can be “paid” for the forest
environment services they provide, in this case by the eventual purchasers of certified
products. By the late 1990s Costa Rica already had six of Central America’s eight certified
projects (De Camino and Alfaro 1997). In 2002 there were 11 Smartwood certified
operations in Costa Rica, though most are for timber plantations of exotic tree species (Table
3.17). The impact of certification on natural forests appears to be minimal, since only one or
two certified operations extract timber from forests. This is likely to be reduced given the
policy of the current government to halt timber extraction from natural forests.
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Table 3.17 Smartwood certified plantation and forest management operations in Costa
Rica (as of 20 April, 2002)
Company / Organization
1. Balsatica, S.A.
2. Brinkman & Asociados
Reforestadores de Centro
América, S.A. (BARCA,
S.A.)
3. ECODIRECTA, S.A.
(EXCLUSIVE)
4. ECO CAPITAL S.A.
5. Expomaderas S.A.
6. Flor y Fauna S.A.

7.
8.

Forestales International BV
Fundación Tuva: Reservas
Extractivas de Madera Caida
de Osa

9. Germano-Costarricense, S.A.
10. Reforestadora Buen Precio
S.A.
11. Reforestation Group
International, S.A

Products
Lumber (kiln-dried)
Logs

Species (common names)
Teak
Teak, Cocobolo, Cristobal, Ron ron

N/A

Teak, Melina

N/A
Lumber
Cabinets, ceilings, custom millwork,
doors, flooring, furniture household, furniture - outdoor
/garden, moldings, veneer, window
components, lumber (tropical
woods)
N/A
Furniture – Household

N/A
Teak
Teak

N/A
Furniture parts, Lumber (kiln-dried)

Teak
Ajo, Cedro bateo, Chiricano,
Cristobal, Manglillo, Manu, Mora,
Nispero, Reseco, Santa maria,
Tamarindo, Zapatero
Teak
Teak, Laurel Negro

N/A

Teak

Source: Smartwood list of certified operations, 2002

3.4.4 Official PES scheme
The Forestry Law of 1996 brought a change in the mechanism used to encourage forest
conservation in Costa Rica, with a switch from subsidies and incentives for forest
conservation to payments made for the ‘environmental services’ (PES) that forests provide.
The PES scheme intended to create a market to internalize the costs of providing the goods
and services from forestlands. It was assumed that without monetary compensation,
deforestation would continue in private lands because “private decisions to convert forests
fail to account for the value of the services that those forests provide to others” (Chomitz et
al. 1998: 3). Therefore, the conceptual framework of the Forestry Law indicated that “forest
cover could be maintained only if there were mechanisms to allow… beneficiaries to
compensate landholders for the benefits they produce” (Chomitz et al. 1998).
The FONAFIFO scheme for PES has set out the background and conceptual framework for
environmental service transactions in Costa Rica. Additionally, it has provided certain
standards such as the categories and the reference values of environmental services. A brief
overview of the institutional arrangements, activities, payment scheme and financing
situation of the PES/FONAFIFO programme is provided below. The level of its empirical
underpinning and its performance are covered in subsequent chapters.
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Institutional arrangements
To implement the PES scheme, a formal mechanism was established in 1997 that designated
the National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO) as the administrator of the national PES
programme. FONAFIFO is a relatively autonomous government agency that forms part of
the State Forestry Administration (Administracion Forestal Estatal) within the Ministry of
Environment. It was created in 1991 to distribute subsidies to the forestry sector and is
responsible for managing the funds and making the payments for environmental services.
Due to its role in managing subsidies to the forestry sector, by the mid 1990s FONAFIFO had
accumulated experience in distributing funds to private landholders for forestry activities.
This role was probably facilitated by the administrative model followed. The intention was to
provide a single national broker in the market for forest environmental service payments:
“Costa Rica's new approach to forestry de-links the provision of environmental services
from the financing of these services. The Government acts as an intermediary in the sale
of services. It sells forest services such as carbon sequestration and watershed protection
to domestic and international buyers. Funds from these sales – and from a fuel tax – are
used to finance the services.” (Chomitz et al. 1998:6).
FONAFIFO has a board of
directors that oversees the
work of the agency, and is
composed of representatives
from the public and private
sectors.
An Executive
Director is responsible for
running the day-to-day
operations
and
four
departments are responsible
for executing the projects
and
the
mandate
of
FONAFIFO.

Board of
Directors

MINAE

Executive
Director

Administrative Area

Credit
Area

Environmental
Services Area

Fundraising

A series of other government agencies, NGOs, donors, and private companies have different
types of relationship with FONAFIFO (Table 3.18). For simplicity’s sake the role of these
organizations can be grouped functionally as funding, mediation, and implementation.
FONAFIFO’s funding comes mainly from a tax on fuel. Costa Rican petrol consumers are
therefore the main financiers of the PES scheme.13 Two additional sources of funding are
donors (such as the Global Environment Facility) and private or public companies.
Companies usually make payments for PES in a specific area of their interest. A third source
of funds is an extra tariff charged in utility bills. However, only one utility in the country
(ESPH) has implemented this alternative (see section 3.3.3 above).
FUNDECOR is a foundation that acts as an intermediary between the companies and
FONAFIFO. It has signed agreements with private hydropower producers. FUNDECOR

13

Originally FONAFIFO was supposed to receive 5% from every fuel sale. However the National Treasury did
not pay the entire amount. In 2001 the law was reformed and FONAFIFO now receives 3.5% from every fuel
sale. Overall FONAFIFO will receive more funds from the 3.5% than from the portion of the 5% it received
before the reform (Ortiz, pers. comm. 2002).
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plays a role in promoting the PES scheme in the watershed, where it also acts as an
intermediary between forest owners and FONAFIFO. OCIC is the government agency that
certifies projects for mitigating climate change. In exchange for the PES, landowners transfer
their credits for carbon mitigation to FONAFIFO, who in turn transfers them to OCIC to seek
international purchasers (often the carbon purchaser is identified prior to initiating the
project). Another intermediary is RECOPE, the Government monopoly on imports of oil and
fuel. RECOPE sells petrol to distributors and collects taxes on the sales.14 Taxes collected
are transferred to the National Treasury, which then disburses a percentage to FONAFIFO.
The two main actors with regard to implementation are SINAC and professional foresters.
SINAC coordinates every year with FONAFIFO on prioritizing areas to receive PES. In
addition SINAC is responsible for overseeing compliance with the PES contracts in their area
of influence. Landowners who enter into the PES scheme are required to have a management
plan, which must be drawn up by a professional forester. In addition, a forester must be
assigned to each project to oversee the implementation of the scheme. The foresters charge a
fee for these services. They may work independently, or for an NGO or a consortium of
foresters that provides professional services to forest owners.

14

Distributors pass this cost onto consumers.
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Table 3.18 Institutions that have a relationship with FONAFIFO and their roles.
(In=Intermediary, Im=Implementing, F=Funding, O=Other)
Institution

Role

Description

OCIC

In

OCIC is the official government agency that endorses climate change mitigation projects.
It certifies the credits for carbon offsets. OCIC also verifies compliance. By signing up
for PES, forest owners cede their carbon offset credits to FONAFIFO, which in turn
transfers them to OCIC, which markets them to potential international or domestic buyers.

RECOPE

In

The government monopoly on oil/fuel imports sells petrol to distributors and collects
taxes on the sales. Distributors pass this cost onto consumers. Taxes collected are
transferred to the National Treasury, which then disburses a proportion to FONAFIFO.

ARESEP

O

This is the national authority that regulates all tariffs for public services, including
aqueducts and electricity. If utilities are to incorporate a fee into their tariffs, this must be
approved by ARESEP

Public
Utilities

F

Only one utility (CNFL) currently transfers funds to FONAFIFO for PES. This is a
voluntary agreement. The initial goal of the PES scheme was that all public utilities
would incorporate a PES into their tariffs, as approved by the regulating authority
(ARESEP). ESPH is the only utility that has incorporated a fee for PES directly into their
fees structure for consumers. However, ESPH does not route their funds through
FONAFIFO.

Private
Hydropower
Companies

F

Two hydropower companies have entered into voluntary agreements with FUNDECOR,
who in turn has an agreement with FONAFIFO. The companies pay FONAFIFO, through
FUNDECOR, for PES invested in the watersheds of their hydropower projects.

FUNDECOR

In/Im

The agreements with private hydropower producers include funds destined to
FUNDECOR for promotional activities. FUNDECOR also acts as an intermediary
between forest owners/re-foresters and FONAFIFO. It fulfills the role of professional
forester, for which it charges a fee.

Professional
Foresters

Im

By law all land receiving government funds from the PES scheme (reforestation, forest
management, or forest conservation) must have a management plan drafted by a
professional forester (duly accredited by the relevant national body). In addition, a
forester supervises the project’s compliance with all relevant legislation and requirements.
Independent foresters, or foresters grouped in organizations like FUNDECOR or
CODERFORSA, fulfill this role.

SINAC

Im

FONAFIFO and SINAC coordinate the process of setting annual priorities for distributing
the available funds for the PES scheme. SINAC is also responsible for enforcing
contracts between landowners and FONAFIFO.

Donors/
Companies

F

Donors or companies that want to enter into an agreement with FONAFIFO to fund the
PES scheme can do so through a contract. Funds can go through the national treasury, as
in the case of the Ecomarkets project, or directly into FONAFIFO’s trust fund.
FONAFIFO has sufficient autonomy to be flexible.

Activities and payment scheme
The 1996 Forestry Law established PES for three activities: reforestation, forest management
for timber production, and forest preservation. These follow very closely, if not exactly, the
system of subsidies established for the forestry sector in the 1980s and 1990s, where there
was a subsidy for reforestation (CAF and CAFA), forest management (CAFMA) and forest
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conservation (CPB/CCB). The payment levels and eligible areas for these contracts were
established in February 1997, and have since then been adjusted for inflation (Table 3.19).
Table 3.19 Amounts assigned per hectare for the PES programme according to the type
of activity, 1997-2001. Values are in current colones or US$.
Activity
Reforestation
Forest
Conservation
Forest
Management

Currency
colones
US$
colones
US$
colones
US$

1997
¢132,000
$566
¢50,000
$215
¢80,225
$344

1998
¢154,000
$596
¢60,000
$232
¢94,000
$364

1999
¢154,000
$539
¢60,000
$210
¢94,000
$329

2000
¢169,000
$548
¢66,000
$214
-

2001
¢185,900
$566
¢72,600
$221
¢113,300
$345

Source: Adapted from Mejías and Segura (2001). Average annual exchange rates were used for each year by
the authors to convert from colones to US dollars.

In all cases the payments are made over a five-year period according to a fixed schedule
(Table 3.20). However, the landowner commits to manage forestry plantations for a period
of 20 years (five in the case of forest conservation). This obligation is noted in the public
land register and applies to future purchasers of the land. The landholder must establish a
management plan for the property and it must be drawn up by a professional forester. The
management plan becomes an integral part of the contract.
Table 3.20 Distribution of annual payments for environmental services
Activity
Reforestation
Forest
Management
Forest
conservation

Year 1
50%
20%

Year 2
20%
20%

Year 3
15%
20%

Year 4
10%
20%

Year 5
5%
20%

20%

20%

20%

20%

20%

Source: FONAFIFO (1998) in de Camino et al. (2000)

The annual per hectare payment is paid as compensation to landholders for the bundle of all
four services, and no distinction is made between ecosystems or any of the individual
environmental services. Landholders receive a different payment if they intend to conserve
forest (~$40/ha/yr) or reforest a parcel of land (~$100/ha/yr). A minimum of 1 ha is required
to receive a PES for plantations while the minimum for forest conservation is 2 ha. The
maximum area that can receive PES is 300 ha, except in the case of Indian reservations which
can have a maximum of 600 ha. In the case of a group of landholders that apply together as a
package, the maximum limit is 50 ha per landowner (Camacho et al. 2000).
Financing
As indicated earlier, the PES scheme merely plays a brokerage role and therefore must find
not only willing sellers but also willing buyers. When the PES scheme was officially
initiated in 1997, $14 million was invested in reforesting 6,500 ha, managing 10,000 ha of
natural forest for timber production, and protecting 79,000 ha of forests, including secondary
forests. The sale of carbon credits in that year through the Norwegian Government generated
approximately 20 per cent of the required investments in PES (Espinoza et al. 1999).
However, through 2001 a majority (>95 per cent, Sanchez 2001) of the financing of
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FONAFIFO came from a national fuel tax. All other sources of finance are service-specific
and, therefore, were mentioned earlier in this chapter. These include other carbon sales, the
Ecomercados project, financing of biodiversity components of conservation payments, and
the contracts developed for hydrological services between FONAFIFO and hydropower
producers.
The 1996 Forestry Law allocates one-third of the revenues from the fossil fuels tax to the
PES scheme (Chomitz et al. 1998), but the allocation promised has not been delivered (Table
3.21). Theoretically, the tax could yield up to $19.8 million annually. However, the Ministry
of Finance negotiated the amount of these payments with forest owner associations and
arrived at a figure of only $6.5 million to $7 million (de Camino et al. 2000).
Table 3.21 Discrepancies between the financial resources allocated to FONAFIFO and
disbursements made by the Government
Year

Amount that should have been
transferred to FONAFIFO from Fuel
Tax (millions of colones)

Amount transferred to
FONAFIFO (millions of
colones)

Amount transferred to
CAF Programme
(millions of colones)

1,786
1,269
2,406

1,581
2,381
1,590

1997
8,959
1998
8,700
1999
9,625
Source: Camacho et al. (2000)

This situation has caused an imbalance between supply and demand for PES, where demand
for the incentives far outstrips available resources and each conservation area competes for a
share of available funds (Barborak 2000). The imbalance is aggravated by the fact that if the
programme is to increase the total area under PES, annual commitments will need to be
raised continuously, as the payments for additional hectares has to be added to commitments
from previous years. For example, in 2001, of 2,345 million colones destined for the PES
programme, only 304 million (~13 per cent of the total funds) were allocated to incorporating
new land (FONAFIFO 2002).
Apart from internal financing from the fuel tax, difficulties experienced in operationalizing
the Kyoto Protocol, and the fact that INBio has directly managed the bioprospecting
agreements, has meant that international funding available for the PES scheme has been
limited in recent years. The situation has led FONAFIFO and the Government to seek
additional sources of internal funding. FONAFIFO is seeking to sign more contracts with
private sector companies that are targeted as key consumers of environmental services, such
as those reviewed above.
As part of its search for innovative ways to raise additional funds for the PES scheme,
FONAFIFO recently established the Environmental Services Certificate (CSA). This new
mechanism, officially launched in March 2002, is a means of giving flexibility to the existing
PES scheme. The CSA is a certificate issued by FONAFIFO, which can be purchased by
individuals or organizations interested in paying for the environmental services of forests.
The purchaser can choose to allow FONAFIFO to allocate the funds to an area it selects, or
can indicate a specific area that FONAFIFO must target to invest the resources collected
through that particular CSA. Although the CSA is not a financial instrument in that it does
not commit FONAFIFO to any financial compensation (i.e. interest rate or return of capital),
the CSA can be deducted from gross income tax. CSAs are certified by a third party to
guarantee to the purchasers that the process is transparent and that all the technical, legal, and
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administrative requirements have been fulfilled. FONAFIFO hopes that CSAs will be
tradable at some point, which will allow the market to establish the value of environmental
services (FONAFIFO 2002). It is important to note that CSAs are not intended as a
mechanism to compensate for environmental damage caused by the purchaser. This means
that the CSA is not a form of environmental mitigation.
In 2001 the legislature abolished the obligation for the Ministry of Finance to pass on the
entire revenues collected by the tax to FONAFIFO. This implied that the Ministry of Finance
would determine how much money would be allocated to FONAFIFO every year. However,
in late 2001, a new law for tax simplification replaced the source of income for FONAFIFO.
Instead of assigning a third of the “impuesto selectivo de consumo” on fuel, the new law
assigned 3.5 per cent of the “impuesto único” on fuel. It is estimated that with this new
scheme FONAFIFO should expect to receive on average 3,500 million colones per year for
the PES programme (Mejías and Segura 2001). Although the previous tax assigned more
than twice that amount, the reality is that if the 3,500 million colones are transferred to
FONAFIFO, it will be a significant increase in the funds available to the PES scheme (Mejias
2001; Ortiz 2002). This tax will most probably continue to be FONAFIFO’s major source of
funds for the foreseeable future.
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4 Knowledge base that underpins markets and payments
This chapter explores the scientific and economic basis for the market and payment schemes
reviewed above. The intention is to offer a critical assessment of the extent to which markets
and payments for environmental services in Costa Rica are based on a sound underpinning
regarding the biophysical, economic and social relationships involved – as opposed to
demonstrably incorrect, unreliable or merely generalized views on the subject. In particular
this assessment focuses on what was known or what was assumed about the economic value
of the services being provided. Where such information is available, the accuracy and
reliability of any associated biophysical and social analyses is then assessed.
The review suggests that the degree to which there is a sound and site-specific knowledge
base that underpins the development of market mechanisms to pay for the environmental
services of forests varies considerably. Some of the mechanisms are based on a series of
studies that serve as the technical justification for the payment or the market. At the same
time, many other cases do not appear to be based on solid knowledge that can be used to
quantify the environmental service being provided or the economic value of that service.
Where there are perceived gaps, limitations or errors in the knowledge base they will be
identified and indicated as such.
Clearly development of markets and payments systems that are based on sound
underpinnings stand the greatest chance of thriving and being replicated, followed by those
that rely on facts as generally accepted (conventional wisdom), even if lacking specific
technical support. Where markets and payments are developed on demonstrably false or
inherently unreliable estimates of the importance of environmental services, not only is there
potential for failure and disenchantment of those involved, but eventually for the larger
process of market development and, indeed, the larger environmental agenda to be
discredited.
In organizing the relevant literature, the same categories of services and market cases
developed in Chapter 3 will be employed. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the references
and how they contribute to the basis for the different services. It is important to stress that
the emphasis in the presentation is on the chronological sequence of the knowledge base, in
order to try to relate the progress over time in understanding of the economic value of these
services to the efforts to develop markets and payments for these services. As will become
clear, it is also the case that for some services a reliance on non-Costa Rican estimates of
values have (or should have) played a role. It is equally true that the broader literature on the
value of these services in Costa Rica has been (or should have been) of relevance, even where
the sites or values studied are not those that are incorporated into specific cases. Thus, the
table below and the ensuing text refer to “generic” studies and to studies undertaken of the
specific market cases reviewed earlier.
Generic studies are ones that while not specific to a particular case of Costa Rican market or
payment development have (or should have) influenced the development of these cases. As
can be seen the mix of these generic and specific studies are generally related to the extent to
which economic valuation is likely to be site specific or not. Thus, in the cases of
bioprospecting and carbon for example, many of the generic studies that are cited are studies
not specific to a given country but rather global estimates. However, in the case of
hydrological services the non-transferability of value figures from other regions is often
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recognized and, thus, the generic studies consist of national estimates from watersheds other
than those in which the services are developed.
Where they are of central importance, the generic studies are described. However, a full
review of the literature on bioprospecting or carbon values, for example, goes beyond the
remit of this paper. Thus, an attempt is made to provide a flavour of the generic literature,
including a rough assessment of its merits. The bulk of the literature review, however,
focuses on the studies that have supported specific cases of market development or have been
undertaken within Costa Rica.
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Table 4.1 Summary of economic studies of environmental services in Costa Rica
Services

1. Biodiversity
A. Bioprospecting
(i) Generic

(ii) INBio-Merck
B. Tourism, Recreation and
Scenic Beauty
(i) Park Entrance Fees

(ii) Scenic Beauty
C: Ecological Services
(i) Del Oro
D. Bundled Biodiversity Services

Classification of studies (i.e. as
economic valuation or cost
estimate)

Reference

Value of a species or sample

Farnsworth and Soejarto (1985);
Principe (1989); McAllister
(1991); Ruitenbeek (1989); Pearce
and Puroshothaman (1992); Reid
et al. (1993); Artuso (1994);
Simpson, Sedjo and Reid (1995)
Aylward (1993);
Harvard Business School (1992)

Value of a species or sample,
versus cost of protection

a) Willingness-to-pay for
entrance fees;
b) WTP for conservation of
protected areas;
c) econometric estimation of
elasticities of demand
Assessment of factors underlying
value of scenic beauty

a) Tobias and Mendelsohn (1991);
Echeverría et al. (1997); Baldares
and Laarman (1991); Chase
(1995); Schultz et al. (1998)
b) Echeverría et al. (1995)
c) Chase et al. (1998); Lindberg
and Aylward (1999)
Watson and Fallas (2000)

Cost of services provided
Total economic value or
contribution to GDP

Janzen (1999)
Barrantes and Castro (1999a)

Damage costs of climate change

Tol (1999)

Costs and benefits of sequestering
and storing carbon

Echeverria et al. (1997), Aylward
at al. (1998); Ramírez and Gomez
(1999); Otarola and Venegas
(1999); Ramírez et al. (1999)

Methodologies, literature review,
and some specific value estimates
from case studies

Echavarria (1999); Castro and
Barrantes (1998); CT Energia
(2000); Cruz and Navarrete
(2000); CINPE (2001)

(ii) Non-PES cases/watersheds
a) Ecological-Economic
Values of Treated Water
b) Arenal
c) Rio Macho

Value, opportunity cost or cost
estimates of watershed protection

(ii) PES cases/watersheds
a) Rio Volcan and Don
Pedro HEP

Valuation or opportunity cost of
services in different future land
use scenarios

a) Solórzano et al. (1995)
b) Aylward et al. (1998); Aylward
(1998); Castro and Barrantes
(1998): Chakravorty and Chen
(2000)
c) Quesada-Mateo (1979);
Rodriguez (1989); Otarola and
Venegas (1999)
a) Reyes and Cordoba (1999
b) Barrantes and Castro (1999b);
Castro and Salazar (2000)

2. Carbon
A. Generic
B. Costa Rica

3. Hydrological Services
(i) Generic
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Services

Classification of studies (i.e. as
economic valuation or cost
estimate)
b) ESPH Heredia
c) La Esperanza HEP

4. Bundles of Services
(i) Generic – Costa Rica

4.1

Reference

c) Rojas and Aylward (2002)

Value aggregations

a) Carranza et al. (1996); Espinoza
et al. (1999); Ortiz (1999); Otarola
and Venegas (1999); Sage and
Otarola (2000)

Biodiversity protection

When paying private forest owners for protecting the biodiversity their forests sustain, it is
vital to understand which species are to be protected and which habitats they are found in.
This knowledge allows for the prioritization of resources allocated to biodiversity protection.
In addition to species taxonomy, it is important to have an understanding of the life history of
the species in order to ensure the protection of a viable minimum population that can be selfsustaining in the long term (Shafer 1990). This is particularly important for migratory
animals that rely on several habitat types at different times of the year. In the case of Costa
Rica, it is also important to have an understanding of the biodiversity conserved in the
national system of protected areas and how it can best be complemented by promoting
biodiversity protection in private lands.
In comparison with other tropical countries, Costa Rica has made rapid strides in identifying
and cataloguing the diversity contained in its ecosystems. Since the late 1960s and early
1970s a global, systematic effort by scientists to improve the knowledge base of tropical
forests was undertaken, and Costa Rica proved to be a very appropriate site to host such work
because of its small size, high biodiversity, and its economic and political stability. Many
researchers from developed countries have used the country as a laboratory to further the
understanding of tropical ecology and, over time, this has fostered a correspondingly large
group of local scientists that have played an important role in the development of this
knowledge base.
The creation of the National Institute of Biodiversity (INBio) in 1989 was a pivotal
development for the taxonomic classification of the country’s biological diversity, though
their work has mainly focused on protected areas. The government has developed a National
Strategy for the Conservation and Sustainable use of Biodiversity. The GRUAS project also
helped identify key forest patches outside protected areas that serve the function of biological
corridors. These developments have enabled the country to have a clear idea of which areas
must be given priority to receive funds for the conservation of biological diversity. It has
also guided the Ministry of Environment in designating new protected areas and supporting
the development of private forest reserves.
This technical knowledge is accompanied by a growing understanding of the economics of
the sustainable use of biodiversity in the country. As the services offered by biodiversity
have often benefited people from far away from the original site there has been a relationship
between the national knowledge base and the international literature. In this section this
knowledge base is reviewed, in an attempt to define the role that valuation has played in the
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four services described earlier: bioprospecting; tourism, recreation and scenic beauty;
ecological services; and bundled biodiversity services.
4.1.1 Bioprospecting
Bioprospecting includes a range of different activities, all of which involve the derivation of
new products from the biochemical and genetic reservoir of information inherent in the
diversity of organisms on the planet. As shown in Table 4.2, pharmaceutical applications are
by far the largest of these markets in terms of revenue. Indeed, as recounted above, the
original INBio-Merck deal (1991) and many of INBio’s subsequent deals have targeted
pharmaceutical products. The generic and specific literature is assessed below in
chronological order as it relates to the INBio experience. Much of the material on
developments prior to 1993 is based on Aylward (1993), which provides a thorough review
of the literature available on valuing pharmaceutical prospecting at that time. Subsequent
papers are also referenced although it is fair to say that most of the interest in the valuation of
bioprospecting occurred in the first half of the 1990s.
Table 4.2 Estimates of market size for products that can be derived from bioprospecting
Type of Product
Pharmaceuticals (worldwide, 1998, estimated growth of 6% per year through 2001)
Nutraceuticals (dietary supplements, functional and medical foods) (USA)
(estimated for 1998, varies according to definition)
Seeds (worldwide) (1994), including commercial seed ($15bn), farm saved seed,
and seed from government institutions
Agbiotech crop and food products (estimates for 2010)
Pesticides (worldwide) (1996)
Cosmetics and toiletries (USA) (1998)
Animal health products (worldwide) (1995)
Top selling herbs (Europe, Asia, North America) (1996) (average growth rate 1215% per year)
Soap and detergent ingredients (USA) (1996)
Herbal remedies (Europe) (1998)
Enzymes (1996)
2.5% natural cosmetics
Detergent enzymes (USA) (1996)
Source: Sittenfeld and Lovejoy, 1999

Revenue
(in US$ billion)
300
86
45
40
31.2
25.6
14.4
12.9
9
8
2.5
0.6
0.16

It is quite probable that no single estimate of the potential value of engaging in
pharmaceutical prospecting motivated INBio’s efforts, as much as did the conviction held by
many of the scientists involved in INBio’s establishment that this was an unexploited and
untapped market. INBio’s emergence was indeed timely. After decades of inactivity, the late
1980s and early 1990s saw a revival of the idea that new drugs could be found by
investigating biodiversity, particularly of the highly biodiverse tropical forests. This
resurgence was illustrated by the numbers that turned out for an international conference
sponsored by the Rainforest Alliance’s “Periwinkle Project” in 1992, which brought together
many people from industry, academia and conservation to share their nascent experiences in
pharmaceutical prospecting.
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In the early days of the resurgence certain “global” studies of the economic value of
pharmaceutical prospecting were oft-cited (see those from 1991 or before in Table 2.4).
Many of these values were severely exaggerated and represented poor application of
economic valuation methodologies (for a full critique see Aylward 1993). Estimates casually
bandied about that species were worth millions of dollars were substantiated by some of these
studies. In fact, it was only following the INBio-Merck deal that these estimates began to
move on from estimating the potential value of the products actually produced by prospecting
to the expected returns that prospectors could earn from royalties in a competitive market. A
series of studies that were linked more or less directly to INBio and tried to respond to the
need for more realistic calculations subsequently emerged (Harvard Business School 1992;
Aylward 1993; Artuso 1994; Reid et al. 1993; Simpson et al. 1995; Barbier and Aylward
1996).
The most straightforward methods were calculations of expected royalty returns based on
expected hit ratios, royalty rates, expected sales and other industry parameters (Harvard
Business School 1992; Aylward 1993; Reid et al. 1993; Artuso 1994; Barbier and Aylward
1996). These studies suggested figures in the order of $50 to $50,000 per untested species,
with the studies by IIED (Aylward 1993; Barbier and Aylward 1996) and Harvard Business
School suggesting a best estimate of approximately $250 per species or per sample. Artuso’s
(1994) royalty model suggested a figure of $500 per extract tested. Simpson et al. (1995)
employed a more complex “lottery” model to estimate the value of the marginal species.
Their results are very sensitive (as are all the models) to the probability that a given species
yields a hit, and they cite combinations of parameters that result in values for marginal
species of from $2 to $10,000, with a value of $67 where the probability of a hit is 1 in
25,000, which approaches the values used by the other researchers.
However, it is difficult to arrive at an exact comparison of these figures as the authors are
discussing variously returns per species, per sample and per extract. How to extrapolate these
figures to actual screening programmes is also not always clear, given that the same species,
sample or extract may be submitted to various screening programmes over time. For
example, the analysis by Simpson et al. (1995) assumes that once a species yields a hit it is
not employed in further testing. However, reality suggests that a “hot” extract will often be
exactly the one that will demonstrate activity in other screens. As pointed out by Aylward
(1993), for the purposes of pharmaceutical prospecting, biodiversity is effectively a
renewable resource since diseases (and, at a much slower rate, organisms) evolve over time
and, thus, a scenario of continually testing species extracts against evolving disease targets is
feasible.
From a practical point of view, much of the discussion of the value of individual species in
pharmaceutical prospecting needs to be weighted against the larger objective of conserving
biodiversity. It is clear that initial expectations regarding the potential contribution of
prospecting to biodiversity were exaggerated based on the early “valuation” studies. These
same claims also drove much of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which in turn
supported efforts to “nationalize” the biodiversity asset for this purpose.
Perhaps the first comparison of this nature appeared in a working paper by Aylward (1993)
and was later published in Barbier and Aylward (1996). Using figures for the costs of
biodiversity protection on 600,000 hectares of Costa Rican national parks and a generous set
of assumptions about annual turnover for screening, loosely based on the INBio-Merck
experience, Barbier and Aylward (1996) calculated that the INBio model of allocating upfront and royalty payments (10 per cent and 50 per cent respectively to protected area
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management) would lead to a present value financial return to protected area management of
around $2 million. When these returns are set against the full present value of the costs of
protecting these areas of $245 million it becomes clear that pharmaceutical prospecting will
only be a minor contributor to the costs of biodiversity conservation. Simpson et al. (1995)
reach the same conclusion, applying their estimates to eighteen biodiversity hot spots around
the world. The results suggest values of $1 to $20 per hectare. The results from Costa Rica
fit nicely within that range at a present value of just over $3/ha.
In conclusion, it is probably worth reiterating that INBio did not depend on these value
estimates to generate business, yet the early, high numbers did provide a secure backdrop for
selling prospecting as a valuable activity. The $1 million from Merck only served to heighten
this sense of anticipation. However, the valuation studies that were then produced urged
caution, and indeed the initial expectations of large flows of money for conservation derived
from prospecting have not materialized. Still, it is worth emphasizing as many authors have,
that pharmaceutical prospecting remains a potentially profitable venture, and one that is
yielding important technical and scientific benefits to countries that invest in it - in terms of
improving human capacity and knowledge in the areas of medical research and biodiversity
inventories (Aylward 1993; Laird and ten Kate 2002).
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Table 4.3 Summary of the literature on the pharmaceutical value of biodiversity
Reference

Farnsworth
and Soejarto
(1985)

Principe
(1989)

McAllister
(1991)

Principe
(1989)

Ruitenbeek
(1989)

Harvard
Business
School (1992)

Pearce and
Puroshothaman
(1992)

Reid et al.
(1993)

plants

plants

trees

plants

Cameroonian
species

Costa Rican
species

rainforest plants

biotic samples

US

OECD

global

OECD

not specified

not specified

OECD

not specified

Type of data

drug sales

drug sales

drug sales

value of a life
saved

patent renewal
costs

royalties on
drug sales

drug sales and
value of life saved

royalties on
drug sales

Type of value

annual

annual

annual

annual

annual

net present
value

annual

net present
value

Value per item

$200m

$200m US

$250,000

$37.5b

$7,500

$253,000

$1.95m - $350m

not specified

3:100

1:5,000

not specified

1:10,000

1:1,000 or

1:40,000

Biodiversity valued
Scope of values

$600m OECD
Success rate for discovery
of new drugs

1:125

1:2,000

(10:500)

1:10,000

Annual value per untested
species (1990 dollars)

$2.58m

$474,000

$7,500

$23.7m

$15.00 $150.00

na

$585.00 - $1.05m

na

Net present value per
untested species (1990
dollars)*

$27.8m

$5.11m

$80,800

$255m

$162.00 -

$253.00

$6,310 -

$52.50 $46,000

$1,620

$11.3m

Notes: *Due to the different methods used in calculating values, the figures are not, strictly speaking, comparable. Net present values for studies presenting only annual
values are calculated over a 40-year term with a 10 per cent discount rate. na = not applicable, m = millions, b = billions.
Source: Aylward (1993)
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4.1.2 Tourism and recreation
Costa Rica is one of the world’s most biodiverse countries and, with more than two dozen
parks and other protected areas, has preserved more than ten per cent of the country’s primary
forests. The country has also experienced rapid growth in international tourism arrivals, due
in large part to these national parks. In 1993, tourism became Costa Rica’s largest single
source of foreign exchange, and 65 per cent of tourists from the US, Canada, and Europe
visited national parks during their holidays in Costa Rica.
Naturally, attempts to estimate the economic value of ecotourism, through examination of
tourists’ willingness-to-pay for visits to protected areas, and for conservation more generally,
have proliferated over the years in Costa Rica. A summary of some of the more notable and
widely cited papers is provided in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Valuation studies of ecotourism in Costa Rica
Survey

Method

Year
1988

Site
Monteverde

1989

Value Measured

TCM

Entrance fee

CVM

1989

National
Parks
Monteverde

1991/92

Monteverde

CVM

1995

National
Parks
National
Parks
Manuel
Antonio NP

CVM

Appropriate
entrance fee
Appropriate
entrance fee
Total economic
value
Appropriate
entrance fee
Entrance fee

Poás NP

CVM

1995
1995

1995

CVM

CVM
CVM

Entrance fee with
improved
services
Entrance fee with
improved
services

Willingnessto-pay
Residents
$35

Study
Foreigners
-

$0.60

$1.30

$1.50

$4.20

$137

$119

Tobias and
Mendelsohn (1991)
Baldares and Laarman
(1991)
Baldares and Laarman
(1991)
Echeverría et al. (1995)

$1.40

$6.80

Chase (1995)

$4.78

$22.76

Chase (1995)

$13

$14

Schultz et al. (1998)

$11

$23

Schultz et al. (1998)

Notes: TCM is the travel cost method and CVM is the contingent valuation method

The first survey was of resident visitors at the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve in 1988.
The study employed the travel cost method and suggested willingness-to-pay figures in the
order of $35. As part of a 1989 initiative by the National Parks Service to review entrance
fees, Baldares and Laarman (1991) asked visitors to report what they felt ‘appropriate’ fee
levels would be at National Parks and at Monteverde. A similar survey was undertaken in
1995 by Chase (1995) at three national parks (Irazú, Poás and Manuel Antonio). While there
was some variation in the results for foreigners, the figures suggested by residents were all
less than $2.00, similar to the fee levels at the time. Baldares and Laarman found foreigners
suggesting a higher fee ($4.20) at Monteverde than at National Parks ($1.30). Almost six
years later, Chase (1995) found that foreigners felt that $6.80 was a ‘fair’ entrance fee for
national parks. Chase (1995) also examined the willingness-to-pay of visitors for entrance
fees at the same parks. The resulting figures were substantially higher than those for
‘appropriate’ fee levels. Residents were willing to pay over $10 to visit the parks and

57

foreigners even more (up to $23) depending on the park. A later paper from surveys also
undertaken in 1995 suggested higher figures (over $10) for the willingness-to-pay of
residents and found similar figures of $14 to $23 for foreigners (Schultz et al 1998).
All of these figures pale before those elicited from tourists at Monteverde for their full
willingness-to-pay for conserving the entire reserve. Echeverría et al. (1995) suggest figures
in the region of $120 for both residents and foreigners. Unfortunately, there is no direct and
comparable survey of willingness-to-pay entrance fees at Monteverde. However, the earlier
studies at Monteverde and those at other parks suggest that a good $100 of this willingnessto-pay is related to existence values apart from those derived from personal enjoyment of the
actual visit (as this would be reflected in the willingness to pay entrance fees).
It is interesting to note that the surveyed values have increased over time, sometimes
substantially. The exact cause is not clear, but one could speculate that the increasing
popularity of Costa Rica as an ecotourism destination and the accompanying rise in the public
perception of the importance of natural assets in this regard may well have influenced
visitors’ sense of value. These changes were clearly visible within the country and the
policy-making community during the 1990s. While it is not clear whether these valuation
studies drove policy or merely confirmed common knowledge and expectation regarding the
worth of the ecotourism experience, it is clear that they very much had an effect on policy.
Indeed, the Chase (1995) study was conducted in conjunction with the National Parks
Service, and early results may well have had an influence on the decision taken in September,
1994 to increase entrance fees significantly for foreigners at national parks. It is also
noteworthy that when the fees were lowered substantially in April 1996, they were lowered to
$6, which was approximately what Chase (1995) had reported as a fee that foreigners felt was
‘appropriate’.
The difficulty of applying sophisticated contingent valuation approaches in developing
countries and the problems that are encountered with many such studies should not be
discounted (Whittington 2002). Nevertheless, many of these studies were carried out by
competent local/international teams of researchers and published in academic journals. The
figures for Costa Ricans probably show more unexplained variability. Indeed, many of the
later studies tend to have small sample sizes for residents (around 50) as researchers focused
more on foreigners and, thus, these figures may be largely discounted. Sample sizes for
foreigners, however, were often between 150 and 300 people, enabling a greater degree of
confidence in the transferability of the estimated means to the larger population of visitors.
Nevertheless, basing policy decisions regarding pricing on estimates of mean willingness-topay remains a crude endeavour. Much more useful is basing such decisions on the expected
elasticities of demand. Elasticities provide the means to assess how visits and revenues will
respond as prices are changed. They can also be used to find the optimum point for
generating revenue. In the case of Costa Rica, two studies of this nature were published
following the raising and lowering of prices. Chase et al. (1998) employed the original
survey data from the 1995 publication to estimate own and cross price elasticities for
foreigners for the three national parks included in the survey. Lindberg and Aylward (1999)
examined actual visits to these same parks before, during and after the price hikes of the mid1990s.
The two studies provide vastly different results. As shown in Table 4.5, Chase et al. (1998)
found that visits were relatively inelastic (elasticities of less than negative one). In other
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words, visits would drop off just as fast if not faster in percentage terms as the price was
raised. In this case the prognosis would have been to avoid a drastic price hike, such as that
of 1994, in the expectation that visits would drop off dramatically. Whether or not this study
or drafts of the study had an influence on pricing policy and the decision to lower the fee to
$6 for foreigners is not known.
Table 4.5 Elasticities of demand in three National Parks
Chase et al. (1998)
Park
Poás
Irazú
M. Antonio

-2.9
-1.05
-0.96

at $5
-0.051
-0.296
-0.238

Lindberg and Aylward (1999)
at $10
-0.053
-0.366
-0.281

at $20
-0.055
-0.485
-0.345

Source: Chase et al. (1998)
Notes: Elasticities represent the percentage change in quantity (visits in this case) associated with a percentage
change in price (entrance fees in this case)

Lindberg and Aylward (1999) employed time series data on prices and visits to Poás, Irazú
and Manuel Antonio parks and found that demand was, in fact, elastic. That is, a significant
gain in revenue from foreign tourists could be expected due to the price hikes, given that the
percentage drop in visits fell off at less than the percentage increase in entrance fees. In the
case of Poás national park, the figure of -2.9 derived by Chase et al. (1998) was far off the
mark, as actual experience showed demand to be very inelastic at -0.05 (across a range of
relevant fee levels). Lindberg and Aylward (1999) found less of a difference in the case of
Manuel Antonio where the observed elasticity was around -0.3 while the stated preference
figure was close to -1.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 reveal how differently foreigners responded to the large price rise in
September 1994. The third arrow from the left in each figure shows the point at which the increase
came into effect. The subsequent drop in visits to Manuel Antonio was considerable, with visits
dropping by up to 50 per cent in response to the 1,500 per cent price rise. Even with half as many
foreign tourists arriving, however, revenues were bound to increase. In the case of Poás, the drop in
visits was much less severe. The difference in elasticity is easily explained. In the case of Manuel
Antonio, a small coastal park featuring lowland rainforest, some of the key attractions are the
beautiful forest-ringed white sand beaches. However, similar sand and waves are available just
outside the park on public beaches. Tourists arriving and faced with a $15 entrance fee were thus
more likely to pass up the opportunity to visit the park than tourists were to forgo their visit in the
case of Poás national park. The latter is an active volcano surrounded by cloud forest and is at least a
half-day trip an hour outside the capital city of San José – and usually figures in the average tourist’s
itinerary.
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Figure 4.1 Response of actual and seasonally adjusted visits to price changes at Manuel
Antonio National Park
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Figure 4.2 Response of actual and seasonally adjusted visits to price changes at Poás
National Park
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4.1.3 Natural scenic beauty
Only one publication was found that specifically addressed issues related to the knowledge
base underpinning the environmental service of scenic beauty (Watson and Fallas 2000). The
report, which was prepared for the Ecomarkets project, attempted to develop a methodology
to quantify the benefits of forests to scenic beauty. For this, the authors reviewed available
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literature, interviewed a wide range of individuals, and developed a GIS based model that
included variables such as angle of visibility, land use, etc. For the model, the variables
enabled different sites to be ranked according to their “index of complexity” and a measure of
uniqueness. Another map was created that included the sensory perception, with variables
such as sound, aroma, social surroundings, and texture. The scenery was calculated by
optimal land use (versus current land use), ruggedness of the terrain, and a measure for
visibility. The final variable included the distance of the scenery from the viewing points,
which was calculated by 250-metre wide rings along the roads.
The authors concluded that the methodology could be applied in watersheds to model scenic
beauty using GIS. For watersheds that do not have forests, the major contribution to scenic
beauty is the recuperation of secondary forests.
4.1.4 Ecological services
Apart from rough estimates derived for the purposes of national statistics (as discussed in the
next sub-section), little or no empirical work on the value of ecological services has been
conducted in Costa Rica. The Del Oro contract referred to earlier was based largely on
estimates of what it would cost for the various parties to the deal to undertake their part of the
agreement, i.e. payments for technical assistance, rent, processing, etc. To conclude that the
estimate of these costs is an estimate of the value of the ecological services is incorrect. It is
simply an estimate of the cost of providing these services and says nothing about whether in
economic terms the benefits are worth incurring these costs. This confusion between costs
and benefits is a repeated theme in the literature on environmental services, stemming largely
from the misuse of the “replacement cost” approach to valuation. Ellis and Fisher (1987)
provide a clear discussion of why this approach can yield potentially erroneous conclusions
on the value of environmental services.
4.1.5 Biodiversity bundles
A question often posed as part of the larger, international processes related to biodiversity
conservation is ‘what is the value of biodiversity?’ An accompanying question relates to
determining the economic contribution to the economy or GNP of biodiversity. Such
questions and efforts to address them typically emerge from national level processes, often
those driven by international initiatives for biodiversity conservation, such as the Biodiversity
Convention. Under the convention, countries must engage in various national level strategies
and assessments that often include issues of valuation of biodiversity. Such efforts are linked
in a way to the issue of environmental services, in the sense that they reflect efforts to take a
holistic view of biodiversity as a service bundle.
Unfortunately, efforts to value ‘biodiversity’ are beset by problems of a conceptual,
theoretical, methodological and practical nature. Principal among these is arriving at a
consistent and useful definition of biodiversity. This can be illustrated by a brief review of
some of the initiatives in this regard in Costa Rica.
Castro and Barrantes (1999) review several issues underlying the creation of a market for
biodiversity services, including a description of the values and revenues from the biodiversity
sector. The approximate revenue/year from some biodiversity products in Costa Rica are
estimated as (1996 US$):
• Ecotourism $686.2 million (based on average expenditure per visitor to national parks);
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• export of cocoons from butterfly farms $0.1 million, water based transport $2 million
(Nicoya Gulf ferry revenues);
• genetic material for livestock $448.8 million, and agriculture $169.2 million (scientific
advances in "produced" biodiversity);
• wood-based crafts for export $6.7 million;
• pharmaceutical nurseries $5.0 million (exports of plants like raicilla and ipecacuana);
• carbon regulation $1.0 million (revenues accrued from the Costa Rica-Norway AIJ
project);
• biodiversity research $0.4 million (funds obtained to support research in biodiversity, as
recorded by FUNDECOOPERACION, GTZ, PNUD, and BID);
• bioprospecting $0.6 million (funds obtained by INBio);
• demand for water from forests $68.8 million;
• scenic beauty $9.5 million (this figure relates to entrance to parks whose main attraction is
their natural beauty);
• fisheries $56.3 million (relates to the fish extracted from the oceans); biological control
$603.8 million (no reference to origin of this figure);
• pollination $235.1 million (the authors estimate this figure is based on studies for the
USA).
From the framework put forward in this paper it is clear that biodiversity quickly becomes
confused with environmental services more broadly in efforts to calculate the “total economic
value” of biodiversity. That said, the example above should reinforce the breadth of
opportunity for biodiversity to contribute to a national economy. While bioprospecting,
tourism and scenic beauty are potentially valuable aspects of biodiversity, there is a range of
other benefits that are less well understood and studied.
4.2

Greenhouse gas mitigation

Costa Rica was one of the first countries to enter into the pilot phase of Activities
Implemented Jointly. These activities included developing the knowledge required as a basis
for financial transactions to buy and sell carbon offsets. Since this paper is focused on
environmental services, this section will only refer to climate change issues related to the
forestry sector.
Key knowledge necessary for developing a carbon market and greenhouse gas mitigation
projects includes understanding:
•
•
•
•

how much carbon is already stored (in existing forests and soils),
what are the carbon sequestration rates of regenerating natural forests or plantations,
how much of the carbon is additional (i.e. would not have been sequestered without the
mitigation project), and
how much of the carbon could not be taken into consideration due to leakage.

Due to Costa Rica’s early entry into the carbon market a number of Costa Rican
organizations have amassed considerable experience and skill in these areas (including the
Tropical Science Center, CATIE, and Fundecor). Early on the Tropical Science Center
developed an approach to carbon flux estimation based on the Life Zone Ecology approach.
Drawing on extensive knowledge and sampling of forests by life zone and association, and
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employing standard conversions from biomass to carbon the Center played a pivotal role in
the initial inventories of carbon stored in standing forests and estimates of the potential for
secondary regrowth. Meanwhile, in developing a number of market proposals for Guanacaste
National Park, estimates of carbon sequestration rates were developed. These figures and
approaches were then used and reused as studies of carbon potential or market proposals were
developed at sites throughout the country.
In terms of the potential above-ground storage of carbon in forests, the figures vary widely
depending on the location or life zone. An example of calculations of above-ground carbon
stored in forests of different types is provided below for a range of sites initially surveyed by
Holdridge as part of the development of the life zone methodology. Figures in Table 4.6
suggest that in per hectare terms stored carbon values might vary by a factor of four. If the
range is expanded somewhat the range is from 50 tons/ha to 300 tons/ha. In terms of carbon
sequestration, estimates of the rate of sequestration of carbon in regrowth can be used to
calculate expected sequestration over time. An example from work in Guanacaste National
Park is provided in
Table 4.7. Note that approximately 70 per cent of the potential carbon of a site is expected to
accumulate in the first 50 years of regrowth.
Table 4.6 Calculation of biomass and carbon storage for Holdridge sites
Site

Life
Zone

Basal Area
(m2/ha)

1B
bs - T
40.5
20A
bh - T
53.4
4
bmh-T
43.8
21
bh - P
32.8
16
bmh - P
49.0
Source: Echeverría et al. (1997)

Length of
stem (m)1
8.2
14.4
16.3
11.5
16.4

Total
Volume
(m3/ha)
222.5
515.2
478.3
252.7
538.4

Average
Density
(gr/cm3)
0.553
0.625
0.515
0.709
0.615

Biomass
(ton/ha)

Carbon
(ton/ha)

196.8
515.2
394.1
286.7
529.8

88.6
231.8
177.4
129.0
238.4

Table 4.7 Sequestration of carbon by life zones over 50 years
Proportion of Total Potential Carbon Stored
10%
Potential
(years 0carbon
10)
(tons/ha)
bs-T, bh-Pv
88.59
8.86
bh-T
231.84
23.18
bmh-T
177.37
17.74
bh-P
129.01
12.90
bmh-P
238.41
23.84
bp-P
74.19
7.42
bp-MB
84.03
8.40
Source: Echeverría et al. (1997)
Life Zones

Total in 50
years

15%
(11-20)

20%
(21-30)

15%
(31-40)

10%
(41-50)

70%

13.29
34.78
26.61
19.35
35.76
11.13
12.60

17.72
46.37
35.47
25.80
47.68
14.84
16.81

13.29
34.78
26.61
19.35
35.76
11.13
12.60

8.86
23.18
17.74
12.90
23.84
7.42
8.40

62.01
162.28
124.15
90.30
166.88
51.93
58.82

As an example of an attempt to calculate national values, Ramírez and Gomez (1999)
examined carbon sequestration on plantations in Costa Rica. The authors estimate that an
average hectare in a plantation can sequester on average 28.2 metric tons of carbon dioxide
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per year, equivalent to 7.7 tons of carbon sequestered in the wood. The 142,600 hectares
planted with forestry species in the country up to 1997 can therefore be expected to have
sequestered approximately 6.3 million tons of carbon, of which the authors expect some 1.5
million remained sequestered (i.e. not harvested). If the same plantation lands are continually
replanted, Ramírez and Gomez (1999) also project that an additional 9.8 million tons of
carbon will be sequestered in the next twenty years.
The biophysical baseline information provided by methods and studies such as those cited
above is often used in assigning a total value to the carbon stored as part of economic studies
or in deriving market prices and proposals for specific mitigation projects. Three broad
approaches are found in the literature and proposals to deriving values and prices for the
carbon outputs of these studies or mitigation projects:
• estimating the total costs of undertaking the mitigation project and deriving a per unit of
carbon sales price to offer in the market;
• taking per unit estimates of the global economic impact of climate change and applying
these to the carbon fluxes produced by the project in order to arrive at the economic
benefits of the project;
• taking estimates of market values (as observed or projected) and applying these to carbon
fluxes.
Early in the 1990s as the initial prospects of a carbon market caught on in Costa Rica a
number of proposals for USIJI projects were developed. Lacking any real precedent in terms
of valuation and, in any event, needing to correctly price their projects in the anticipated
market, most of these initial projects simply estimated the costs of storage or sequestration.
Using estimates of the rate at which stored carbon would be emitted as carbon dioxide (forest
protection projects) or at which carbon would be sequestered (plantation or secondary
regrowth projects) to arrive at net carbon fluxes for the projects, unit costs were derived.
These varied considerably with the first three projects approved by USIJI varying from $37 to
$58 per ton of carbon (for carbon dioxide values divide by 3.66).
As with the AIJ projects (and others) that followed, this approach is one that effectively
emphasizes cost-effectiveness. If the costs are too high relative to the outputs then the project
is expensive relative to other projects in the ‘marketplace’ and the buyer may go elsewhere.
Indeed, the costs of the Costa Rican projects may well be one reason for the lack of examples
of converting the carbon market into deals within the country. However, the fact that projects
were “offered” at such prices does indicate that there was a presumption that Costa Rica
would be a cost-competitive country in the carbon market – and that buyers would be willing
to pay such amounts.
In part this may be due to the proliferation of estimates using the other two approaches.
These are more research-related approaches, which attempt to assess the worth of mitigation
projects for planning (or other) purposes, including that of examining the value of
environmental services for the purpose of designing payment schemes. Loosely speaking,
studies that use market values examine the financial worth of mitigation projects and those
employing global economic figures are used to portray the global economic importance of
such projects. There are many examples of these calculations as once the carbon figures are
available these calculations are relatively straightforward.
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At the macro level, for example, Ramírez and Gomez (1999) estimate that the additional 9.8
million tons of carbon that are forecasted to be sequestered by plantations in the next 20 years
are valued between US$98 and US$196 million.
The potential range for per unit values is quite large from one study to the next. This problem
is magnified by the occasional confusion between dollar values per ton of CO2 and per ton of
C or carbon (the latter being 3.6 times the comparable value for CO2). As a consequence, the
results of such calculations in per hectare terms also have a wide range. This applies to
financial and economic studies. For financial values, at the lower end the price paid for a
forestry mitigation project in Bolivia was around $1. At the upper end some early market
studies predicted market prices up to $100/ton of carbon in the future. With respect to
economic impact studies (marginal costs of emissions or cost-benefit studies) the range found
in the literature varied substantially as well: from $5 to $35 depending on models and
assumptions (Tol 1999).
Add to this range the confusion between the financial and economic concepts, annual vs.
present value figures, storage vs. sequestration values, the lack of clear details about the
calculations, and the overall picture on per hectare values or potentials in Costa Rica is not
clear. Pearce (1989) first suggested per hectare carbon values in the order of $2,000/ha based
on 100 tons per hectare and a $20 price. From this point onwards in Costa Rica any number
of values can be derived from the literature. Kishor and Constantino (1993) suggest annual
values of $60 to $120 for sequestration purposes. Echeverría et al. (1997) arrive at $131/ha
present value for carbon sequestered and $262/ha for stored carbon in Guanacaste National
Park. Aylward et al. (1998) suggest $200 to $300/ha for natural regeneration in Arenal.
Otarola and Venegas (1999) estimate the economic benefits provided by forests for carbon
sequestration of $11/ha/yr, and for carbon storage from $31 to $34/ha/yr. Carranza et al.
(1996) take this to the extreme and generate a set of values from $4/ha/yr to $334/ha/yr for
different combinations of price assumptions and life zone carbon potential.
A full assessment of the empirical work on this topic would be an exhausting task indeed. It
is unlikely that such an effort would actually be informative with respect to the question of
what the value of the greenhouse gas mitigation service of Costa Rican forests is – either in
economic or market (financial) terms. It would be more likely to provide data for a
sociological study of the consistency, or lack thereof, of assumptions employed by
economists and quasi-economists in this field. However, this review does suggest that
estimates of the value of such projects were not out of line with the projects being developed
in the country. Thus, the valuation work may have played a role in supporting such efforts to
capture the value of the carbon market. Unfortunately, it appears that while the projects
Costa Rica had to offer were to the upper end of the valuation range, the actual willingnessto-pay of market speculators in those early years were at the lower end of the range. This
may explain the lack of carbon deals noted in Chapter 3 above.
4.3

Watershed protection

Hydrological services are some of the most complicated environmental services to
understand and quantify, in which very little field empirical biophysical work has been done
in Costa Rica. It is assumed that in order for a downstream water user to pay for upstream
forest conservation, there needs to be an understanding of how conserving forest translates
into benefits for water users. Economic valuation of these services requires knowledge
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regarding the linkages between land use and forest hydrology, hydrological functions and
consumption/production activities, and the marginal values of water to these activities.
A complicating factor is that a given watershed may have many different users of water, each
with their own requirements in terms of hydrological services. Domestic water supply,
irrigation, hydropower, navigation, fisheries and ecosystem maintenance are just a few of
these uses, each with its own requirements in terms of water quantity and water quality. Even
within one sector the hydrological service that is most desired may vary. For example, a runof-river hydropower plant is interested in maximizing water retention in the watershed and
providing as regular a water inflow as possible throughout the day. Peaking hydropower
plants with daily storage facilities are more concerned with maximizing daily inflows during
the dry season. Meanwhile an inter-annual storage reservoir is most interested in maximizing
total annual water inflow given its ability to store water across seasons. These objectives
require different strategies of land use management in the watershed, in which forests play
different roles.
4.3.1 Biophysical knowledge base
Hydrological services can be divided into water quantity (volume and rate and its distribution
in the system in space and time) and water quality (physical, chemical, or biological
characteristics with reference to a particular use). Very little fieldwork has been carried out
in Costa Rica to understand the relationship between forests and water quantity and quality.
Paired catchment experiments, which provide the opportunity to rigorously assess factors
such as evapotranspiration, infiltration, and suspended sediment yields, are largely unheard of
in Costa Rica, and indeed in Central America as a whole. Thus, most of the experiences in
Costa Rica aimed at developing markets for watershed services have either relied on
conventional wisdom on the direction and magnitude of these linkages or they have been
based on an understanding derived from secondary sources. A number of these sources are
often cited (Hamilton and Pearce 1986, Bruijnzeel 1990, Stadtmuller 1994) as the basis for
general trends about the relationship between forests and water, which are then used as the
justification to promote forest conservation. However, as the conventional wisdom on the
direction and magnitude of these impacts differs from scientific knowledge – particularly in
the case of water quantity – the degree to which the local literature correctly cites these
international sources varies considerably.
In recent years, three locally produced literature reviews have sought to summarize the
knowledge on forest hydrology. These include a review carried out for the CREED project
by the Tropical Science Center (Mouraille et al. 1996), a background section in a CATIE
thesis by Otarola and Venegas (1999), and a summary in a publication by FONAFIFO (Cruz
and Navarrete 2000). All synthesize the basics of the current understanding about the
relationship between forests and hydrology. It is interesting to note that even though these
reviews are balanced in terms of reflecting the mixed nature of forests in providing
hydrological services, they have subsequently been used as a basis for the watershed
protection service, stating that there will be higher water yields from forestland even when
they indicate that the scientific literature suggests that the opposite is expected.
A more recent review of experience in Costa Rica with markets for watershed services by
Pagiola et al. (2002) also comments on the biophysical information base and briefly reviews a
few of the valuation studies covered below. Pagiola et al.’s major conclusion is that the use of
the PES system in Costa Rica to promote watershed management is limited by the lack of
reliable and precise information on forest/water linkages.
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In addition to the literature reviews, there have been some field studies and statistical
analyses that have attempted to examine the impact of land use and vegetation cover on water
quantity. A few of these are worth mentioning to provide a flavour of the work undertaken to
date. A study by Fallas (1996), carried out as part of the CREED project, measured the
contribution of horizontal precipitation in primary and secondary forests. The study found
that high primary forests have a net loss of 9.7 per cent, while strips of remnant forest have a
net contribution of between 13.9 per cent (remnant primary forest) and 7.9 per cent (remnant
secondary forest). Low primary forests have a net contribution of 5.9 per cent. The study
concludes that while significant capture of cloud moisture is observed in all cases, the
unfortunate reality is that intact cloud forests appear to capture less precipitation than
fragmented forests.
At the same time a recent publication by Lawton et al. (2001) suggests that deforestation in
the Atlantic lowlands of Costa Rica may lead to reduced cloud formation and increased cloud
heights – each of which can have negative effects on the precipitation (horizontal and
vertical) in the upland areas along the continental divide. In particular, elevated levels for
clouds may lead to reduced fog stripping by cloud forests, which as shown by Fallas (1996)
can be an important dry season input to the hydrological cycle. Thus, there may even be
important interconnections between geographically distinct forest areas in terms of their
hydrological services.
In addition to these studies, there have been a series of initiatives to assess the economic
value of hydrological services (or watershed protection). Some of these are undertaken in the
areas that are engaged in markets or payments for watershed services and others are not.
Many of the studies are based on outdated and overly generalized assumptions about the
biophysical linkages between land use and downstream hydrology. In some cases the studies
do not even value the resource but rather calculate what the opportunity cost would be of
returning cleared land to forest cover and proceed to claim that this “value” is somehow
informative with respect to the value of hydrological services. In addition, there are a few
studies that make an explicit attempt to develop a model of land use and hydrology
interactions.
4.3.2 Background: generic studies of the economic value of hydrological services in
Costa Rica
Before turning to examine the biophysical and economic basis for each of the market cases
identified in Chapter 3, a review of other studies of hydrological externalities in Costa Rica
provides background on the nature of the general information available to those developing
market deals. These are loosely grouped by the focus of such studies – either by watershed or
service area, while still trying to preserve some of the chronological sequencing of the studies
in order to assess the extent to which the studies reveal ‘learning-by-doing’.
Ecological-economic valuation of treated water supply. In 1995, as part of a larger
initiative aimed at natural resource accounting, the Tropical Science Center (CCT) and the
International Center for Economic Policy for Sustainable Development (CINPE) of the
National University of Heredia collaborated on an “ecological-economic valuation” of water
as a first step towards the internalization of the ecological-economic costs of water supply
(Solorzano et al. 1995). The study appeared only as a working paper and contains a number
of conceptual, methodological and numerical errors. However, as it was indeed the first step
in a process of developing markets – one that continues to the present day as seen below – it
is worth at least a partial review. It is interesting for the information that it presents, but it
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does not fully assess the issue of incentives to provide watershed protection as a means of
guaranteeing hydrological services.
Working backwards it appears that the authors propose three ways of estimating the
ecological-economic value of hydrological services as reflected in industrial, urban and rural
piped water supply. The analysis includes seven components:
1. a watershed “production cost” which reflects the cost of providing clean water
through ensuring forest cover (by conservation and management of existing forest,
forest management and reforestation) – this is calculated by assessing the annual and
net present value of 20 years of costs of these activities;
2. a conventional “production cost” reflecting the cost of abstracting, treating and
delivering water to customers – based on costs of the national water and sewerage
company AyA;
3. an “economic value” of consumer willingness-to-pay for clean water for a permanent
and quality water supply – calculated through a contingent valuation survey of the
willingness-to-pay of three rural communities;
4. an “economic-ecological” value reflecting consumer willingness-to-pay for water as
in (3) but that includes the concept of paying for watershed protection to guarantee
sustainability of supply – measured by an additional question on the survey mentioned
under (3) above;
5. a conventional “sanitation” cost that reflects the cost of treating water discharge from
municipal systems – calculated as 18 per cent of the conventional production cost;
6. a cost reflecting the “exhaustion” of the water supply (the word in Spanish is
agotamiento so perhaps the idea related to “user cost” although the concept is not
explained well) – measured as the incremental usage of water that would be
consumed due to population growth over the next 25 years multiplied by the cost of
production (unfortunately it is not clear which cost of production is meant, as the
figure for this value (11.49 colones) does not appear elsewhere in the document).
The authors then propose three ways of combining this data to arrive at different measures of
cost and value:
•
•
•

an estimate of the real costs of the system which includes (1), (2), (5) and (6);
an estimate of the “social” value which includes (1), (3) and (6);
an estimate of the value in perpetuity which includes (4), (5) and (6).

The results are shown in Table 4.8 for metropolitan areas (the figures for (4) are cited
incorrectly in the document for urban and rural uses) in order to provide an indication of
orders of magnitude. In recalculating the costs and values the production cost figure
presented in the paper is reduced by a factor of 20 to account for the paper’s attribution of the
production of only a single year’s water (m3) against the present value costs of production
over 20 years.15 The paper thus demonstrates that consumers are willing to pay more than the
15

The paper also slightly underestimates these net present values by using the annual cost of protection in the
calculation of present value costs of protection, reforestation and forest management. However, as it is likely
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real costs in order to provide a permanent and environmentally sustainable source of water.
Of course this result is based on a survey of three rural communities, hence the additional
surveys that have been conducted since (Table 4.8).
Table 4.8 Ecological-economic values of water
Cited
Cost
Col/m3

Corrected Values

Col/m3

Real Costs

$/m3

Col/m

Social Value

Sustainable Value

%

Col/m3

%

Col/m3

%

3

1.Watershed production
cost
2.Conventional
production cost
3. WTP for clean water
4. WTP for clean water
from protected
watersheds
5. Water sanitation
costs
6. Water “exhaustion”
costs
Total

9.96

0.50

$0.003

0.50

0.7%

0.5

0.4%

-

-

60

60

$0.400

60.00

84.2%

-

-

-

-

106.5
132.6

106.5
132.6

$0.710
$0.884

-

-

106.5
-

90.4%
na

132.6

92.5%

10.8

10.8

$0.072

10.80

15.1%

10.8

9.2%

10.8

7.5%

0.072

na

na

na

na

na

na

na

na

71.30

100%

117.80

100%

143.40

100%

Source: Solorzano et al. (1995)

Another conclusion that can be drawn, however, is that the watershed production cost is a
relatively insignificant cost relative to conventional production costs. While this might seem
surprising, it is actually confirmed by an interesting calculation that appears in the study
(which does not enter into the calculations of costs and values). The authors calculate the
material costs of treating water in two watersheds, one that is forested and one that is
deforested. As expected, the costs of treating water (per m3) are higher in the deforested
watershed, but only by 0.04 colones/m3. At the applicable exchange rate, that value comes to
about US$ 0.0003/m3. The paper states that 90 per cent of households consume less than 40
m3 per month. In other words, the extra monthly costs that are incurred in cleaning up “dirty”
water from the intake in the deforested watershed would come to $0.01/month. The real
question, however, is what incentive does this contribute to the decision to manage, or not,
Costa Rican watersheds. Returning to the calculation of watershed production costs as
defined by Solorzano et al. (1995), these are seen to be around 0.50 colones/m3. Thus, the
extra costs of providing clean water through water treatment represents just 8 per cent of the
costs of protecting the watersheds. If the original figures for watershed production costs are
used, then the costs savings of producing water from forested watersheds would be
insignificant. In other words, in purely economic terms, the other benefits from maintaining
or restoring forest cover would need to play an important role in justifying watershed
protection.

that the figure of $1,000 per year for the opportunity cost of land that is to be protected is exaggerated and it is
unclear why figures for reforestation and forest management would not already have accounted for any required
protection costs, these figures are left as is.
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These figures and, indeed the conclusions derived therefrom, should be treated with caution
given the problems in the paper by Solorzano et al. (1995). And, indeed, the costs of water
treatment may be underestimated; for example, there may be additional labour or
administrative costs alongside the increased costs of treatment chemicals when intake water
is “dirty”. However, the main point is that in an effort to advance an argument for raising
tariffs to provide for the environmental services component, an opportunity was missed in
assessing the underlying economic justification for taking such action.
Arenal Watershed. Lake Arenal was impounded in 1979 by the construction of a large dam.
Water from the reservoir is diverted from the Atlantic to the Pacific drainage in order to
produce electricity in a cascade system with three power plants, and the water is then used for
an irrigation project. The Arenal watershed, thus, effectively provides an inter-basin water
transfer to the country’s largest hydropower complex (21 per cent of installed capacity in the
year 2000) and the largest irrigation project (60,000 ha originally planned, 20,000 ha of
which have been developed). As noted earlier, at present, no market is being developed for
hydrological services in the Arenal watershed. However, in the mid-1990s the Costa Rican
Electricity Institute (ICE) developed plans to try to obtain double carbon credits for
reforestation activities in the watershed. The first credit would be for the fixation of carbon
in the trees, and the second for the increased flow of water to the hydropower complex that
was presumed to result from reforestation, thereby offsetting thermal power generation from
other plants on the national grid. Although this idea came to nothing, the hydrological
importance of this watershed is illustrated by the number of initiatives to value its
hydrological services, all of which were developed with the intention of promoting
restoration of forest cover in the large areas of pasture within the watershed.
Valuation initiatives in Arenal go as far back as the original environmental impact study of
the dam conducted by the Tropical Science Center, which attempted to calculate the cost of
importing extra oil due to deforestation and subsequent sedimentation of the reservoir
(Duisberg 1980; and see review in Aylward et al. 1998). More recently, three different
studies of the hydrological services in the watershed have been undertaken: a study by the
Tropical Science Center and IIED as part of the CREED project (Aylward 1998; Aylward
and Echeverría 1999), a study by Castro and Barrantes (1998) aimed at promoting the
establishment of markets for services in the watershed, and a third study undertaken as part of
a World Bank Environment Department examination of indicators for sustainable
development in the Arenal-Tempisque Basin (Chakravorty and Chen 2001).
In the CREED study the present value of the cost of sedimentation from pasture (as opposed
to reforestation) in terms of lost hydroelectric production ranged from $35 to $75/ha. The
study employed a formal model of the impact of sedimentation on both the dead and live
storage areas of the reservoir, enabling it to separate out the different effects on these areas.
Given the large dead storage relative to sediment inflow for this particular reservoir, the
effect of sedimentation on dead storage produced benefits, not costs, in the case of Arenal, as
the sediment effectively displaces water upwards into the live storage during dry periods.
Arenal is an inter-annual regulation reservoir and thus during a series of dry years in which
the reservoir does not fill but is gradually drawn down, the sediment occupying the dead
storage effectively makes additional water available for power generation.
With respect to water quantity, the CREED study showed that annual water yield losses due
to reforestation of pasture areas could lead to large efficiency losses in downstream
hydroelectric power production. The externalities associated with water yield effects were
calculated to be one order of magnitude greater than those associated with the sedimentation
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costs (as already referred to above). Best estimates for both cloud and non-cloud forest areas
suggested positive present values in the range of $250 to $1,100/ha for pasture. Sensitivity
analysis showed that the values would be reduced to two-thirds of these figures with higher
discount rates and in the event that all the water yield gain under pasture were to arrive
during the wet season (instead of being received proportionately across wet and dry seasons).
The values may also rise to almost $5,000/ha if dry periods lengthen or occur early in the 70year simulation period. Further sensitivity analysis examined what would be the economic
outcome if reforestation resulted in net gains in dry season flow, in spite of the expected
overall losses in total annual water yield. A switching value (where the value of total
hydrological externalities go to zero) was obtained only when all of the annual water yield
gain and an amount equal to an additional 50 per cent of this amount was redistributed to
arrive during the wet season (when water is less valuable for power generation). When the
analysis of livestock productivity was incorporated into a cost-benefit analysis of land use
options, strong synergies between livestock production and hydroelectric power generation in
the catchment were demonstrated (Aylward and Echeverría 2001).
Castro and Barrantes (1998) also conducted a study aimed at quantifying in physical and
monetary terms the water potential of the Arenal basin. The economic value of the services
provided by the watershed has three components: water capture by forests (0.62 colones per
m3), protection and maintenance of the watershed (0.044 colones per m3), and the value of the
water resource as an input to production (2.13 colones per m3). As with the author’s earlier
analysis in the case of Heredia (see below), the authors focus primarily on the costs of
providing forest cover rather than on the actual marginal value of water as an input into water
usage for production or consumption.
The section provided by Chakravorty and Chen (2001) as part of the World Bank report on
monitoring attempts to model some of the externalities in the Arenal Tempisque watersheds.
However, the paper seems disjointed – on the one hand, clearly having access to prior work
in the area yet, on the other, largely ignoring this work and citing unrelated pieces of work.
The authors ignore earlier work in Arenal and do not explicitly model water flows but instead
assert that water quality is a major problem in Arenal. Unfortunately the authors do not
recognize that the relative size of the land area in the watershed and the size of the reservoir
when combined with the simple agricultural practices employed make water quality a nonstarter as a major problem.
With respect to water quality in Arenal, the authors claim forests have important effects on
water quality, based on two reports and a single comparison of forest and agricultural land.
All the references are from the United States and two of them were published in the 1970s.
In the case of sedimentation rates, the authors cite the figures used in Aylward et al. (1998),
which contains a thorough review of a series of erosion and sedimentation studies carried out
in Arenal. Arenal, being by far the largest hydropower reservoir in the country, has been the
subject of the most extensive studies on this topic, yet the authors then state there is no
reliable information on sediment rates for different types of land use, and cite a publication
from IFPRI on Honduras that states that erosion is more severe on slopes of 25 per cent or
more and that it may be 5 tons/ha in areas with modest slopes. Since the authors then take 5
tons/ha as their model parameter (despite the watershed having extremely steep slopes), the
extent to which the authors are really familiar with the area they are modelling is unclear.
Chakravorty and Chen (2001) end up modelling the impact of sedimentation not on Lake
Arenal but the small Santa Rosa reservoir (in series with Lake Arenal). The authors assume
that 10 per cent of the sediment would make its way downstream to this third reservoir and
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that this would alter the use of the three power plants (which are in series). This is despite
their acknowledgement that ICE might be able to dredge the reservoir at a reasonable cost.
The authors argue that dairy farming in the Arenal watershed is inefficient as it causes $703
million in externalities. The logic and construction of the model is hard to follow. In
particular it is hard to justify the large externality costs, given that in a reservoir the size of
Arenal one would expect almost all of the sediment to be trapped in the reservoir.
Furthermore, with a $703 million loss in power production at stake, it is hard to imagine that
the Santa Rosa reservoir would not be dredged. Given that Santa Rosa has a volume of 0.1
million cubic metres there would be at least $7,000 available to cover the dredging of each
cubic metre of sediment. The results are therefore largely meaningless.
Talamanca – Rio Macho. Rio Macho is the site of one of the older hydropower facilities in
the country, the Cachi HEP. In a Ph.D. thesis for Colorado State University, Quesada-Mateo
(1979) develops a deterministic simulation model that enables the user to determine the
maximum amount of firm (reliable) power that could be produced from the Cachi
hydroelectric reservoir. What makes the model interesting is that it explicitly incorporates
the effect of the accumulation of sediment in the live storage, as well as a change in
stormflow regime. The author assumes that the removal of forest cover will lead to an
increase in peak flow during the wet season and a decrease in base flow during the dry
season. While the first assumption is likely to be correct, the latter does not necessarily
follow.
In a master’s thesis for CATIE, Rodriguez (1989) examines the effect of erosion and
subsequent sedimentation in the Rio Macho watershed on the production of the Cachí HEP
and subsequent dredging costs. The study suggests that degradation of 16,600 ha in the Rio
Macho watershed has caused an increase in maintenance costs of $16.54/ha/yr (in 1989 US
dollars or 22.5 million colones). While a useful and informative, the paper sticks to a narrow
interpretation of hydrological services.
In a master’s thesis for the National University of Heredia, Otarola and Venegas (1999)
developed a proposal for a compensation system for the environmental services provided by
the oak forests of the Talamanca Cordillera, specifically within the Rio Macho Forest
Reserve. They calculated the economic benefits received by two downstream hydropower
plants (Cachí and Río Macho) to be $14.40/ha/yr and the benefits received by a downstream
water treatment plant (Planta de Tratamiento de Tres Ríos) to be $10.40/ha/yr. Values for the
hydropower projects were calculated based on the cost increase data for Cachi during the
period 1970-1986, when a portion of its watershed was deforested. These numbers were used
as the future scenario for cost increases if deforestation were to take place in Rio Macho’s
basin. In the case of hydropower plants, the expected benefits from PES are preventing the
loss of power production (preventing storage loss) and reducing the maintenance costs for
hydraulic machinery. Values for the water treatment plant were calculated by comparing the
water treatment costs at the Tres Rios plant with another plant that has a deforested
watershed. The water treatment plant is expected to receive benefits through a reduction in
the costs of water treatment (reduction in costs of chemicals used) and a reduction in the costs
of cleaning sediments from infrastructure and filters. As with the previous study the focus is
exclusively on water quality impacts and does not consider water quantity impacts associated
with forest maintenance.
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4.3.3 Valuation in watersheds containing market initiatives in hydrological services
Energía Global and FUNDECOR – Don Pedro and Río Volcan HEP. According to
Chomitz et al. (1998) the rational for Energía Global to enter into watershed payments was its
desire to maintain forest cover in order to smooth out streamflow over time. This enables
output and revenue to be maximized as both hydropower plants have tiny reservoirs, able to
store only five hours of water. Chomitz et al (1998:16) go on to point out that:
“When streamflow exceeds the plant's capacity for more than five hours, the excess water
must be spilled. Each lost cubic metre of water translates approximately to a lost kWh of
output, or about US $0.065 in lost revenue (with price depending on time of day and year).
While no in-depth hydrological analysis has been performed, the company's investment will
pay off if it succeeds in capturing an extra 460,000 cubic metres per year for generation.”
However, no assessment of the likelihood of this occurring is available or was employed in
reaching the decision to go ahead with the watershed payments.
In a master’s thesis for the Universidad Nacional, Reyes and Cordoba (1999) valued the
environmental service of forests in relation to water resources for the Volcan River
Watershed. Two land use scenarios were considered for a 15-year simulation period in which
land is either deforested or reforested to form the existing land use pattern. The former
option is more profitable from a private (landowner’s) perspective since the net present value
was $1,533/ha (all figures cited for 10 per cent discount rate) per hectare as compared to
$1,241/ha for engaging in reforestation. However, taking environmental externalities (carbon
sequestration and water quality) into account, the authors suggest that profitability of the
“with forest” scenario is higher since the NPV is $1,198 and the NPV for without forest is
$834 (10 per cent).
In terms of the methodologies applied, Reyes and Cordoba (1999) is one of the best studies
reviewed here. Not only does it actually calculate the change in productivity associated with
a change in land use, but it also explicitly models the erosion, sediment and consequent
impacts on small hydro in terms of plant outages and penalty costs (due to power purchaser
when agreed targets are not reached).
Conceptually, however, the study suffers from a series of flaws. First, as noted above there is
cause to expect that the effect of land use change on small hydro will be related to water
quantity and not just water quality. Not only is this not attempted in the paper, but the
authors seem unaware that the effect of reforestation could potentially be a reduction in
production instead of an increase, if dry season base flow is reduced.
The second difficulty of the study relates to the way the scenarios are constructed and
consequently, the way the results are interpreted. The private scenarios appear logical – in
the reforestation option the farmers obtain the environmental services payments and pay the
associated costs. However, in the social comparison the financial value of the payments are
left in as benefits under the reforestation option and the “income” from the sale of captured
carbon and the costs of poor water quality (albeit reduced in this scenario) are added in. The
first oversight here is that in the social scenario the valuation figures should be included but
not the payments. If both are included then this represents double counting of benefits. It is
not possible to enter the payment schemes and separately sell carbon. Entering the
programme implies ceding the farmer’s rights of any sequestered carbon to FONAFIFO.
Similarly, the payments also implicitly include a payment for the “value” of the hydrological
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services. Thus, the results for the social scenario as cited are invalid. If the incentive
payments (but not the costs of reforestation) are excluded and the valuation efforts left in the
analysis then the comparable results for the reforestation option under the social scenario
drop to $311. Given that the social benefits of deforesting are $834 this remains the optimal
land use from an economic perspective (i.e. the farmers could compensate the global
community for the carbon consumed and the hydropower producer for his losses). A perverse
result perhaps, but interpreted correctly this is what the study suggests.
Finally, the study does not actually provide an indication of the cost of the loss of
hydrological services due to deforestation instead of reforestation. If the two streams of costs
(one under reforestation and one under deforestation) are compared and the net present value
calculated per hectare of land affected (either by reforestation or deforestation), the pure
external cost of deforestation imposed on the hydropower producer would be $54/ha. Note
that the combination of two differing land use projections in each of the options (i.e
deforestation of 1,652 ha and reforestation of 826 ha) and the lack of a baseline for
comparison make this figure difficult to interpret. Presumably the per hectare costs
attributable to deforestation would be higher than this given that the figure also incorporates
the benefits of reforestation in terms of gains in water quality. The accuracy of the response
of production figures to the change in erosion cannot be judged for a variety of reasons. One
reason is that the exact method for converting erosion into sediment accumulated in the
reservoir is not clear. Indeed, the number of tons of sediment deposited in year one under the
two options is different and so are the cost figures, despite having the same land use patterns
in the start year. The other reason is whether the USLE method yields accurate estimates of
erosion under the conditions in the watershed.
Difficulties notwithstanding, the contribution made by the study is to actually estimate the
change in revenues associated with a decline in small hydropower production due to
sedimentation. If the resulting figures are reliable it certainly implies that these costs are
significant when viewed on a per hectare basis. However, when mixed in with the costs and
benefits of the productive activities on the land and the potential carbon gains and losses the
paradoxical end result is that reforestation and the prevention of deforestation is a losing
proposition in economic terms even when the value of carbon and hydrological services is
included.
Heredia - ESPH. As part of the initiative to increase monthly tariffs to reflect the
internalization of environmental services in the watersheds where ESPH obtains its potable
water supplies the ESPH contracted a local consultancy, SEED, to produce an initial
economic study in 1998. In order to quantify the value of watershed services Barrantes and
Castro (1999b) disaggregated the concept into three components and calculated a value for
each. The components and estimated values of the adjusted tariff include the capture value
($0.01/m3), watershed protection and recovery value ($0.02/m3), and water as production
input ($0.04/m3). From these values Castro and Barrantes (1999b) calculated that the tariff
would have to be raised from $0.27/m3 (¢68.47/m3) to $0.31/m3 (¢77.20/m3). The increase
was less than the value determined from a willingness-to-pay survey that showed people were
willing to pay approximately $0.06/m3 for the environmental adjustment over the amount
they currently pay.
The authors estimated the compensation value to landowners as $133/ha for capture value of
forests, and $180/ha for protection value. These amounts compensate for the opportunity cost
of livestock activities and recognize the better water quality from forests.
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In a follow-up study on the “Economic Value of the Hydrological Environmental Service at
the Forest-Gate: A Supply Analysis,” Castro and Salazar (2000) returned to the watershed
and asked farmers what they were willing to accept as payment for conserving existing forest,
engaging in natural regeneration and undertaking reforestation. This study simply continues
the conceptual confusion evidenced in the earlier SEED and CCT/CINPE studies by
suggesting that estimates of the opportunity costs of land under alternative uses can be used
to infer the benefits of forest hydrological services. As such, the results of the study are also
left to the section in which the size of the FONAFIFO payments is discussed. Interestingly,
at one point in the document Castro and Salazar (2000: 9) suggest that the “producers of
environmental services [i.e. farmers] could conscientiously calculate the value of each
environmental service that is produced by a hectare of forest.” However, the authors
themselves do not attempt to cite such a value in the document.
To their credit Castro and Salazar (2000:11) are explicit about their justification for payments
for hydrological services, stating that “Costa Rican society positively correlates the presence
of forest with the supply of hydrological services.” As evidence of this the authors cite one
respondent’s statement regarding the importance of forests in water regulation:
“I left the forest to regenerate around one of the springs that I have on the farm and with
the increase in forest cover in that area the quantity of water available increased” (Castro
and Salazar 2000:16).
This only serves to underscore the gap that exists between local perceptions and scientific
knowledge on these issues. While theory and experience are not inconsistent, the bulk of the
scientific evidence at small catchment scales does not support such statements. While this
may be a deficiency in the experimental process of paired catchment assessments, it may just
as easily be the product of conditioned thinking on the part of those who for years have been
told that forests produce water.
La Esperanza HEP-Monteverde Conservation League (MCL). Rojas and Aylward (2002)
provide a detailed review of the origins and implementation of this landmark voluntary
agreement between La Esperanza HEP and the MCL. No formal studies of a biophysical or
economic nature underlie the agreement. In fact, there are no hydro-meteorological gauges
within the 3,000 ha that lie above the dam site so the hydrological parameters for the site are
inferred from downstream gauges. However, as the watershed is largely comprised of intact
primary forest the intention of the agreement is merely to keep this land use constant, rather
than (as in some of the other market cases) one of trying to increase forest cover with the aim
of improving hydrological conditions. Indeed, the negotiations appear to have revolved as
much around the lease of land on which the plant is sited as on the expected nature and
magnitude of the environmental services that were contracted (Rojas and Aylward 2002).
4.3.4 General guidance provided to FONAFIFO and ECOMERCADOS
Cross-sectional analysis and hypothetical extrapolation by CT Energía
In a study by CT Energía (2000) for the World Bank/MINAE Ecomarkets project, a statistical
analysis was undertaken for the purpose of quantifying the hydrological benefits that forests
provide to run-of-river hydropower projects downstream. The overall goal was to devise a
formula that could be used to determine and quantify the economic benefits that hydropower
producers receive from forest cover in its watersheds. This methodology was to be the basis
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on which the official PES scheme could quantify the charges that would be made to
hydropower producers for the watershed environmental services of forests.
As part of the study it was necessary to develop a quantitative relationship between forest
cover and hydrological services. The study compared how land use had changed in six
specific watersheds during the period 1979-1992, and attempted to draw statistically
significant correlations between land use change and: 1) dry season stream flow and 2)
sediment load. It must be noted, however, that the study mixed a wide range of watersheds.
Some are in the dry Pacific slopes, others in the moist Atlantic, some have degraded
watersheds, some have pristine forested watersheds. This wide range makes for a better
statistical fit because of the inherent distortions within the various contexts.
For the period studied, the rates in land use change of the watersheds ranged from 2.7 per
cent annual deforestation to 0.7 per cent reforestation. Empirical formulas were developed
that related forest cover with sediment load such that:
Y= -2.7X +311 (R2 = 0.60),
where Y is the sediment load (tons/km2/year) and X is the percentage of forest cover in the
watershed.
For dry season (January-April) stream flow, the empirical formula is:
Y = 0.11X + 4.99 (R2 =0.94),
where Y is equal to the dry season flow as a percentage of annual stream flow (dry season
flow/ annual stream flow), and X is the percentage of forest cover in the watershed.
The notion that sediment discharge is related to forest cover is not particularly controversial.
It is worth noting, however, that the estimation subsumes into one equation what effectively
are two functions of forest cover or land use more generally: the effect of forest in preventing
erosion and in detaining sediment transport. The dry season formula purports to show that
forest is positively related to dry season stream flow. This is a recurring theme in Central
America and one that proceeds without much firm evidence to support it (Aylward
forthcoming). This analysis does little in this direction as the rather high power to explain the
relationship evinced by the equation (R2=0.94) is a mere artifice of a mistaken theoretical
model and a limited sample size. It requires more than empirical evidence from a sample of
six data points to overturn well-established scientific knowledge.
Effectively what the authors do is plot two points for each watershed representing 1979 and
1992 data for percentage of forest cover and percentage of total annual stream flow accruing
in the dry season. The authors then use the mean of these points for each watershed as their
sample for the analysis. The graph is reproduced below to show that the authors simply
connect the dots across watersheds, when quite obviously the more relevant analysis would
be a time series assessment of each watershed (Figure 4.3). As can be noted, for example, the
Rio Pacuar is the watershed with the lowest percentage of forest and the lowest percentage of
rainfall that accrues in the dry season. Quite clearly, this is a feature of the watershed and its
hydro-meteorological conditions, but the authors use this point to anchor their positively
sloped relationship between forest and dry season flow. Needless to say the data as presented
for Rio Pacuar actually show that between 1979 and 1992 forest cover dropped from 17.4 per
cent to 4 per cent. For the rather arbitrary two-year sample selected, the percentage of
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rainfall accruing in the dry season increased with deforestation from 4.4 per cent to 6.4 per
cent.
As indicated by Bruijnzeel (2002) “simply comparing streamflow totals for catchments with
contrasting land-use types may produce misleading results because of the possibility of
geologically determined differences in catchment groundwater reserves or deep leakage”.
Bruijnzeel’s general observation applies to the results of the CT Energía (2000) study,
limiting their practical import.
Figure 4.3 Relationship between forest cover and dry season flow/annual stream flow in
various watersheds
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The economic component of the study by CT Energía (2000) is based on the assumption that
downstream hydropower producers benefit from having a high dry season stream flow and
small sediment loads. Using this assumption plus the aforementioned formula for the
relationship between land use and water flows, the authors determine a formula that can be
applied to any hydropower project to determine the annual benefit for the project for every
forested hectare in the watershed. A theoretical example is given in the paper to illustrate the
method. An 11MW hydropower plant that produces 84.7GW per year, has a head of 100m,
and a watershed of 38 km2 that is 70 per cent deforested, should make annual payments of
$19/ha for the remaining forestland.
The overall conclusion from the study was that, on average, hydro projects receive benefits of
$20/hectare/year. This, CT Energía (2000) believes, should be evenly shared by the forest
owner and the hydro project, therefore arriving at an estimate of $10/ha/yr, which is what a
downstream hydropower project should pay the upstream forest owner.
The average value of benefits (reduced sedimentation and increased generation) provided by
forested watersheds to run-of-river hydropower producers was calculated as $24/ha/yr for
existing projects and $15.7/ha/yr for future projects. The average of both values is $20/ha/yr,
with a standard deviation of $12.7, a coefficient of variation of 0.63, and a range between
$7.3 and $32.7/ha/yr.
The authors consider that the cost of benefits should be split 50:50 between forest owners and
hydropower projects, therefore the calculated average value of the payment of environmental
service that should be paid by hydropower producers to forest owners upstream is $10/ha/yr.
This is a convenient result given that at the time of writing this was already the established
payment amount.
4.3.5 Conclusions
This review of the literature on valuation of hydrological services reveals a series of
deficiencies in the approach taken by those involved in this field, which consequently
severely constrains the utility of much of the quantitative work undertaken to date.
Most of the valuation literature appears to be familiar with the basic concepts and terms of
forest hydrology, such as evapotranspiration, infiltration, and water balance. However, a
significant part of this literature relies on conventional wisdom regarding the relationship
between land use and hydrological responses, effectively ignoring the international scientific
literature on the topic. Another smaller set of literature refers to the scientific literature and
acknowledges at least a few of the inconvenient facts and theories that emerge from the
literature, i.e. the inverse relationship between forest cover and water quantity. Some of these
papers gloss over the implications of this literature preferring to rely on the conventional
wisdom, which produces results that are at odds with the knowledge they cite in the paper.
With regard to the literature on the economic valuation of hydrological services, most of the
papers cite at most a few of the locally produced studies from Costa Rica. Many of the
studies seem to proceed in the absence of any connection to the literature and, indeed, only a
very few make the connection to the global literature. The large majority of the “valuation”
case studies make little effort to actually examine the economic benefits of hydrological
services. Many of these supposed “valuations” merely tot up the cost to farmers of turning
their land to forestry – either as their stated willingness to accept such a change, the direct
costs of forest alternatives or the opportunity costs of lost agricultural or livestock production.

78

What is remarkable is that the recent production of a series of case studies and overviews on
this topic – much of it related to the issue of payments and charges for environmental services
– has mushroomed in such a manner that a number of publications fall into the vicious cycle
of citing the local literature, without taking a critical view of it. The result is a series of
assumptions, invalid methodologies and erroneous results and conclusions being cited over
and over again, all of which seemingly builds a basis on which further market development is
based.
Effectively then, market development proceeds based on conventional wisdom, so that should
there be a need to actually rely on the “supporting” literature to demonstrate the value of
hydrological services the inconvenient realization would emerge that there is no such support
from a scientific or an economic standpoint. This is not to say that the deals that have been
developed will not lead to the services for which the payments are made, but rather to
emphasize that should this happen this will be more by chance than by design. As pointed
out by one of the most cited authors on tropical forest hydrology, an author well-cited in the
local literature that has concerned itself with the larger body of science on this issue, L.A.
Bruijnzeel, in advocating a proposal to conduct basic hydrological research on this topic in
Costa Rica:
“… in the absence of sound quantitative information on the hydrological role of montane
(cloud) forest/pasture, any payment scheme in which downstream beneficiaries
compensate upland people/forest managers for sustainable land and forest stewardship
will have to be considered arbitrary.”
What is interesting is that there is a qualified base of forest hydrologists in the country and
indeed Bruijnzeel has found excellent local partners at the Tropical Science Center and the
National University. However, it is likewise clear that within policy circles and amongst
economists working on the subject there has either been a basic failure to understand the
biophysical bases of the services provided or, the knowledge in this regard has simply been
too inconvenient and too at odds with popular, received wisdom – including that exercised by
those making policy. Thus, this failure to conduct good background research and valuation
reveals a learning process amongst government officials, NGOs, consultants and academics
that is only loosely linked to scientific method. Those few cases that do not fit the trend
largely consist of either analyses undertaken by relative outsiders to the daily machinery
associated with environmental services work – i.e. foreign-funded researchers and their
partners, or students working on theses. Somewhat predictably this latter literature has
achieved little attention in the policy world in which market development occurs.
4.4

Bundles of environmental services

The official PES scheme is in many ways a continuation of the previous systems of forestry
incentives and as such was based largely on existing assumptions, expectations and context.
It should, however, be noted that there was an attempt to revisit the values of environmental
services as part of the process of designing the new system. In 1996, with funds from the
UK’s Department for International Development, the Ministry of Environment commissioned
the Tropical Science Center to conduct a review of value estimates for environmental
services. Carranza et al. (1996) recommended payments for all four environmental services,
and distinguished between primary and secondary forests, departing from the assumption that
secondary forests provide fewer environmental services than natural forests. The review of
values of environmental services from Carranza et al. is summarized in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9 Estimates of the value of environmental services
Environmental Service
(US dollars/ha/yr).
Carbon sequestration
Water conservation
Biodiversity
Natural beauty
Total
Source: Carranza et al. 1996

Primary Forest

Secondary Forest

$38
$5
$10
$5
$58

$29.3
$2.5
$7.5
$2.5
$41.8

Although studies by the World Bank and the Tropical Science Center suggested fixing a
value per hectare and year, or a single payment for one full rotation or cutting cycle, MINAE
fixed a payment for environmental services for a period of five years and as a percentage of
the costs of establishing and managing different kinds of forests. This decision would
compensate all four environmental services, and avoid disrupting existing incentives to the
forestry sector (de Camino et al. 2000). In the case of forest preservation, FONAFIFO’s
$40/ha/yr figure was set as the standard payment, based on the existing government subsidy
for forest conservation (CPB). This figure was approximately confirmed in the study by
Carranza et al. (1996) which suggested a value of $58 per year for primary forest. However,
it can be argued that the process undertaken by Carranza et al. (1996) was heavily influenced
by MINAE and the lead consultant had little incentive to arrive at a final value estimate that
differed significantly from the existing set of payments.
A number of the other studies reviewed here provide additional summary estimates of the
value of environmental services or make recommendations regarding the size of the payment
for environmental services:
• Otarola and Venegas (1999) used the opportunity cost approach to finally quantify a
range for the PES for oak forests in Talamanca as $32.9-$145/ha/yr
• Espinoza et al. (1999) suggest values of between $23 and $53/ha/yr based on tourism
values of $12-25/ha/yr, water protection services of $10-20/year/hectare and biodiversity
services of US$0.15-8.81 per hectare.
Ortiz (1999) presents survey results from the initial stages of a choice experiment applied to
Costa Rican Fuel Tax Payment Allocation among four different services provided by
protected, managed and planted forests. Those interviewed considered that the PES should
be re-distributed among ecosystem types. Payments (over five years) for managed forests
should stay at current levels ($320/ha), protected forests should receive a higher PES
($525/ha), while plantations should only receive $207/ha.
In a paper for FONAFIFO, Sage and Otarola (2000) examined whether the current payment
levels (under the PES programme) were sufficiently attractive to rural producers. Using the
opportunity cost for the best soil types for permanent crops, it was determined that if the cost
of capital is 14 per cent, at least $246/ha/yr is needed to induce landowners to plant teak
(best forestry use) instead of orange orchards (best agricultural use). Teak plantations
without PES are a competitive land use compared with the best agricultural land use. In
marginal sites for agricultural activities, the authors conclude that the current PES are
sufficient to induce land owners to carry out management and conservation. Lower value
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timber species such as Gmelina will obviously require greater contributions from PES to
compete with agricultural activities in the best soil types.
4.5
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5 Monitoring and evaluation
In response to the question of what has been achieved with respect to markets for forest
environmental services in Costa Rica, this chapter reviews the available literature on the
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the market cases presented earlier in the paper. Given
that many of these initiatives remain ideas or work in progress, it is not surprising that there is
little available literature on this topic. However, reviewing what is available against the base
of relevant experience can yield an idea of the extent to which monitoring and evaluation are
being undertaken and what the coverage of this work is.
The most explicit M&E documents found are the biannual audits that FONAFIFO carries out
of its programme. Probably because the PES system in Costa Rica was seen as innovative
throughout the late 1990s, most documents do not evaluate or analyze the scheme, but instead
focus on the description of how the system works. There are regular monitoring processes in
place for certain PES projects, mostly for those in which government institutions are
involved, such as OCIC and FONAFIFO, but those reports are not published. NGOs like
Fundecor and INBio also have periodic reviews and other internal processes of analysis, but
they are not published either. Table 5.1 sets out the ongoing cases of MES in Costa Rica and
includes references found that represent either official or unofficial attempts at monitoring
and evaluation.
Table 5.1 Markets for environmental services cases and monitoring and evaluation
found in the literature
Market Case

Monitoring

Evaluation

Biodiversity
INBio

INBio Annual Reports

Occasional Donor Evaluations
Camacho et al. (2000);
Sittenfeld et al. (1999);
Sittenfeld and Lovejoy (1999);
ten Kate and Laird (2002)
Aylward et al. (1996); Lindberg
and Aylward (1999)

Site Entrance Fees
Carbon
none found

none found

Hydrological Services
All

none found

Calvo (2002), Fallas (2002),
Rojas (2002), Tattenbach
(2002), Pagiola (2002)

Bundles of Services
PES-FONAFIFO

Reports by forest managers

Chomitz et al. (1998),
CECADE (1999), Camacho et
al. (2000), Camacho et al.
(2001)
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5.1

Biodiversity

5.1.1 INBio
INBio is the most prominent example of an organization raising funds for biodiversity
conservation in Costa Rica, specifically through bioprospecting. However, thorough
evaluations of the INBio case are not readily available due to the confidential nature of the
contracts between INBio, pharmaceutical companies and research groups, and this makes it
very difficult to obtain accurate estimates and details of the transactions. For example, it is
publicly known that a percentage of the funds received by INBio from bioprospecting
contracts goes to the system of protected areas (SINAC) for conservation purposes, the public
universities for research, and the Ministry of Environment (MINAE), and the remainder is
used by INBio’s research programme. According to Sittenfeld and Lovejoy (1999) “in 199297 INBio has conducted bioprospecting agreements worth over $6 million: $3.5 for
investments and research expenses at INBio and $2.5 million for MINAE, the conservation
areas, and the universities.” Camacho et al. (2000) give a figure of $2,635,611 received by
INBio in the period 1991-1997, of which 30 per cent was distributed to SINAC, 29 per cent
to INBio’s research programme, 27 per cent to the public universities, and 14 per cent to
MINAE (Table 5.2). It appears that the total value of $2.6 million quoted by Camacho et al.
(2000) refers to the $2.5 million mentioned by Sittenfeld and Lovejoy (1999). However, it is
not clear how the $3.5 million destined for investments and research differs from the
$740,800 allocated to INBio’s research programme out of the remaining $2.5 million. If the
$3.5 million is added to the $740,800, the proportion of funds allocated to INBio’s
programme jumps from 29 per cent to 71 per cent of the total.
Table 5.2 Allocation of bioprospecting resources captured by INBio in the period 19911997
Institution

1991-1993*

MINAE
110,040
SINAC
86,102
Public Universities
460,409
INBIO
228,161
Total
884,712
Source: Adapted from Camacho et al. 2000

1994

1995

1996

1997

Total

43,400
203,135
126,006
92,830
465,371

66,670
153,555
46,962
118,292
385,479

51,092
192,035
31,265
172,591
446,983

95,196
126,243
34,694
129,008
385,141

366,398
761,070
699,336
740,882
2,567,686

INBio’s 2000 Annual Report indicates that for fiscal year 2000, only 15 per cent (equivalent
to 355 million colones) of the institution’s budget came from agreements with pharmaceutical
companies and research institutions. Over 66 percent of the budget for that year came from
bilateral donor agencies, foundations, and international aid agencies. Through its activities,
INBio was able to generate income to cover 18 per cent of its budget (INBio 2001). These
figures indicate that even though INBio is one of the most successful examples of income
generation through bioprospecting agreements, in the year 2000 these contracts provided only
a small percentage of the overall financial resources required to run the institution and its
programmes (see Figure 5.). The value of the resources is significant, though other sources
of income are much more important for the institution than bioprospecting contracts.
Camacho et al. (2000) have questioned whether INBio’s bioprospecting agreements should
be considered a form of PES. Instead they suggest that INBio’s pioneering work is part of
the groundwork that preceded and enabled the establishment of a national PES programme by
allowing access to biodiversity resources that have a commercial value (Camacho et al.
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2000). This coincides with a more general statement by Laird and ten Kate (2002), who say
that “while in most cases biodiversity prospecting payments per hectare of forest would prove
negligible… the direct and indirect benefits for conservation can be significant.” Similarly,
Sittenfeld et al. (1999) suggest that it is difficult to assign a value to the benefits of
bioprospecting “given the inherent complexities of assigning value to accumulated
knowledge of biodiversity, the transfer of know-how and technology, and enhanced capacity
building”.
However, in the same article Sittenfeld et al. (1999) suggest that even though the valuation of
benefits from INBio is difficult, and the samples processed have not reached the market place
to generate revenues from the sale of pharmaceuticals, “it is important to take into
consideration that the figure of over US$2.5 million for conservation and biotechnology
development is significant for a country the size of Costa Rica, with a GNP of only US$9
billion for 1997”. It is difficult to determine the significance of INBio’s contribution given
that much of the information about INBio is not available to the public and given the
difficulty in valuing non-tangible benefits. Whether US$2.5 million in a nine-year period is a
significant contribution to a country with a GNP of US$9 billion (in 1997) is totally
subjective. For example, the significance of $761,000 allocated to SINAC in a seven-year
period, which in 2000 had a budget of approximately $30 million (Estado de la Nación,
2001), is debatable. In this respect the financial resources received by MINAE and SINAC
are not significant. These conclusions are similar to a study carried out early on by Aylward
et al. (1993), who “examined the economic value of species information and its role in
biodiversity conservation and… found the sums negligible, and argued that as long as
demand for biotic samples remains low, the returns from pharmaceutical prospecting cannot
be expected to generate a market solution to the biodiversity crisis” (Laird and ten Kate,
2002). Nine years later the conclusions of Aylward (1993) remain valid.
Figure 5.1 INBio’s income and expenses during fiscal year 2000

Source: INBio Annual Report 2000.

Looking beyond the economic aspects of the INBio case, the institutional aspects of the
development of INBio are of interest. Chapela (1997) analyzed the INBio process and
pointed out key institutional features that allowed for the success of this particular case:
“The signing of the INBio-Merck agreement was the culmination of years of preparation.
During that time, a presidential decree had to be produced to develop the institutional
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framework that enables INBio to operate at times as a governmental agency and at times
as a private enterprise. A ministerial-level commission was created to give legality and
rationale to INBio's operation as a national project. First-rate scientists were enrolled to
provide credibility and functionality to INBio. This institutional framework worked in
conjunction with the vast international network of connections between politicians,
scientists and citizens with an interest in Costa Rica. In other words, the transaction costs
necessary to enable the signing of the Merck-INBio agreement were extremely high, and
extended over a long period of time.”
There is no doubt that INBio can be considered a success story in many ways. The institution
has been a leader in the field of bioprospecting for ten years, its programmes have grown, and
it is now able to generate revenue to cover a portion of its annual budget. Benefits such as
the taxonomic inventory for Costa Rica are considerable, and far more advanced than most
tropical developing countries. INBio, working with other local institutions, has described on
average 104 new species per year since 1989, and in 2000 alone described 331 new species,
of which 279 are endemic (Estado de la Nación 2001). However the fundamental question
that must be asked in light of this analysis is whether INBio is a case of a market that pays for
the environmental services of forests. The information available in the literature indicates
that this function is relatively limited.
5.1.2 Site entrance fees
Data on site visits and entrance fees is maintained by MINAE, but little in the way of formal
monitoring or evaluation of this experience or “experiment” was conducted by the
authorities. However, in an econometric analysis of the rise and fall in park visits that
accompanied the price hike in 1994, Lindberg and Aylward (1999) confirm that demand for
park visits was relatively inelastic. In other words, the decline in number of visits was
moderate when compared to the level to which the price was raised. All of which suggests
that the parks could have raised significantly more money by keeping the fees higher rather
than lowering them.
Table 5.3 Expected visits and revenue under different pricing scenarios in Poás, Irazú
and Manuel Antonio National Parks
Expected Foreign Visits
Price

Expected Revenue

Poás

Irazú

M.A.

1

6,900

3,900

7,400

83,000

47,000

88,000

5

6,500

2,900

5,600

389,000

175,000

336,000

10

6,300

2,500

4,800

756,000

299,000

581,000

15

6,200

2,200

4,400

1,115,000

405,000

792,000

20

6,100

2,100

4,100

1,468,000

498,000

981,000

1,032,000

358,000

704,000

Gain in increasing fees from $1 to $15

Poás

Irazú

M.A.

Source: Lindberg and Aylward (1999)

There is a series of additional impacts of raising fees that must be incorporated into any
evaluation of such action. First and foremost is the issue of access and equity. Fees for
resident visitors were left unchanged. This reflects the feeling that parks are national
patrimony and that access should not be regulated by prices. Of course, this is a largely
illusory argument given that the travel costs of visiting a protected area are often excessive
for many developing country residents. However, it remains a politically powerful argument
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to dissuade policy-makers from raising fees for locals. At $15 per person and with little in
the way of discounts, certain groups of foreigners such as backpackers and families would
probably alter their itinerary and visit fewer parks based on their ability to pay.
Aylward et al. (1996) also suggest that the policy will not necessarily fulfil another of its
stated objectives, that of increasing the profitability of private reserves. Falls in visits were
observed at the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve in 1994-95 when it might otherwise have
been expected that visitors would actually visit the reserve more, given the higher fees in the
state-run parks. But this effect may have as much to do with substitution outside of Costa
Rica as between the national parks and private reserves. Thus, changes in pricing policy at
the national level may need to take into account not simply the microeconomic argument for
extracting fees from tourists for reinvestment in the parks, but also subsequent economic
impacts on a country’s ability to maintain its competitiveness as an ecotourism destination.
It is unfortunate that the rather crude and drastic change in the pricing policy for the national
parks failed to take account of the history of pricing policy and fee structure management at
the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve, where a series of differentiated, but graduated fees
had been implemented over a number of years prior to the hike in park entrances fees in
1994. While some suggest that the end result was worth the turmoil and confusion – i.e. that
a $6 fee is in itself a significant achievement in terms of differentiating fees – this view is not
shared by everybody. If the eventual objective of good governance is a reasoned, balanced
and participatory approach to policy-making then the Costa Rican experience was not a
positive one. The fact that prices have not shifted since 1996 is an indication that the
momentum that might have been generated by gradually raising prices has been lost. Despite
the evidence that much-needed finance for biodiversity conservation could be generated in
this way, too much political capital was lost for this route to be tried again.
5.2

Carbon

There is a series of reports that are required as part of the deals in which carbon credits are
traded. These include monitoring and evaluation of commitments, as well as reporting to the
international trading institutions. However no independent empirical evaluations of the
overall market experiences with carbon in Costa Rica were found in the literature. Most
documents on the topic are descriptive presentations of specific carbon schemes or technical
documents such as methodologies to quantify carbon content. Documents such as those used
to report progress of projects to the UNFCCC mention the status of individual projects, but
do not assess their effectiveness.
A review of Costa Rica’s experience with carbon would be very opportune, given that it was
one of the first developing countries to enter into schemes for trading carbon offsets. An
analysis of expected versus received benefits from carbon deals would shed light on the
success of the first set of transactions. In the energy field, for example, the fact that there
were no international buyers for carbon offsets has affected the expected rate of return of one
wind power project (Gallegos 2001). It would be interesting to ascertain whether that has
also happened in the case of forestry projects. Another important aspect that an evaluation
could clarify is the impact that the failure to approve the Kyoto Protocol within the expected
timeline has had on the Costa Rican projects. Many of the expectations for carbon deals were
centred around the commitments imposed on developed countries, however, without Kyoto
many companies have lost the incentive to purchase carbon offsets. This could be reversed
through the Clean Development Mechanism, but it is still too early to judge.
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5.3

Hydrological services

No formal evaluations of the hydrological component of payments for environmental services
have been conducted. In many cases, even the hydrological data necessary to perform an expost evaluation is not being monitored due to the cost of installing the necessary equipment.
The issue is not being ignored, however. FONAFIFO organized a seminar in May 2002 that
examined these issues and served as the closest to an evaluation of hydrological services yet
undertaken in the country. The proceedings of the seminar and the discussions that took
place are thus instructive. The seminar focused on the hydrological services that forests
provide, and the implications these have for the PES scheme. Presentations by Rojas (2002),
Calvo (2002), and Fallas (2002) all analyzed and questioned some of the perceptions that
exist in Costa Rica about the relationship between forests and the hydrological services they
provide. Rojas (2002) indicated that hydropower projects currently paying for the watershed
services of forests do not know if in return for their payment they are getting more or less
water, or water of a different quality. The only indicator used for the effectiveness of the
payment for watershed services is the change in forest cover in the specified watershed. In
Costa Rica it is widely assumed that forests are the best possible land use for hydrological
services and therefore forest cover is used as an indirect means of verification.
Tattenbach (2002) presented data that shows a reduced rate of deforestation in watersheds
that receive PES. However, he failed to provide data that quantifies how a reduced rate of
land use change from forests to something else translates into hydrological services for
hydropower projects. Calvo (2002) summarized the results from the international literature
on this topic, and clearly stated that some perceptions in Costa Rica contradict the scientific
evidence for other tropical countries. An international review of the hydrological literature
and the implications it has for environmental services (Bruijnzeel 2002) is likely to shed more
light on this debated topic. Fallas (2002) presented an analysis of evidence gathered from the
Costa Rican context, and demonstrated that there is a high degree of uncertainty, which is
complicated by the data sources available in the country.
Overall, presentations in the FONAFIFO seminar questioned the assumption that forests and
timber plantations are by default the optimal land use for water users and therefore that
forests do in fact provide the benefits claimed by the PES proponents. Presenters concluded
that there would be variations on what services are or are not provided, depending on what
the water is used for and the specific conditions of each watershed. This echoes the
conclusions drawn by Pagiola (2003) in an independent review.
Symptomatic of this problem, Rojas and Aylward (2002) mention the lack of evidence to
justify the PES scheme with regard to the hydrological services of forests in a review of a
specific case where a hydropower project is paying for forest conservation upstream. In that
particular case, the evaluation indicated that the agreement is based on assumptions and is
solely the result of negotiations between two parties, basically centred on how much one part
is willing to pay and the other willing to receive. The general feedback at the FONAFIFO
seminar indicated that due to the lack of information it is important to have a precautionary
approach to changes in land use in watersheds (Fallas 2002; Rojas 2002). However, there
were also presenters who argued against the international literature as valid evidence for the
local context, and emphasized that the assumed environmental services do exist (Segura
2002).
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FONAFIFO and MINAE are currently placing a high importance on the hydrological services
of forests (Solorzano 2002; Rodriguez 2002). It is thus advisable to initiate an evaluation of
what the data for Costa Rica shows. Unfortunately, much of the hydrological information has
been collected by ICE, and is not freely accessible by the general public. One alternative
would be to commission a joint analysis of the hydrology-forest relationship with ICE,
MINAE, other local experts and international reviewers.
5.4

Bundled services

Of the initiatives for PES that include a bundle of environmental services, monitoring and
evaluation are available only for the FONAFIFO scheme. Most local initiatives have not
even been documented and the land easements programme has not been reviewed.
Since FONAFIFO does not have field staff, it delegates the responsibility for permanent
monitoring of projects to professional foresters. These foresters are accredited professionals
whose reports are legally binding. They work for the forest owners, but legally they are
expected to be impartial evaluators of forest management practices. Foresters must submit
reports to FONAFIFO at least once a year. In addition to the work done by foresters,
FONAFIFO also subcontracts periodical monitoring of land cover using GIS, through which
they determine if there has been any loss in forest cover in areas receiving PES (Ansmann
2001). Finally, FONAFIFO carries out periodic external evaluations and audits, including a
bi-annual technical review of its PES programme (Ansmann 2001). As of 2002, FONAFIFO
had contracted two external evaluations of its PES programme, one in 1999 (CECADE 1999)
and the most recent one in 2001. These are, however, fairly narrow audits, focused on the
direct performance of the programme in terms of expenditure and lands incorporated into the
programme.
Achievements during the period 1997-2000 are indicated in Table 5.4. A total of 256,520 ha
were entered into the PES scheme, a majority (85 per cent) under the forest conservation
modality. The PES programme has benefited 3,978 beneficiaries.
Table 5.4 Land incorporated into the PES scheme 1997-2000

Year

Forest
Conservation
(hectares)

Forest
Management
(hectares)

Reforestation/
Plantations
(hectares)

Total
(hectares)

No. of
Beneficiaries

1997

88,830

9,325

4,629

102,784

1,531

1998

47,804

7,620

4,492

59,916

1,021

1999

55,776

5,125

3,880

64,781

925

2000

26,583

-

2,457

29,040

501

Total

218,993

22,070

15,458

256,520

3,978

Source: Estado de la Nación (2001)

According to the Costa Rican Chamber of Forestry, most of the private primary forest in
Costa Rica is held in properties between 20 and 150 ha in size (Camacho et al. 2000). During
the period 1997-2000, more than 80 per cent of the PES contracts were directed to parcels of
under 80 hectares in size (Estado de la Nación 2001). As a reference for scale, FONAFIFO
considers as small producers to be those with a parcel of land of 1-50 ha in area, while
medium sized producers are those with properties of 50-300 ha in area.
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The limitations of the programme can be summarized as relating to their conservation rather
than service-specific nature and the single, centralized approach to the establishment of
payment levels. Given the variations in soil and forest type, local land uses, downstream
infrastructure, and socioeconomic conditions, it would clearly be more efficient not to
package all four services into a single payment which obscures the variation in individual
service levels across the country and the potential variations and tradeoffs between the
different services. With regard to carbon offsets it would be particularly interesting to assess
the possibilities for developing internal, national marketable permit systems as these have
clear advantages over conservation transfer payment schemes.
An interesting question is whether there might not be better institutional arrangements and
financial mechanisms for fulfilling the central role of providing for financial transfers to these
smallholders. In the Costa Rican case, existing legislation complicates the issue as the new
Forestry Law effectively expropriated land use rights on private land by forbidding any
change in land use on lands with forest cover. As a result the PES are frequently regarded as
a compensatory payment for this expropriation rather than an incentive or compensation per
se.
In addition to the internal efforts at monitoring and evaluation, there have been three
independent reviews of the PES programme. A very early summary and review by Chomitz
et al. (1998) for the World Bank aimed primarily to draw lessons and generate
recommendations for the programme. The authors emphasized the importance of improving
the cost efficiency of the programme with respect to price setting and prioritization by using a
spatial approach to supply price and environmental services. Two later efforts by Camacho
et al. (2000) and Camacho et al. (2001) to compile existing information on PES included an
emphasis on participation and social impacts. These efforts have since sparked off initiatives
on behalf of a number of local and international organizations in conducting empirical field
studies aimed at assessing the environmental and social impacts of the PES programmes.
5.5
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6 Conclusion: lessons, findings and analysis
6.1

The current conceptual framework: is it too narrow, and skewed towards forests?

•

The focus of PES is mainly on forests, but what about other ecosystems? There are
several benefits and services provided by ecosystems other than forests, such as wetlands.
If there is a market for the services of forests, should there be a market for the services
provided by other ecosystems? The focus in Costa Rica has been on forests probably
because the PES scheme represents an evolution from previous incentives to the forestry
sector. Other institutional and market examples do include non-forest ecosystems, such as
INBio and ecotourism. For example, INBio carries out bioprospecting on species that
inhabit wetland, aquatic, and marine ecosystems. But the bottom line is that if the goal of
the PES system is to internalize the costs of beneficial externalities of ecosystems, then the
system will need to evolve to incorporate non-forest ecosystems.

•

The focus of Law No.7575 is only on four environmental services, but what about the
rest? There are other services provided by forests, such as flood mitigation, erosion
control, storm protection (particularly mangrove forests), provision of nutrients for
downstream ecosystems (i.e. fisheries), pollination of crops, pest control, etc. Some of
these are implicitly included in the four services recognized in Costa Rica, such as erosion
in hydrological services and pollination in biodiversity. But some are not included at all.
Whether or not additional services should be considered will depend on the context.
However, if all services are considered, it is more likely that a buyer of the services will be
found. This would maximize the opportunity of obtaining economic compensation for
conserving ecosystems even if not all services can be sold in every case.

•

Ecological functions and services are not exclusive to natural ecosystems. This is
implicitly recognized when timber plantations are included in Costa Rica’s forestry law as
providers of environmental services. For example, a citrus orchard or coffee plantation
contributes to carbon sequestration, albeit with lower volumes than a fast growing timber
tree species. Should citrus and coffee farmers be paid for the environmental services their
crops provide? Once the thin line between natural ecosystems and other land uses is
crossed the justification for payments becomes more complicated. An extreme scenario
would be where a homeowner requests economic compensation for some trees on his or
her backyard! Therefore, there may be a need to maintain the distinction between natural
ecosystems and other land uses. This does not mean, however, that other land uses cannot
be promoted for the benefits they provide. They may still be preferred to the alternative
when both productive and environmental benefits are considered. Depending on the
objectives, a mixture of strategies and land uses might be the best alternative, which may
or may not include PES mechanisms.
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6.2

Does the PES scheme really offer a new concept or is it simply a repackaged
subsidy?

•

The PES concept in Costa Rica emerged because of the increasing need to find
sustainable sources of funding for forest conservation and forestry sector activities. This
dual goal is the result of the development of two separate but parallel trends in Costa Rica
over the last thirty years: the creation of the protected areas system with its associated
conservation approach, and the creation of a subsidized forestry sector. It also forms part
of the development of financing mechanisms for conservation activities. Therefore, it
would appear that for forest conservation, the PES is in fact an innovative new marketbased approach. However, making payments for environmental services to commercial
timber plantations only seems to be a continuation of the subsidy scheme to the forestry
sector.

•

Law 7575 prohibited changing land use in areas of natural forests, and the penalty for this
was imprisonment. One could then ask, why give an economic incentive to prevent
landowners from breaking the law? One argument is that the PES scheme can be viewed
as an alternative to ease the transition process from incentives to clear forests to a regime
that prohibits deforestation. A law cannot achieve such a drastic change in a short time.
Strong enforcement would have been necessary to make the transition - something that
would have had a very high economic cost for the government. Therefore, it is feasible to
view the PES scheme as an economic incentive to ease the transition. The big challenge,
however, is that if the PES is to be a transitional incentive until the new law can fully be
enforced, then it must end at some point.

•

There has been no evaluation or study that examines the distinction (if any) between the
current PES scheme and the previous subsidy system to the forestry sector. As noted in
this paper, the amounts of the payments closely resemble those offered as part of the
earlier incentives schemes. This supports the contention that the PES was a means to
justify the continuation of subsidies to the forestry sector by capturing external funds from
climate change and bioprospecting activities. In fact, the justification for the PES scheme
was to internalize the costs of the services provided by forests on private lands. While
payments and subsidies are different concepts, it is possible that this was not recognized
by those involved in the process. This does not mean that the concepts are the same, even
if conceptual confusion led to the establishment of similar amounts for the same result.

•

How will the Government finance the conservation of forests in areas that do not have
any major users of environmental services? This is very important, particularly for remote
and rural areas that might have high conservation values. It is important to remember that
the PES scheme is a tool that is to be combined with many other tools in order to reach a
single goal: conservation of forests and biodiversity. PES is but one alternative
mechanism to finance conservation. There must be complementary alternatives for public
conservation areas. PES does not necessarily replace the need for command and control
measures.
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6.3

INBio’s success story with bioprospecting: is it a replicable model?

•

Even though the example of INBio is viewed as an ideal case for bioprospecting it is not
really suitable as a general model. Conditions within Costa Rica at the time of its
development were very specific and favoured INBio’s success. As recognized by Aventis,
an important pharmaceutical company16: “even before INBio, nature conservation was
held in high regard throughout the country. Furthermore, there is no argument about who
receives the share of the profits. In Costa Rica there are no indigenous peoples whose
knowledge INBio might expropriate. This means that here, unlike many other places,
consideration does not have to be given to the question of who should benefit from any
profits among the indigenous population that brought a given plant to a researcher’s
attention.” This is also supported by Onaga (2001), who states that: “INBio already had a
high level of understanding of its biological resources and a stable country infrastructure
when Merck began to set up its scientific programme in Costa Rica. It is, unfortunately, a
situation that doesn’t exist in most countries… Indeed, the Merck-INBio agreement raised
the expectations of immediate benefits in many developing countries unrealistically…”.
The main lesson is that not all the successful experiences are easily replicable, and new
innovations will still be required to promote conservation in different contexts.

•

An aspect that forms part of the appeal of bioprospecting schemes is the sharing of
revenues from the sale of ‘blockbuster’ drugs. However, as Onaga (2001) indicates: “So
far… the Merck-INBio agreement… has [not] produced any major revenue-producing
drug that benefits both the pharmaceutical industry and the environment. Scale remains a
major obstacle. The chance of a successful hit is one in 10,000 for synthetic compounds,
while the rate for natural products is as low as one in 30,000 or 40,000. In addition,
difficulties in purifying extracts and the low number of non-microbial specimens pose
major obstacles, and drugs can take ten, even 20 years to pass clinical trials.” This
situation could be due to the short time frame between the first signed agreements and
today, and is likely to change in the future. However, this also means that “… it has
become clear that the illusion of easy gains is gone… But to say that the deals between big
pharmaceutical companies and poor countries have not worked is unfair… because the
total number of natural samples that have been tested so far is less than the calculated
sample volume needed to get a ‘hit’.” (Onaga, 2001). What can be learned from the flow
of revenues expected by INBio is that sustainability requires short- and long-term sources
of funding. Because the business of drug development takes a long time, bioprospecting
contracts need to be considered carefully and with a long-term horizon. Moreover, it is
important to include a variety of clauses into bioprospecting contracts, as INBio has done,
in order to ensure some short-term flows of capital.

•

There has been a great deal of hype surrounding the INBio case, and key aspects and
constraints are not always explicitly mentioned. As Vogel (1996) stated: “Bioprospecting
has received disproportionate attention in the popular press as a means to finance habitat
preservation. Of the six values that can generate revenues in the short-run, bioprospecting
occupies the last place. One predicts low returns for a fairly simple reason: many of the
chemicals of interest to biotechnology firms do not exist in one country or even in one
species but are diffused across both countries and species. This economic prediction has
been confirmed by experience. A price war is emerging among supplying countries as
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each offers its biological diversity at lower and lower prices: royalties in some contracts
have been reported as low as 0.2%.” Another aspect “seldom mentioned in the press
coverage is the fact that most of the biological diversity of Costa Rica is not endemic to
Costa Rica” (Vogel, 1996). This is important because since “secondary compounds are
diffused across international boundaries and taxa, a bioprospecting institution such as
INBio is granting access not just to the biological diversity of the home country… but also
to the biological diversity of the entire region” (Vogel, 1996). These concepts are “key to
understanding why INBio or any other successful institution cannot be viewed as a model
to replicate in the quest to internalize the value of biological diversity for bioprospecting”
(Vogel, 1996).
•

As with the PES scheme in Costa Rica, “… the economic impact of bioprospecting
should not be overestimated. Bioprospecting can only complement other activities
designed to advance human development and therefore cannot solve conservation and
development issues in and by itself. It is an instrument that, complemented by science and
technology, can work together with other tools to improve national capacities, support
economic growth and generate financial income to conservation activities” (Sittenfeld and
Lovejoy 1999).

6.4

Were carbon offsets over-promoted or is it still a matter of time?

•

There has been no review of what happened to the carbon projects developed in Costa
Rica, but it is clear that carbon has not delivered the benefits expected by the potential
beneficiaries. The central question is: is this the result of delays in international
negotiations about the Kyoto Protocol or is it because of the local context? For fairness
sake it must be clarified that the projects developed in Costa Rica under AIJ were not
really market transactions, but instead part of a pilot phase to develop experience. In this
regard, the scheme was very successful in developing local experience in carbon projects.
It is clear that they were not market transactions as most of the money that came in during
that phase was in the form of donations. At the time “the Costa Rican Office for Joint
Implementation (OCIC) believes that JI is the most important potential financing
instrument for environmental services. A functioning administrative structure is already in
place, it has enormous funding potential, and it involves financially strong international
beneficiaries. However, the future of JI is uncertain” (de Camino et al. 2000). This clearly
shows that even though the local context was ready, several internal changes were made,
and an efficient local institutional framework was developed, uncertainty was crystallized
due to the delays in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, it is evident that the
constraints that the carbon projects have faced are the result of an international process
that is beyond the control of Costa Rica. Assuming that the Kyoto process moves
forwards, and restrictions in developed countries create a market for carbon offset
projects, it could well be a matter of time before the Costa Rican projects receive
economic compensation for the services they provide.

•

The AIJ carbon projects in Costa Rica were developed before there were buyers. The
objective at the time was to develop an institutional framework and gather experience.
That is why it was a pilot phase. There is already evidence that this is changing. An
example of this change is the package of projects OCIC is negotiating with the Prototype
Carbon Fund of the World Bank, where projects are being developed after the buyer for
the carbon credits is identified. A similar situation is taking place in the negotiations
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underway with the Dutch Government through Carboncredits.nl, though all projects in the
pipeline are in the energy sector.
6.5

Watershed protection: are downstream users getting what they pay for?

•

There are a handful of hydropower producers that are making payments for
environmental services. However, they do not know if they are getting what they pay for.
Measuring the expected benefits would be prohibitively expensive for individual small
companies. Until now the payments of hydro producers have been voluntary, but there
have been proposals to make such payments mandatory. If there is uncertainty as to the
benefits that forests might provide to hydropower producers, then there should be more
caution in trying to "sell" the idea of PES or attempting to make it a mandatory payment.
By making it mandatory the purpose of market driven mechanisms is defeated. Given
Costa Rica's heavy reliance on hydropower, it could be worthwhile for the national utility
(ICE) to invest in applied practical research into this matter. Otherwise, companies
considering investing in PES should carefully weigh the pros and cons under the high
level of uncertainty that exists today.

•

Watershed management does not equal PES for watershed services. Although this sounds
like a very basic concept, both ideas appear to be confused in the literature. The concept
of a watershed is very narrowly believed to mean the upper catchments. This means that
other important environmental services and users of those services are seldom taken into
account. This is the case for nutrient removal by wetlands, navigation in lowland rivers,
and flood mitigation by floodplains. More important, water users who make payments
should not be exempt by simply making those payments. Land cover is simply one
component of ensuring a set of hydrological properties. Adequate watershed management
is likely to require investment additional to PES.

6.6

Is there really a market for environmental services?

•

The Government’s PES programme does not demonstrate the existence of a market for
environmental services since most of the funding comes from a fuel tax and not from a
free and willing transaction. It can even be argued that a majority of fuel buyers do not
relate their purchase with a payment for environmental mitigation. What the PES
programme does demonstrate is the possibilities of developing a programme of payments
for environmental services. In other words, it demonstrates a worked-out approach to
using market approaches to allocated funding for environmental services. In this regard,
the Costa Rican case, with its institutional development, is worthy of further study and
analysis. To date, little effort has been made to monitor and evaluate the programme. The
few studies that have been undertaken or are underway tend to focus on either traditional
project monitoring or on examining the distributional implications of the programme. In
other words, no study of the supposed intention, i.e. an efficient and low-cost allocation of
conservation monies, has been undertaken.

•

Supply far exceeds demand (only 25-33 per cent of demand for PES can be met). If it
was left to the market, the payments for environmental services are likely to be even lower
than current rates. This situation could lend itself to considering auctions for PES. By
auctioning to the lowest bidder, a higher area could be conserved. However, this might
not target the key priority areas, where a higher price might be required. The main point,
though, is that the system could allow for a variable price. The problem here is that
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management would be much more complicated. For simplicity sake, and to allow for a
system that works, it might be preferable to keep the existing fixed price. However, in the
future the "market", if there is such a thing, could evolve into a more complex array of
options to make deals that further promote the conservation of natural ecosystems.
6.7

Were PES developed based on sound information on the economic value of the
planned activities?

•

Costa Rica has been the subject of a multitude of studies examining the economic value
and costs associated with environmental services. In comparison with its neighboring
countries, Costa Rica has an abundance of such studies. How useful the studies are and
what impact they have had is variable. In many instances (bioprospecting and ecotourism)
the value of the activity was promoted and realized largely independently of economic
studies. Still, the studies have often provided political cover under which new initiatives
and projects can be launched. Thus, it is difficult to conclude precisely how instrumental
the valuation studies have been in decision-making. However, they have played a role in
advertising and promoting the larger concept of markets/payments for environmental
services.

•

Valuation studies undertaken locally have often served as much to confuse the truth as to
provide useful information. In the case of hydrological services, considerable confusion
and controversy remains over the exact linkage between the natural function and the
human, social and economic functions. Many valuation studies (bioprospecting and
hydrological services) have produced erroneous and wildly misleading figures thus adding
to the general confusion over environmental services.

102

